The Evolution of Incentives and Social Structure under Imperfect Information

不完全信息下激励和社会结构的演化

• 批准号: 1137894
• 负责人: Simon Levin
• 金额: $ 73.36万
• 依托单位: Princeton University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2011
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2011-09-01 至 2015-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1137894&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Evolution; Incentives; Social; Structure; under

Despite the common conception of nature as "red in tooth and claw," almost all organisms, from soil bacteria to primates -including humans-, must cooperate with others to survive and reproduce. How such cooperation persists evolutionarily despite conflicts of interests is a central question in biology. The problem is exacerbated when individuals face uncertainty about factors affecting their payoffs, because this creates incentives for deception that would undermine cooperation. This project will study how incentives for cooperation and the related social structure evolve when individuals face uncertainty and have private information. The PI and his colleagues will use a suite of mathematical tools originally developed in economics, called mechanism design theory. Mechanism design studies how appropriate incentive structures can be set up to prevent self-interested individuals from deceiving each other and undermining the desired outcome. However, classic applications of mechanism design theory, such as the design of auctions and trading schemes, usually presuppose an agent (such as a government) with the power of setting the "rules of the game". In contrast, natural selection acts on individuals that can alter the game only in limited ways by themselves. Hence, the evolved "rules of the game" represent the outcome of natural selection working in a decentralized way through individuals. The aim of this project is to understand how natural selection thus organizes interactions between individuals to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes. The project's interdisciplinary approach will not only further our understanding of fundamental evolutionary processes, but also help in understanding how we in human societies can cooperate without relying on a central authority to tackle problems such as global climate change. It will also produce new results in social evolution theory that are sure to capture the public's attention, and will therefore aid in furthering science education and public understanding of science.

尽管大自然的普遍概念是“红色的牙齿和爪子”，但几乎所有的生物，从土壤细菌到灵长类动物--包括人类--都必须与他人合作才能生存和繁殖。尽管存在利益冲突，但这种合作如何在进化中持续存在，这是生物学的一个中心问题。当个人面临影响其收益的因素的不确定性时，问题会变得更加严重，因为这会产生欺骗的动机，从而破坏合作。本项目将研究当个人面临不确定性和拥有私人信息时，合作动机和相关社会结构如何演变。PI和他的同事将使用一套最初在经济学中开发的数学工具，称为机制设计理论。机制设计研究如何建立适当的激励结构，以防止自私的个人相互欺骗，破坏预期的结果。然而，机制设计理论的经典应用，如拍卖和交易计划的设计，通常都以一个具有制定“游戏规则”权力的代理人（如政府）为前提。 相比之下，自然选择作用于个体，这些个体只能以有限的方式改变游戏。因此，进化的“游戏规则”代表了自然选择以分散的方式通过个体发挥作用的结果。该项目的目的是了解自然选择如何组织个体之间的相互作用，以实现互利的结果。 该项目的跨学科方法不仅将进一步加深我们对基本进化过程的理解，而且还有助于理解我们人类社会如何在不依赖中央权威的情况下进行合作，以解决全球气候变化等问题。它还将产生社会进化理论的新成果，这些成果肯定会引起公众的注意，因此将有助于促进科学教育和公众对科学的理解。