Two Projects on Market Design

该奖项为两个不同经济理论领域的研究提供资金。第一个项目开发了一种新的方法来理解机制设计中的一个重要问题：当几个不同的人将从拥有或使用该对象中受益时，如何将一个不可分割的对象分配给一个人。这项研究推广了一个实现随机分配的现有定理；新的广义定理适用于广泛的情况和各种实际重要的约束条件。研究确定了满足实施条件的约束结构条件，并开发了可计算的实施算法。研究还建立了双边匹配的最大充分条件。该理论的应用包括提高分配机制的事后公平性，调整现有机制以使其更广泛地适用，以及开发新的机制。最后，研究建立了这些机制的福利、公平和激励属性。第二个项目考察了广义二次价格拍卖(GSP)中的行为，GSP现在是用于进行互联网搜索广告拍卖的行业标准。其目标是通过实验室实验了解投标者之间丰富、动态的互动。最后，研究人员将GSP方法与基于每个印象出价的其他拍卖形式进行了比较，并分析了更广泛的拍卖机制。不可分商品的随机分配包括一类重要的现实世界问题，如分配孩子到公立学校、低收入住房、办公室、任务和服务排队。本文开发的理论和可计算算法增强了这类机构在现实世界中的适用性。了解进行网上搜索拍卖的替代方式的影响，将使考虑到这个日益重要的行业的竞争程度的供应商、买家和政策制定者受益。

This award funds research in two different areas of economic theory. The first project develops a new method for understanding an important problem in mechanism design: how to assign an indivisible object to one person when several different people would benefit from owning or using the object. The research generalizes an existing theorem for implementing random assignments; the new generalized theorem applies to a broad range of circumstances and various practically important constraints. The research identifies a condition on the constraint structure that is sufficient for implementation, and develop a computable algorithm for implementation. The research also establishes the condition to be maximally sufficient in two-sided matching. Applications of the theory include improving the ex post fairness of assignment mechanisms, adapting existing mechanisms to be more broadly applicable, and developing new mechanisms. Finally, the research establishes the welfare, fairness, and incentive properties of these mechanisms.The second project examines behavior in a generalized second price auction (GSP), which is now the industry standard used to conduct auctions for internet search advertising. The goal is to understand rich, dynamic interactions among bidders using a lab experiment. Finally, the researchers compare the GSP method with alternative auction formats based on per-impression bids and analyze a broader class of auction mechanisms.Random assignment of indivisible goods comprises an important class of real-world problems such as assigning children to public schools, low-income housing, offices, tasks, and queuing for services. The theory and the computable algorithm developed here enhance the real world applicability of this class of mechanisms. Understanding the effects of alternative ways to conduct interent search auctions will benefit providers, purchasers, and policymakers who consider the degree of competition in this increasingly important industry.