Litigation versus Administration and its Implications for Policy and Democracy

诉讼与行政，及其对政策和民主的影响当国会颁布法律，以规范经济或社会生活的某些方面，其中遵守是强制性的，它面临着一个选择之间的执法通过官僚机构和使用诉讼，或两者的某种组合在一个混合的方法。 自20世纪60年代末以来，国会通过允许和鼓励私人诉讼来实施联邦监管法律的频率大幅增长。 本项目调查当国会依赖诉讼当事人和法院的行动来执行监管法规时，这种选择是否会对导致通过的立法过程的性质以及这些法律的后续内容产生影响。鉴于国会自20世纪60年代末以来越来越依赖诉讼和法院来执行监管法规，阐明这一问题将有助于深入了解民主治理和监管程序。

Litigation versus Administration, and its Implications for Policy and DemocracyWhen Congress enacts a law to regulate some facet of economic or social life where compliance is mandatory, it faces a choice between enforcement through bureaucratic machinery and the use of lawsuits, or some combination of the two in a mixed approach. Since the late 1960s, there has been massive growth in the frequency with which Congress has chosen to implement federal regulatory law by allowing and incentivizing private lawsuits. This project investigates whether, when Congress relies upon the actions of litigants and courts for implementation of regulatory statutes, this choice has consequences for the nature of the legislative process leading to passage, and for the subsequent content of those laws.Given Congress' growing reliance upon litigation and courts for regulatory implementation since the late 1960s, shedding light on this question will offer insight into democratic governance and regulatory procedures.