Market Design with Financially Constrained Agents

许多重要的资源，如住房、医疗保健、人体器官和教育，往往是通过偏离“经典”市场的方法分配的。 目前的项目为使用这种非市场方法提供了一个效率基础，并研究了改进这些方法的方法，特别关注公立学校选择方案。 目前研究的关键要素是认识到，由于个人进入资本市场的机会不平等，他们往往受到财务限制，有些人比其他人更受限制。 个人所面临的这种财务约束的不平等，导致标准市场在向富人分配资源时存在偏见，使得结果不仅不公平，而且效率低下，即使与简单的随机资源分配相比也是如此，前提是允许资源的接受者转售资源。 允许福利或应享权利的接受者转让这些福利或应享权利，对于有效的非市场资源分配方法至关重要，但这项研究也确定了与不受限制的转让性有关的成本，从而导致投机活动。 在为非市场资源配置方法建立了一般效率基础之后，本研究探讨了改进现有方法的方法，特别是那些在公立学校选择计划中采用的方法。 特别是，该项目提出了一个新的程序，允许参与者表明他们的偏好，但以一种限制他们“游戏系统”的激励的方式。“研究表明，这种新的择校程序比现有程序更有效。 该项目接下来通过实验测试与新程序相关的效率效益以及参与该计划的个人可用的信息的作用。 最后，该项目调查的作用，住房市场发挥在传统的住宅为基础的制度，以及在新的学校选择制度。 更广泛的影响：正在调查的许多问题具有重大的政策影响。 第一部分发现了允许福利或应享权利的领取者转移福利或应享权利的权衡。这一发现广泛适用于许多政府项目，特别是那些目前不允许此类转移的项目，包括移民签证的分配和人体器官的获取。 第二部分择校设计具有更直接、更具体的应用。 拟议的程序有可能分配学生到学校更有效地比已经使用或提出迄今为止的方法，并可能影响学校选择方案的设计方式在该国许多地区。 最后，该项目有望使人们更好地了解住房市场在学校选择中的作用，特别是所谓的“步行区”优先权的优点，该优先权通常授予居住在学校附近的学生，以利于他们分配到该学校。

Many important resources, such as housing, health care, human organs, and education, are often allocated via methods that depart from "classic" markets. The current project provides an efficiency foundation for the use of such non-market methods and investigates ways to improve upon them, with a special attention given to the public school choice programs. The key element of the current research is the recognition that individuals are often financially constrained, some more so than others, due to their unequal access to capital markets. This inequality in financial constraints facing individuals causes standard markets to be prejudiced in allocation toward wealthy individuals, making the outcome inefficient, and not just inequitable, even compared with simple random assignment of resources, provided that the recipients of the resources are allowed to resell them. Allowing the recipients of benefits or entitlements to transfer them is crucial for non-market methods of resource allocation to be efficient, but this research also identifies the cost associated with unrestricted transferability in engendering speculation activities. Having established a general efficiency foundation for non-market methods of resource allocation, the research then investigates ways to improve upon existing methods, particularly those adopted in public school choice programs. In particular, the project proposes a new procedure which would allow participants to signal their preferences, but in a way that limits their incentives to "game the system." The research demonstrates this new procedure of school choice to be more efficient than the existing procedures. The project next tests experimentally the efficiency benefit associated with the new procedure as well as the role of information available to the individuals participating in the program. Finally, the project investigates the roles housing markets play in the traditional residence-based regime as well as in the new school choice regime. Broader Impact: Many issues under investigation have significant policy implications. The first part finds a tradeoff associated with allowing recipients of benefits or entitlements to transfer them. This finding has broad applications for many government programs, especially those which currently do not permit such transfers, including assignment of immigration visas and access to human organs. The second part on school choice design has more immediate and tangible applications. The proposed procedure has a potential for assigning students to schools more efficiently than the methods that have been used or proposed thus far and may influence the way school choice programs are designed in many parts of the country. Lastly, this project promises to yield a better understanding about the role of housing market in school selection in general, but particularly about the merit of the so-called "walk zone'' priority, which is often awarded to the students who reside in the immediate vicinity of a school to favor their assignment to that school.