The Institutional Foundations of Cooperation and Trading
The Institutional Foundations of Cooperation and Trading
批准号:
0748881
负责人:
Samuel Bowles
金额:
$14.91万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2008
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2008-01-01 至 2012-12-31
中文摘要
圣达菲研究所(SFI)的合作与贸易的制度基础工作组是欧洲科学基金会欧洲核心合作与贸易演变项目(TECT)的一个组成部分,该项目探索合作的社会和心理动力(SOCCOP)。SFI小组试图解释群体层面的机构在早期人类合作和交易进化中的作用,并探索行为经济学和认知心理学的最新进展对改善公司,社区和国家合作和交易关系治理的影响。该项目使用进化博弈论和基于代理的模拟以及经验来源来模拟与合作和交易相关的群体层面制度和个人偏好的共同进化。其中的机构进行研究是生育水平和其他组内方差减少战略,出现和随后的动态的新系统的财产和社会经济等级,以及内部和外部的区别和频繁的组间冲突。该项目还开发了一个经济和公民动机相互作用的新模型,以探索我们物种合作性质的最新实验证据对设计更有效的公共政策和机构的影响。最后一个目标是促进SOCCOP项目和其他TECT项目的高级学者、学生和其他从事相关研究的人之间的网络联系。这项研究调查了位于生物学和人类社会和行为科学中一些最具活力的领域的交叉点的假设。根据《科学》杂志的编辑,人类合作的进化是当今科学界面临的25个最重要的问题之一。内生偏好、制度创新和持续性的重要性以及两者之间的关系在社会科学和行为科学中越来越受到重视。然而,部分原因在于将制度和个人进化结合起来的数学困难,以及需要将这些联合收割机与相关案例的经验知识结合起来,这些制度的动态在大多数进化模型中被忽视了。SFI研究团队已经在这种新颖的建模和相关的实证工作中建立了良好的记录。这项研究将产生更广泛的影响超出科学界,因为合作和公民动机的理解是必不可少的动员不同的个人朝着共同的目标,无论是在公司,社区,国家,或全球社区的任务。需要发展的一个关键思想是,如果公民和经济行为者完全是自利的,那么设计用于良好运作的制度通常不会是异质人口的最佳制度,其中相当多的人受到强烈的互惠动机,不平等厌恶,内部偏见或其他社会偏好以及自我利益的激励。对公共政策的应用范围从刑事判决的最佳威慑到促进遵守环境保护措施的政策。
英文摘要
The Santa Fe Institute (SFI) work group The Institutional Foundations of Cooperation and Trading is a component of the European Science Foundation Eurocores project on Evolution of Cooperation and Trading (TECT) exploring the Social and Mental Dynamics of Cooperation (SOCCOP). The SFI group seeks to explain the role of group-level institutions in the evolution of cooperation and trading among early humans and explore the implications of recent advances in behavioral economics and cognitive psychology for improving the governance of cooperative and trading relationships in firms, neighborhoods, and nations. This project uses evolutionary game theory and agent-based simulations as well as empirical sources to model the co-evolution of those group-level institutions and individual preferences associated with cooperation and trading. Among the institutions to be studied are reproductive leveling and other within-group variance-reduction strategies, the emergence and subsequent dynamics of novel systems of property and socio-economic hierarchy, as well as insider outsider distinctions and frequent intergroup conflict. This project also develops a novel model of the interplay of economic and civic motivations to explore the implications of recent experimental evidence of the cooperative nature of our species for the design of more effective public policies and institutions. A final objective is to facilitate networking of both senior scholars in the SOCCOP project and other TECT projects, students, and others engaged in related research. This study investigates hypotheses that are situated at the intersection of some of the most vibrant fields in biology and the human social and behavioral sciences. According to the editors of Science the evolution of cooperation among humans is one of the top 25 questions facing the scientific community today. The importance of endogenous preferences, institutional innovation and persistence, and the relationship among the two is increasingly recognized in the social and behavioral sciences. Yet in part due to the formidable mathematical difficulties of combining institutional and individual evolution and the need to combine these with empirical knowledge of the relevant cases, the dynamics of these institutions has been overlooked in most evolutionary models. The SFI research team has already established a strong track record in this novel kind of modeling and related empirical work. The study will have broader impacts beyond the scientific community because an understanding of cooperative and civic motives is essential to the task of mobilizing diverse individuals towards common ends, whether in firms, neighborhoods, nations, or global communities. A key idea to be developed is that institutions that are designed to work well if citizens and economic actors are entirely self-interested will not generally be the best institutions for a heterogeneous population in which significant numbers are motivated by strong reciprocity motives, inequality aversion, insider bias, or other social preferences, as well as by self-interest. Applications to public policy range from optimal deterrence in criminal sentencing to policies to promote compliance with environmental protection measures.
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会议论文
IBSS-Ex: Wealth, Wealth Inequality, and Marraige Systems
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批准号:1329089
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$24.92万
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财政年份:2013
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负责人:Samuel Bowles
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依托单位:
Network Structure, Political Hierarchy, and Economic Inequality: An Interdisciplinary Workshop and Training Program
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批准号:1258489
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$4.71万
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财政年份:2012
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负责人:Samuel Bowles
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依托单位:
海外基金