Matching Theory and College Admissions

该奖项研究的是经济学理论中的匹配方法。该研究开发了分析双边匹配的新方法，无论是通过分散的市场还是中央清算所组织。 这些项目的重点是大学入学作为一种可能的应用，虽然新的理论是通用的，并将适用于许多其他情况。 第一个项目开发了一个分散的大学招生博弈的规范模型，分析了高校的战略收益管理决策，并评估了由此产生的均衡结果。 第二个项目使用的数据来自澳大利亚，那里的大学招生集中在每个州。 数据分析确定了这种集中化过程的具体特征对大学学生分配的影响。 第三个项目也是经济理论;该团队寻求开发新的和更一般的条件，以保证在渐近意义上的稳定匹配的存在;当应用于大学招生时，这意味着随着学生数量和大学名额的经济增长，匹配是稳定的。该项目的更广泛的影响包括对不同鼓励方式的优点和缺点的新见解。通过改变录取流程来获得大学入学机会。

This award funds research in the economic theory of matching methods. The research develops new methods for analyzing two-sided matching, whether it is organized via a decentralized market or a central clearinghouse. The projects focus on college admissions as a possible application, although the new theory is general and will apply to many other contexts. The first project develops a canonical model of a decentralized college admissions game, analyzes the strategic yield management decisions made by colleges and universities, and evaluates the resulting equilibrium outcomes. The second project uses data from Australia, where college admissions are centralized in each state. The data analysis determines the effect of specific features of this centralized process on the resulting assignment of students to universities. The third project is again economic theory; the team seeks to develop new and more general conditions that guarantee existence of stable matching in an asymptotic sense; as applied to college admissions this would mean a match that is stable as the economy grows in the number of students and in the number of college places.Broader impacts of this project include new insights into the strengths and weaknesses of different ways of encouraging college access through changes in admissions processes.