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Persuasion in Financial Decisions

Persuasion in Financial Decisions
财务决策中的说服力
批准号:
0721111
负责人:
Andrew Schotter
金额:
$10.49万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2007
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2007-09-01 至 2009-08-31

项目摘要

项目成果

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中文摘要
翻译
真实的世界的两个特征在许多经济理论中似乎缺失了。其中之一是,决策者往往是在别人的劝说下做出决定的。例如,投资者向经纪人寻求建议,经纪人试图说服他们选择某种股票或共同基金,而销售人员则试图说服人们购买一种产品而不是另一种产品。如果说服的对象是一项投资,即一种彩票,而不是金钱奖励,那么一个问题是,人们认为一项潜在投资的哪些特征具有足够的说服力或说服力,足以让他们选择它?换句话说,为了说服他或她的客户,经纪人可能会选择突出这些分配或彩票的哪些特征?他或她会强调赢得很多钱的可能性,还是会根据最不理想的结果来比较投资。他或她会关注投资的差异还是其他方面?其他问题也随之产生。不同类型的人是否认为分布的不同特征更有说服力?如果是,在这种关系中哪些因素是重要的?金融业咨询市场的竞争水平(即,经纪行之间的竞争)改变了向个人提供的咨询类型,与没有这种竞争的情况下提供的咨询类型相比,这种竞争是否会提高福利?提供建议如何与“经济家长主义”(即,根据你认为对他或她最好的建议向他或她提供建议的动机),以及它对福利的影响是什么?使用实验技术,我们将试图回答这些问题和更多。实验方法提供了这样一个项目的许多优势。它将允许实验系统地改变环境的各个方面,例如竞争水平和决策者所拥有的信息量,这些在实际投资市场中很难观察到。它还允许控制顾问可用的建议,这在实地是不可能的。更广泛的影响:这个建议侧重于个人决策问题的说服。这项研究将增加人们对什么语言以及在什么情况下有说服力的理解。它还将确定投资者所掌握的信息水平以及顾问之间的竞争程度如何影响所提供的建议。这可以帮助立法者了解顾问应要求提供哪些类型的投资信息。它还可以揭示什么对投资者最有利:增加竞争,还是增加信息。最后,它可以为投资顾问提供关于如何更好地告知客户的宝贵信息。
英文摘要
Two features of the real world seem missing in much of economic theory. One is the fact that decision makers often make their decisions after being persuaded to do so by someone else. For example, investors seek advice from brokers who try to persuade them to select a certain stock or mutual fund, while salesmen try to persuade people to buy one product rather than another. If the object of persuasion is an investment defined as a lottery over monetary prizes, one question is what features of a potential investment do people find persuasive or convincing enough to lead them to choose it? In other words, what features of these distributions or lotteries might the broker choose to highlight in order to persuade his or her client? Would he or she stress the possibility of winning a lot of money or would he or she compare the investments on the basis of their least desirable outcomes. Would he or she focus on the variance or on other aspects of the investments? Other questions also arise. Do different types of people find different features of distributions more persuasive, and if so, what factors are important in this relationship? Does the level of competition in advice markets in the financial industry (i.e., competition between brokerage houses) alters the type of advice that is offered to individuals, as compared to the type of advice that would be offered without such competition, and is such competition welfare enhancing? How is advice giving connected to "economic paternalism" (i.e., the motive to advise an individual on the basis of what you think is best for him or her) and what are its welfare implications? Using experimental techniques we will try to answer these questions and more.The experimental approach offers many advantages for such a project. It will allow the experiment to systematically vary aspects of the environment, such as the level of competition and the amount of information the decision maker has which are difficult to observe in actual investment markets. It also allows the control of the advice available to the adviser, something not possible in the field.Broader Impacts: This proposal focuses on persuasion in individual decision problems. This research will increase understanding of what language people find persuasive and in what circumstances. It will also establish how the level of information the investors have and how much competition there is amongst advisers affect the advice given. This can help to inform lawmakers on what types of information about investments should be required, if any, by advisors. It also can shed light on what is best for investors: increased competition, or increased information. Finally, it could provide valuable information to investment advisers about how to better inform their clients.
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Collaborative Research: Attention in Games and Decisions
  • 批准号:
    1724550
  • 项目类别:
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  • 资助金额:
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    1623854
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  • 资助金额:
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    2016
  • 负责人:
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    1624364
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    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
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    2016
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    1260840
  • 项目类别:
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  • 资助金额:
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  • 财政年份:
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  • 负责人:
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