TC: Small: Deployment Incentives for Secure Internet Routing

TC：小型：安全互联网路由的部署激励

• 批准号: 1017907
• 负责人: Sharon Goldberg
• 金额: $ 49万
• 依托单位: Trustees of Boston University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2010
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2010-08-01 至 2014-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1017907&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: TC; Small; Deployment; Incentives; Secure

Despite a decade of research, the problem of securing the Internet's interdomain routing system is far from solved. For a long time, it seemed there was a problem of technical feasibility; research focused on designing more and more lightweight protocols, by reducing computational or communication overheads, or considering weaker security guarantees. It has now become clear that the challenge of deploying these protocols is not one of technical feasibility, but one of incentives. The Internet is a complex, distributed system that is not controlled by any one entity, but instead has thousands of players with different economic incentives. The real challenge is to create incentives for these players to band together and deploy a secure routing protocol that will significantly improve the reliability and security of the Internet.To address this challenge, this project develops: (a) Metrics for measuring the utility of different network security protocols, (b) Algorithms that identify a target set of Autonomous Systems (ASes) in the Internet that should be initially convinced or incentivized to adopt the new security protocols, so that the rest of the Internet has the incentive to follow suit, (c) Guidelines for using secure routing protocols when they are partially deployed in the Internet, (d) Models for evaluating improvements in security as ASes gradually deploy the protocol. The approaches in this project combine domain knowledge and validation on real network data, with problem formulations inspired by emerging ideas from cryptography, game theory, and the literature on social networks.

尽管经过十年的研究，互联网域间路由系统的安全问题远未解决。很长一段时间以来，似乎存在技术可行性的问题;研究集中在设计越来越多的轻量级协议，通过减少计算或通信开销，或考虑较弱的安全保证。 现在已经很清楚，部署这些协议的挑战不是技术可行性，而是激励措施。 互联网是一个复杂的分布式系统，不受任何一个实体的控制，而是有成千上万的玩家，他们有不同的经济动机。 真实的挑战是激励这些参与者联合起来，部署一个安全的路由协议，这将大大提高互联网的可靠性和安全性。为了应对这一挑战，本项目开发：（a）用于测量不同网络安全协议的效用的测试，（B）识别因特网中的目标自治系统（AS）集合的算法，所述目标自治系统（AS）最初应当被说服或激励以采用新的安全协议，以便因特网的其余部分有动机效仿，（c）当安全路由协议部分部署在因特网中时使用安全路由协议的指南，（d）当AS逐渐部署协议时用于评估安全性改进的模型。 该项目中的方法结合了联合收割机领域知识和对真实的网络数据的验证，以及受到密码学、博弈论和社交网络文献中新兴思想启发的问题公式。