Selling to Financially-Constrained Buyers

出售给经济拮据的买家

• 批准号: 9423649
• 负责人: Yeon-Koo Che
• 金额: $ 4.92万
• 依托单位: University of Wisconsin-Madison
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1995
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1995-07-01 至 1998-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9423649&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Selling; Financially; Constrained; Buyers

SBR-9423649 Yeon-Koo Che One of the great success stories of the application of game theory to economics has been in the analysis and design of auctions. This has been highlighted by the recent federal auctions of licenses for the use of parts of the radio spectrum. Although auction theorists have succeeded in making their models more and more realistic, they have so far ignored the financial constraints of the bidders. This project will begin to redress this by evaluating the effect of financial constraints on bidding behavior when such constraints are not public information, but rather carefully guarded secrets. The investigator has already determined that under many common auction rules the good being auctioned off is not necessarily sold to the bidder who values it the most. Furthermore, the presence of financial constraints favors the use of lotteries and tends to favor the all-pay auction over the first-price sealed-bid auction. The research will be conducted in three parts. Part 1 considers the standard monopoly model in which a single seller sells a homogenous good to a continuum of sellers. In Part 2, the investigator looks at the auction of a single good to many potential buyers. Part 3 examines the desirability of low-interest, seller-provided financing. Other promising avenues of research are: joint bidding, mergers, and the design of privatization and bankruptcy policies.

SBR-9423649 Yeon-Koo Che 将博弈论应用于经济学的一个伟大的成功故事是在拍卖的分析和设计中。 最近联邦拍卖使用部分无线电频谱的许可证突出了这一点。 尽管拍卖理论家们已经成功地使他们的模型变得越来越现实，但到目前为止，他们忽略了投标人的财务约束。 本项目将开始纠正这一点，当这种限制不是公开信息，而是谨慎保守的秘密时，通过评估财务限制对投标行为的影响。 调查人员已经确定，根据许多常见的拍卖规则，被拍卖的货物不一定卖给最有价值的投标人。 此外，财务约束的存在有利于使用彩票，并倾向于支持全付拍卖的第一价格密封投标拍卖。 研究将分三个部分进行。 第1部分考虑了标准的垄断模型，其中一个单一的卖方出售同质商品的连续体的卖方。 在第2部分中，研究者将研究一件物品拍卖给许多潜在买家的情况。 第三部分探讨了低利率、卖方提供融资的可取性。 其他有希望的研究途径有：联合投标、合并以及私有化和破产政策的设计。