Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Vote-Buying and Political Preferences in Africa

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The distribution of small material resources by politicians to voters during election campaigns, often in the form of money, food, beer, or clothing, has long been common in many democracies around the world. These activities typically go by the name of vote buying. Where ballot secrecy is not legislated or enforced, buying votes can be effective because politicians can enforce vote-buying bargains. In some settings, however, vote-buying persists despite the secret ballot. In Kenya, over 40 percent of voters in some areas received money before the 2007 election; yet the ballot is formally secret, parties lack the capacity to monitor voters, and large majorities believe that powerful people cannot figure out how they voted. Vote buying in Kenya is puzzling. It is even more puzzling because Africans and Kenyans in particular are often said to vote ethnically. If African voters vote ethnically, as the conventional wisdom suggests, why must their votes also be bought? To understand vote buying in the African context, this project develops a fuller understanding of how vote buying influences the preferences and expectations of recipients and observers. Indeed, despite the prevalence of vote-buying in many settings, there is little systematic evidence documenting its impact on support for and perceptions of politicians. This project provides such evidence while addressing largely unanswered questions: Is vote buying effective in building support for politicians? If so, with whom is vote buying effective, and why? Answering these questions is difficult with survey data for at least two reasons. First, because of embarrassment or fear, many survey respondents are unwilling to respond honestly to survey questions about vote buying, which biases the surveys. Second, different theories of vote buying predict outcomes that are observationally equivalent in survey data. To avoid these problems, this study conducts field experiments in Kenya. The experiments will present participants with artificial, but realistic, audio recordings discussing hypothetical political candidates, varying only the inclusion of subtle references to the politician's vote-buying behavior in the recordings heard by randomly selected treatment groups. Follow-up questions will gauge support for and perceptions of the politicians discussed in the recording, and will yield a dataset with which to analyze and measure vote buying's impact on voter support for and perceptions of politicians across a number of key dimensions. The artificiality of the experiment provides the control necessary to test competing theories. Moreover, the use of recordings allows the investigator to gain subtlety in referring to vote buying. The intellectual merit of this project lies in its capacity to advance understanding of the workings of the critical democratic process of elections in Africa. The project illuminates in particular the widespread and puzzling phenomenon of vote buying. By contributing to our understanding of whether and why vote buying is effective, the project enhances knowledge of when and why democratic elections do--and do not--yield responsive and accountable government.The broader implications of the project are tied to its intellectual contributions. The project can inform the design of policies and programs seeking to promote the responsiveness and accountability of governments to their citizens.