Revising rational beliefs in legal reasoning: Defeasibility, Counterexamples, and probabilities

修正法律推理中的理性信念：可废止性、反例和概率

• 批准号: 201369889
• 负责人: Professor Dr. Carsten Bäcker
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Lehrstuhl für Öffentliches Recht IV: Allgemeine und Vergleichende Staatslehre
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Priority Programmes
• 财政年份: 2011
• 资助国家: 德国
• 起止时间: 2010-12-31 至 2022-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/201369889?language=en
• 关键词: Revising; rational; beliefs; legal; reasoning

Recent research on conditional reasoning shows that people defeat valid conclu-sions if they can imagine situations in which the precondition of the conditional is fulfilled but the consequent does not follow. Cognitive psychologists refer to these contradicting situations as counterexamples, exceptions, or abnormalities. In the last three years, we investigated the defeasibility and the role of counterexamples in reasoning with legal conditionals such as ''If a person kills another human, then this person should be punished for manslaughter''. We showed that legal experts and laypeople respond differently to counterexamples, for instance exculpatory circum-stance such as that the person acted in self-defense. While legal experts consider counterexamples according to the regulations of penal code, laypeople base their decisions on their moral standards and intuitive sense of justice.In the next three years, we want to continue to strengthen the link between defeasi-bility, legal reasoning, and rationality. First, we want to draw further connections be-tween non-monotonic logics and the consideration of counterexamples in human legal reasoning. We plan a series of experiments to investigate how the probability and believability of counterexamples influence their acceptance and how the con-sideration of counterexamples changes depending on whether legal rules are pre-sented as factual or deontic legal conditionals. Second, we want to extend our re-search to the investigation of the rationality of balancing. Balancing is a hot topic in legal theory and describes how judges decide about conflicting fundamental rights (e.g. freedom of press vs. right to privacy). Here want to compare the decision of hu-man participants with the norms from legal theory. Third, we want to relate our find-ings to different logical systems developed in philosophy and AI to make progress towards an integrated theory of defeasible legal reasoning and argumentation. Fi-nally, we want to transfer our results to more ecologic valid scenarios and investi-gate the daily-life legal reasoning of judges and legal laypeople. All our experiments will be designed taking into account the psychological and legal theoretical state of the art. Participants will be laypeople and legal experts. Our investigations are not only important for psychology and legal theory, but also for our society.

条件推理的最新研究表明，如果人们能够想象出条件的前提条件得到满足但结果不满足的情况，那么他们就无法得出有效的结论。认知心理学家把这些矛盾的情况称为反例、例外或异常。在过去的三年里，我们研究了可废止性和反例在法律的条件推理中的作用，例如"如果一个人杀死了另一个人，那么这个人应该因过失杀人而受到惩罚"。我们发现，法律的专家和外行人对反例的反应不同，例如，开脱罪责的情况下，如该人采取自卫行动。法律的专家根据刑法典的规定来考虑反例，而外行则根据自己的道德标准和直觉正义感来做出决定。在未来三年，我们要继续加强可失败性、法律的推理和理性之间的联系。首先，我们想进一步把非单调逻辑和人类法律的推理中对反例的考虑联系起来。我们计划了一系列实验来研究反例的概率和可信度如何影响它们的接受，以及对反例的考虑如何根据法律的规则是以事实条件还是道义法律的条件来呈现而变化。第二，我们希望将我们的研究扩展到对平衡的合理性的考察。平衡是法律的理论中的一个热门话题，它描述了法官如何决定相互冲突的基本权利（例如新闻自由与隐私权）。本文试图从法律的理论的角度，将人的参与决定与规范进行比较。第三，我们希望将我们的发现与哲学和人工智能中发展的不同逻辑系统联系起来，以朝着可废止的法律的推理和论证的综合理论取得进展。最后，我们希望将我们的研究结果转移到更生态有效的场景中，并调查法官和法律的外行的日常生活中的法律的推理。我们所有的实验都将考虑到心理学和法律的理论的最新发展。参与者将是外行和法律的专家。我们的调查不仅对心理学和法律的理论很重要，而且对我们的社会也很重要。