Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Inside Autocracy

政治学博士论文研究：专制内部

• 批准号: 1065650
• 负责人: James Robinson
• 金额: $ 1.19万
• 依托单位: Harvard University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2011
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2011-07-01 至 2012-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1065650&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Political; Science

Although autocracies constitute forty percent of the world's regimes, social scientists lack a sophisticated account of political competition within those regimes. This project goes "inside autocracy" in the Republic of Congo to answer three questions. Under what conditions do senior military and ministry elites attempt coups d'état or struggle for greater spoils from the autocrat? What forms do these struggles take? And how do autocrats adjust survival strategies in order to maintain a stable coalition despite declining population welfare? Since these questions require unusual access to political elites, the project focuses on one contemporary autocracy: Congo, ruled by Denis Sassou-Nguesso for all but five years since 1979. Despite the appearance of stability, political competition among the military and ministerial elite is intense and varied. Since Sassou-Nguesso's return to power after the 1997 civil war, elites have sought to demonstrate their political relevance to the government. Disgruntled military leaders occasionally foster violent conflict in the countryside; frustrated civilian leaders mobilize dissidents. Elite competition was even more violent during Sassou-Nguesso's first reign, between 1979 and 1992, when he was the frequent target of coup d?état attempts. Survival in the midst of this competition seems to require political genius. To prevent elite conspiracies, Sassou-Nguesso employs a range of survival strategies designed to recruit elites into the coalition, induce their compliance with his orders, and then monitor their activities. He encumbers some elites in marriage networks, forces others to join secret societies, subjects some to a parallel government, and prefers everyone to live in close geographic proximity. These survival strategies, historians find, are common in autocracies. Yet contemporary political science does little to illuminate these dynamics. Political scientists generally believe autocrats create legislatures or political parties to enable commitments with their elite, moderating incentives for coups d?état. In fact, autocrats typically inherit political institutions upon claiming power. To understand elite challenge and autocratic durability, this project builds models in which Sassou-Nguesso inherits formal and informal political institutions: the party and electoral system, and a set of military and financial elites. These institutions determine the survival strategies available to the autocrat. The project's models then explain how Sassou-Nguesso varies survival strategies across elites to maintain a stable coalition. The research substantiates this theoretical account with quantitative and qualitative methods. The empirical centerpiece is a dataset on 1,300 Congolese elites since 1970. The project makes broader contributions as well. By probing the sources of autocrats' longevity in power, the project enhances understanding of the prospects for democratization. Findings will be of interest to journalists, the foreign aid community, and non-governmental organizations.

尽管独裁政权占世界政权的百分之四十，但社会科学家缺乏对这些政权内部政治竞争的复杂解释。该项目深入刚果共和国的“独裁政权内部”，以回答三个问题。在什么条件下，高级军事和部委精英会试图发动政变或从独裁者那里争夺更大的战利品？这些斗争采取什么形式？独裁者如何调整生存策略，以在人口福利下降的情况下维持稳定的联盟？由于这些问题需要与政治精英进行非同寻常的接触，因此该项目将重点放在一个当代独裁国家：刚果，自 1979 年以来，由丹尼斯·萨苏-恩格索统治了近五年。尽管表面上稳定，但军方和部长级精英之间的政治竞争却是激烈而多样的。自从 1997 年内战后萨苏-恩格索重新掌权以来，精英们一直试图证明他们与政府的政治相关性。心怀不满的军事领导人有时会在农村煽动暴力冲突；沮丧的文职领导人动员持不同政见者。 1979 年至 1992 年萨苏-恩格索首次统治期间，精英竞争更加激烈，当时他经常成为政变的目标。在这场竞争中生存似乎需要政治天才。为了防止精英阴谋，萨苏-恩格索采用了一系列生存策略，旨在招募精英加入联盟，诱导他们遵守他的命令，然后监视他们的活动。他在婚姻网络中阻碍了一些精英，强迫其他人加入秘密社团，让一些人服从于平行政府，并希望每个人都生活在地理上接近的地方。历史学家发现，这些生存策略在独裁国家中很常见。然而当代政治科学对阐明这些动态几乎没有什么作用。政治学家普遍认为，独裁者创建立法机构或政党是为了让他们的精英做出承诺，缓和政变的动机。事实上，独裁者通常在夺取权力后继承政治制度。为了理解精英的挑战和独裁的持久性，该项目构建了萨苏-恩格索继承的正式和非正式政治制度的模型：政党和选举制度，以及一组军事和金融精英。这些机构决定了独裁者可以采用的生存策略。该项目的模型随后解释了萨苏-恩格索如何改变精英阶层的生存策略以维持稳定的联盟。该研究通过定量和定性方法证实了这一理论解释。实证核心是自 1970 年以来 1,300 名刚果精英的数据集。该项目还做出了更广泛的贡献。通过探讨独裁者长期掌权的根源，该项目增强了对民主化前景的理解。调查结果将引起记者、外国援助界和非政府组织的兴趣。