Supply Risk Management and Asymmetric Information

摘要该基金为博弈论模型的发展和分析提供资金，这些模型将明确地以供应风险的信息不对称为特征。这些模型将用于研究传统的风险管理政策和信息获取合同如何相互作用。将被纳入模型的传统风险管理工具是：制造商内部生产能力的开发；供应商对后备生产能力的投资；制造商采用多源和鲁棒网络设计；不交货的处罚；供应商筛选;采购授权。pi将引用契约和激励理论中的概念，如贝叶斯均衡、启示原则、共谋和决策授权，以推导出制造商的最优信息诱导契约。为了确定信息不对称对风险管理的影响，pi将通过分析和数值方法比较不对称和对称信息下的均衡结果。研究结果将被纳入密歇根大学的研究生和本科生课程。这个多学科的研究，位于操作，风险管理和信息经济学的接口，将解决有关弹性供应链的设计和管理及时和重要的问题。对于运营文献，本研究将提供一个框架，捕捉有关供应风险的信息不对称，并深入了解采购服务提供商的风险缓解作用。本研究将通过考虑存在信息不对称的分散决策系统来扩展企业风险管理文献的边界。这项研究将通过纳入供应中断的可能性来丰富经济学文献。这项研究的结果将有助于决策者更好地利用运营和风险管理工具来应对供应中断。该研究项目将促进行业研究人员、工程和商业学院之间的持续互动和合作，并将为未来的联合项目奠定基础。

AbstractThe grant provides funding for the development and analysis of game-theoretic models that will explicitly feature information asymmetry about supply risk. These models will be used to study how traditional risk-management policies and information-eliciting contracts interact. The traditional risk management tools that will be included in the models are: development of internal production capabilities by the manufacturer; investment in backup production capacity by suppliers; adoption of multisourcing and robust network design by the manufacturer; penalties for non-delivery; supplier screening; and procurement delegation. The PIs will invoke concepts from contracts and incentives theory, such as Bayesian equilibria, the revelation principle, collusion, and decision-delegation, to derive the manufacturer's optimal information-eliciting contracts. In order to identify the ramifications of information asymmetry on risk management, the PIs will compare equilibrium outcomes under asymmetric and symmetric information through both analytical and numerical means. The results of the research will be incorporated in the curriculum of graduate and undergraduate courses at the University of Michigan.This multi-disciplinary research, which lies at the interface of operations, risk management, and information economics, will address timely and important questions regarding design and management of resilient supply chains. To the operations literature this research will contribute a framework capturing information asymmetry about supply risk and insights on the risk-mitigating role of procurement service providers. This research will expand the boundaries of the enterprise risk management literature by considering decentralized decision systems in the presence of information asymmetry. This research will enrich the economics literature by including the possibility of supply disruptions. The results of this research will help decision makers to make better use of operational and risk-management tools to deal with supply disruptions. This research project will foster continued interactions and collaboration among industry researchers, engineering and business faculty, and will perpetuate infrastructure for future joint projects.