DDRIG in DRMS: Multi-target Technology Deployment and Information Disclosure in Attacker-defender Settings: Analyzing Game-theoretic Prescriptions and Human Decisions

防御敌对威胁一直是世界各国政府的中心和长期关注的焦点。提高防御能力的一个重要方法是在感兴趣的场所(例如机场的金属探测器)中部署新技术。在部署新的安全和防御技术时，各机构必须决定相关信息应该如何向公众发布。鉴于恐怖组织等对手可以获取公开传播的信息，了解发布不同类型信息的影响至关重要。例如，安全机构可能选择仅在部署新技术的场馆子集上发布信息，这给对手在其他场馆(例如机场)部署该技术带来了不确定性。本研究以博弈论和对抗性决策的前人工作为基础，建立模型和实验，对防御性信息披露、对抗性信念和对抗性目标选择决策进行深入研究，旨在对安全和防御背景下的技术部署和信息披露策略进行数学建模、实验测试和稳健分析。为了达到这些目标，本项目开发和分析了一个新的博弈论信号传递模型，该模型为最优信息披露策略提供了有洞察力的分析。此外，人类实验--旨在模仿游戏模型--是为了(I)研究人类在这一背景下的信念和决策，以及(Ii)将博弈论的处方与实际的人类决策进行比较。该项目的成功完成有助于了解安全和国防部门内技术部署的长期有效性。尽管这项研究的动机是安全和防御方面的问题，但数学模型和实验框架可以推广到任何对跨多个地点的信息战略发布感兴趣的应用程序。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的智力优势和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

Defending against adversarial threats has been a central and longstanding focus for governments throughout the world. One prominent approach to improve defensive capabilities is to deploy new technologies among venues of interest (e.g., metal detectors at airports). When it comes to deploying new security and defense technologies, agencies must decide how the related information should be released to the public. Given that adversaries, such as terrorist organizations, can access information that is publicly disseminated, it is critical to understand the implications of releasing different types of information. For instance, security agencies may choose to release information on only a subset of venues where new technology is deployed, creating an uncertainty for an adversary regarding the deployment of the technology at other venues (e.g., airports). This research addresses this difficult information disclosure problem by building on previous work in game theory and adversarial decision making to develop models and experiments that provide insights into defensive information disclosure, adversarial beliefs, and adversarial target selection decisions.The research objectives of this proposed effort are to mathematically model, experimentally test, and robustly analyze technology deployment and information disclosure strategies in the context of security and defense. To meet these objectives, this project develops and analyzes a novel game-theoretic signaling model, which provides insightful analyses into optimal information disclosure strategies. Further, human experiments –designed to mimic the game model – are conducted to (i) study human beliefs and decision making in this context, and (ii) compare the game-theoretic prescriptions with actual human decisions. Successful completion of this project helps to inform the long-term effectiveness of technology deployments within the security and defense sectors. Although this research is motivated by problems in security and defense, the mathematical model and experimental framework is generalizable to any application in which the strategic release of information across multiple venues is of interest.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.