Logical consequence. Epistemological and proof-theoretic perspectives.

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The traditional analysis of the relation of logical consequence due to Alfred Tarski explains consequence in terms of truth. A more recent rival view developed by Dag Prawitz aims at replacing the notion of truth with the one of proof. What is common to both approaches is the characterization of consequence as 'transmission': B is a logical consequence of A if and only if truth (resp. provability) is transmitted from A to B.Both analyses of logical consequence are the core of alternative views on how the meaning of the sentences of a language is to be conceived. The truththeoretic account characterizes the meaning of a sentence in terms of the conditions that must obtain for it to be true. The proof-theoretic approach seeks to characterizes the meaning of a sentence in terms of what it is to prove it or, say, to recognize it, in contrast with the truth-theoretic approach drawn upon a recognition-transcendent notion of truth.We argue that the transmission view of consequence, encapsulated in the standard proof-theoretic approach, flaws the possibility of developing a real alternative to a truth-based approach. The research aims at the development of an alternative proof-theoretic approach, based on the rejection of the 'transmission' view of consequence, capable of yielding a conception of meaning anchored to subjects' epistemological capabilities.Keywords: Logical Consequence, Proof-Theoretic Semantics, Theory of Meaning