TC: Small: Collaborative Research: Exploration and Validation of Hardware Primitives for Security and Trust

对许多基于微电子的社会基础设施，例如交通、能源等，硬件级别的安全和信任是不够的。本项目研究芯片级硬件原语，旨在提高此类系统的安全性和可信性。具体地说，许多安全机制依赖于与系统中的芯片或板相关联的秘密、唯一的标识符。制造商插入的嵌入数字签名是不安全的，因为它可能被攻击者提取。物理不可克隆功能(PUF)是为每个芯片提供一整套安全、唯一的标识符的最新方法。PUF是芯片级原语，它利用工艺技术的内在和随机制造变化。测量芯片电网中的电阻变化的PUF被作为硬件原语进行研究，以提供安全、唯一的标识符。同样，集成电路信任关系到人们对制造的芯片实例只实现原始规范中描述的那些功能的置信度--没有更多也没有更少。鉴于该行业将芯片制造过程传播到许多组织的趋势，对手秘密改变芯片功能的机会越来越多。“信任但核实”可能是应对这一威胁的唯一方法。为了支持这一验证过程，研究了一组硬件原语，这些原语被设计为测量芯片的参数、模拟特性，作为检测可能已被对手插入的任何恶意逻辑的手段。使用采用先进技术的芯片对PUF和硬件木马检测方法进行了实验验证。

Hardware-level security and trust in many of society's microelectronic-based infrastructures, e.g., transportation, energy, etc., is inadequate. This project investigates chip-level hardware primitives that are designed to improve the security and trust in such systems. In particular, many security mechanisms depend on a secret, unique identifier that is associated with the chip or board in the system. An embedded digital signature inserted by the manufacturer is not secure because it can be extracted by adversaries. A physical unclonable function (PUF) is a recent approach for providing an entire set of secure, unique identifiers for each chip. PUFs are chip-level primitives that leverage the intrinsic and random manufacturing variations of the process technology. A PUF that measures the resistance variations in the chip's power grid is investigated as a hardware primitive for providing secure, unique identifiers. Similarly, integrated circuit trust relates to the degree of confidence one has that a fabricated instance of a chip implements only those functions described in the original specification -- nothing more and nothing less. There are increasing opportunities for adversaries to secretly change a chip's function given the trend of the industry to disseminate the chip fabrication process over many organizations. "Trust but verify" is likely the only approach to dealing with this threat. To support this verification process, a set of hardware primitives are investigated that are designed to measure the parametric, analog characteristics of chip as a means of detecting any malicious logic that might have been inserted by an adversary. A chip built in an advanced technology is used to experimentally validate the PUF and hardware Trojan detection methods.