TC: Small: Enemies from Within: Thwarting Sophisticated Insider Attacks in Wireless Networks

TC：小：来自内部的敌人：阻止无线网络中复杂的内部攻击

• 批准号: 1016943
• 负责人: Loukas Lazos
• 金额: $ 49.95万
• 依托单位: University of Arizona
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2010
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2010-07-15 至 2014-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1016943&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: TC; Small; Enemies; Within; Thwarting

Wireless networks are inherently vulnerable to external and internal network attacks, due to the open nature of the wireless medium and the poor physical security of wireless devices. While external attacks can be neutralized through a combination of cryptography-based measures and robustness mechanisms, internal attacks, which are launched from compromised nodes, are much more sophisticated in nature. Insider adversaries exploit knowledge of network secrets (e.g., cryptographic keys and pseudo-random spreading codes) and protocol semantics to maximize their detrimental impact by selectively and adaptively targeting critical network functionalities. This project focuses on designing and evaluating secure protocols for thwarting sophisticated insider attacks of selective, adaptive, and cross-layer nature. A unified adversarial model is considered in which selective jamming and/or dropping of high-value packets (e.g., control information) is used as the primary vehicle for denying network service. Defending wireless networks under this model is particularly challenging, because the adversary remains active for short periods of time and may adapt/modify his strategies on the fly. The impact of insider attacks on critical network functions such as end-to-end reliable data delivery and routing is quantified via extensive experimentation and modeling. Novel protocols are developed which detect ongoing attacks and identify compromised nodes in a timely manner. Project results will reinforce the resilience of wireless networks to denial-of-service attacks launched by insiders. The proposed research is expected to have profound impacts on every wireless technology (e.g., WiFi, WSNs, MANETs, CRNs, Mesh, etc.), due to the generality of the addressed vulnerabilities.

由于无线介质的开放性和无线设备的物理安全性差，无线网络天生就容易受到外部和内部网络的攻击。虽然外部攻击可以通过基于加密的措施和健壮性机制的组合来中和，但从受危害的节点发起的内部攻击本质上要复杂得多。内部攻击者利用网络秘密(例如，密钥和伪随机扩频码)和协议语义的知识，通过选择性地和自适应地以关键网络功能为目标来最大化其有害影响。本项目的重点是设计和评估安全协议，以阻止具有选择性、自适应性和跨层性质的复杂内部攻击。考虑了一个统一的对抗模型，其中选择性地干扰和/或丢弃高价值分组(例如，控制信息)作为拒绝网络服务的主要工具。在这种模式下防御无线网络特别具有挑战性，因为对手在短时间内保持活跃，并可能在运行中调整/修改他的策略。通过广泛的实验和建模，量化了内部攻击对端到端可靠数据传输和路由等关键网络功能的影响。开发了新的协议来检测正在进行的攻击并及时识别受危害的节点。项目成果将增强无线网络抵御内部人士发起的拒绝服务攻击的能力。由于解决的漏洞具有普遍性，预计拟议的研究将对每一种无线技术(如WiFi、WSNs、MANET、CRN、Mesh等)产生深远影响。