Doctoral Dissertation Research: Cooperation in Stochastic Games: A Prisoner's Dilemma Experiment

博士论文研究：随机博弈中的合作：囚徒困境实验

• 批准号: 1260840
• 负责人: Andrew Schotter
• 金额: $ 1.36万
• 依托单位: New York University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2013
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2013-04-01 至 2015-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1260840&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Cooperation; Stochastic

One question that economists and social scientists have contemplated for some time is what are the proper prerequisites for societal cooperation when private incentives conflict with social ones? One answer to this question comes from the theory of repeated games, the study of decision making amongst members of a group (the game) where the decision is made over and over again. More precisely, the specific game associated with this answer is the repeated prisoner's dilemma. In the prisoner's dilemma, cooperation is socially beneficial but it is in the private best interest of each player to not cooperate and thus, when only played once, no cooperation occurs. However, when the prisoner's dilemma is repeated, cooperation can be sustained by linking future choices to current choices so that the gain that one would obtain by deviating from cooperation in the present period is offset by a loss in future periods. Specifically, the gain is deterred by the credible threat of mutual non-cooperation by all players in the future.Repeated games, however, are a drastic simplification of the real world. Realistically, while many economic situations feature repeated interaction, the nature of the interaction changes through time. This feature is captured by stochastic games, a generalization of repeated games in which the game played each period changes and is determined, at least partially, by chance.This project is a laboratory experiment in the field of stochastic games. In particular, the experiment utilizes a repeated prisoner's dilemma in which the payoffs of the prisoner?s dilemma are stochastically determined each period. Most importantly, given the link between future choices and current choices that is established to sustain cooperation, altering the nature of future choices is a substantial step towards understanding how people behave in these environments.From a broader perspective, the main economic example for the stochastic prisoner?s dilemma in the experiment is collusion among firms over the business cycle. In this environment, firms desire collusion, cooperation on non-competitive prices or quantities, and compete over many periods. The demand fluctuates because of booms and busts in the economy, which changes the exact interaction they face each period. This experiment can potentially guide antitrust law by providing insight into conditions where firms may find it easier to collude.

经济学家和社会科学家已经思考了一段时间的一个问题是，当私人激励与社会激励发生冲突时，社会合作的适当先决条件是什么？ 这个问题的一个答案来自重复博弈理论，该理论研究一个群体（博弈）成员之间的决策，其中决策是一遍又一遍地做出的。 更准确地说，与这个答案相关的特定博弈是重复的囚徒困境。 在囚徒困境中，合作对社会有益，但不合作符合每个参与者的最佳利益，因此，当只玩一次时，不会发生合作。 然而，当囚徒困境再次出现时，合作可以通过将未来的选择与当前的选择联系起来来维持，这样，在当前时期偏离合作所获得的收益就会被未来时期的损失所抵消。 具体来说，收益受到所有参与者未来相互不合作的可信威胁的阻碍，然而，重复的游戏是对真实的世界的急剧简化。 现实地说，虽然许多经济情况的特点是重复的相互作用，但相互作用的性质随着时间的推移而变化。 这一特征被随机博弈所捕捉，随机博弈是重复博弈的一种概括，在这种重复博弈中，每一阶段的博弈都是变化的，至少部分是由偶然性决定的。本项目是随机博弈领域的实验室实验。 特别是，该实验利用了重复的囚犯的困境中，囚犯的收益？的困境是随机决定的每个时期。 最重要的是，考虑到未来选择和当前选择之间的联系是为了维持合作而建立的，改变未来选择的性质是朝着理解人们在这些环境中的行为迈出的实质性一步。从更广泛的角度来看，随机囚犯的主要经济例子是什么？在实验中的困境是在商业周期中企业之间的共谋。 在这种环境下，企业希望在非竞争性价格或数量上进行共谋、合作，并在许多时期内进行竞争。 需求波动是因为经济的繁荣和萧条，这改变了他们在每个时期面临的确切互动。 这一实验可以通过深入了解公司可能发现更容易串通的条件来指导反垄断法。