Incentives in Government Provision of Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Relief

政府提供应急准备和救灾的激励措施

• 批准号: 1334930
• 负责人: Jun Zhuang
• 金额: $ 35万
• 依托单位: SUNY at Buffalo
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2013
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2013-09-01 至 2017-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1334930&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Incentives; Government; Provision; Emergency; Preparedness

The goal of this award is to help provide a solid foundation for motivating more comprehensive ways to assess the risk tradeoffs in multi-stakeholder disaster management and resource allocation. This will be accomplished by taking advantage of theoretical decision frameworks such as game theory and prospect theory, and will use robust optimization techniques to address the uncertainty that surrounds disasters. This project will address under-studied questions such as: (a) How should governments and private sectors balance between the funding for emergency preparedness and the funding for disaster relief, when they are uncertain about the disaster location and consequences? (b) How should governments distribute incentives to reduce vulnerability to disasters? and (c) How should decision makers balance equity, efficiency, and effectiveness when preparing for and responding to disasters? As a 2012 National Research Council report states, "there is currently no comprehensive framework to guide private-public collaboration focused on disaster preparedness, response, and recovery." If successful, this project will help to address this issue by providing insights, practical guidelines, and decision support tools to help save lives and property in the face of disasters. This research will engage many graduate, undergraduate, and high school students, including those from under-represented groups. The models, results, and insight gained will be shared with international, federal, and local representatives through seminars, conferences, publication, media coverage, and websites.

该奖项的目的是帮助提供一个坚实的基础，以激励更全面的方法来评估多利益攸关方灾害管理和资源分配中的风险权衡。这将通过利用博弈论和前景理论等理论决策框架来实现，并将使用强大的优化技术来解决围绕灾害的不确定性。（a）政府和私营部门在不确定灾害地点和后果的情况下，应如何在应急准备供资和救灾供资之间取得平衡？(b)政府应如何分配激励措施以减少对灾害的脆弱性？（c）决策者在备灾和救灾时应如何平衡公平、效率和效力？正如2012年国家研究理事会的一份报告所指出的，“目前没有一个全面的框架来指导公私合作，重点是备灾、救灾和恢复。如果成功，该项目将通过提供见解，实用指南和决策支持工具来帮助解决这个问题，以帮助在灾难面前拯救生命和财产。这项研究将吸引许多研究生，本科生和高中生，包括那些来自代表性不足的群体。通过研讨会、会议、出版物、媒体报道和网站，与国际、联邦和地方代表分享所获得的模型、结果和见解。