Two Projects on Market Design

两个市场设计项目

• 批准号: 1023818
• 负责人: Yeon-Koo Che
• 金额: $ 30.18万
• 依托单位: Columbia University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2010
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2010-10-01 至 2016-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1023818&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Two; Projects; Market; Design

This award funds research in two different areas of economic theory. The first project develops a new method for understanding an important problem in mechanism design: how to assign an indivisible object to one person when several different people would benefit from owning or using the object. The research generalizes an existing theorem for implementing random assignments; the new generalized theorem applies to a broad range of circumstances and various practically important constraints. The research identifies a condition on the constraint structure that is sufficient for implementation, and develop a computable algorithm for implementation. The research also establishes the condition to be maximally sufficient in two-sided matching. Applications of the theory include improving the ex post fairness of assignment mechanisms, adapting existing mechanisms to be more broadly applicable, and developing new mechanisms. Finally, the research establishes the welfare, fairness, and incentive properties of these mechanisms.The second project examines behavior in a generalized second price auction (GSP), which is now the industry standard used to conduct auctions for internet search advertising. The goal is to understand rich, dynamic interactions among bidders using a lab experiment. Finally, the researchers compare the GSP method with alternative auction formats based on per-impression bids and analyze a broader class of auction mechanisms.Random assignment of indivisible goods comprises an important class of real-world problems such as assigning children to public schools, low-income housing, offices, tasks, and queuing for services. The theory and the computable algorithm developed here enhance the real world applicability of this class of mechanisms. Understanding the effects of alternative ways to conduct interent search auctions will benefit providers, purchasers, and policymakers who consider the degree of competition in this increasingly important industry.

该奖项资助经济理论两个不同领域的研究。 第一个项目开发了一种新的方法来理解机制设计中的一个重要问题：如何将一个不可分割的对象分配给一个人，而几个不同的人将从拥有或使用该对象中受益。 该研究推广了现有的定理实现随机分配，新的广义定理适用于广泛的情况和各种实际重要的约束。 该研究确定了一个条件的约束结构，这是充分的实施，并开发一个可计算的算法实现。 研究还建立了双边匹配的最大充分条件。该理论的应用包括改善分配机制的事后公平性，使现有机制适用范围更广，以及开发新的机制。 最后，研究建立了福利，公平性和激励属性，这些机制。第二个项目检查行为在一个广义的第二价格拍卖（GSP），这是现在的行业标准，用于进行拍卖的互联网搜索广告。 我们的目标是通过实验室实验来了解投标人之间丰富的动态互动。 最后，研究人员将GSP方法与基于每次展示出价的其他拍卖形式进行了比较，并分析了更广泛的拍卖机制。不可分割商品的随机分配包括一类重要的现实问题，例如将孩子分配到公立学校，低收入住房，办公室，任务和排队等待服务。 理论和可计算的算法在这里开发的提高真实的世界的适用性，这类机制。 了解替代方式进行互联网搜索拍卖的影响将有利于供应商，购买者和决策者谁考虑在这个日益重要的行业的竞争程度。