CAREER: Cyber-security of Electric Power Systems: Theft and Systemic Failure

职业：电力系统的网络安全：盗窃和系统故障

• 批准号: 1351621
• 负责人: Eilyan Bitar
• 金额: $ 40万
• 依托单位: Cornell University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2014
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2014-05-01 至 2020-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1351621&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: CAREER; Cyber; security; Electric; Power

The physical infrastructure of the US electric grid is aging, over-burdened, and prone to failure. The drive to support the deep integration of variable renewable energy into the grid, without sacrificing reliability, will require a paradigm shift in how we produce, deliver, and consume energy. At the heart of this profound transformation is the rapid deployment of the Smart Grid, which integrates new embedded sensing, communication, and computing technologies to improve utilization of existing physical assets, operational efficiency, and reliability. However, with the increased reliance of grid operations on complex and actionable data flows, comes the substantial risk of cyber attacks on the physical system. By coordinating the manipulation of actionable data transfers from only a small number of remote sensing units (e.g. power meters, relay states, voltage sensors), a malicious adversary can mislead the system operator into taking corrective control actions with staggering economic and physical consequences. These include: (i) inefficient market outcomes based on sub-optimal dispatch of generation, (ii) manipulation of electricity market prices and financial instruments for profit gain, (iii) cascading failures in transmission networks, and (iv) physical damage to large generation and substation facilities. Broadly, the proposed research seeks to address the fundamental open research challenges associated with securing the electric power infrastructure and electricity markets against such malicious cyber attacks.The various mechanisms through which data integrity attacks can manipulate the behavior of cyber-physical systems such as the power grid are not yet well understood, and effective countermeasures remain undeveloped. By combining expertise at the intersection of power systems, estimation, optimization, and control theory, the proposed research aims to develop a mathematical framework and set of algorithmic tools that will serve as the foundation for a new information technology capable of (i) assessing the vulnerability of existing power grids, (ii) calculating the consequence of successful attacks, and (iii) developing effective countermeasures to thwart those attacks -- innovations that will serve to substantially enhance the security the United States' critical energy infrastructure. In addition to improving the security of the US electric grid, the proposed work will aim to have societal impact by addressing the urgent need to train the next generation of engineers to design, build, and manage the Smart Grid. The novel integration of the proposed research into senior course offerings will serve to create both awareness and excitement about the field; with the ultimate goal of stimulating increased adoption of careers in power and thus contributing to the attenuation of the current shortfall of well-trained engineers capable of managing our electricity grid.

美国电网的物理基础设施老化、负担过重，而且容易出现故障。在不牺牲可靠性的情况下，支持将各种可再生能源深度整合到电网中，这将要求我们在生产、交付和消费能源的方式上进行范式转变。这场深刻变革的核心是智能电网的快速部署，它集成了新的嵌入式传感、通信和计算技术，以提高现有有形资产的利用率、运营效率和可靠性。然而，随着电网运营越来越依赖复杂和可操作的数据流，物理系统受到网络攻击的巨大风险也随之而来。通过协调对仅来自少数遥感单元(例如，功率计、继电器状态、电压传感器)的可操作数据传输的操纵，恶意对手可以误导系统操作员采取纠正控制措施，从而造成惊人的经济和物理后果。这些问题包括：(1)基于非最优发电调度的低效市场结果；(2)操纵电力市场价格和金融工具以获取利润；(3)输电网络的连锁故障；(4)对大型发电和变电所设施的实际损害。总的来说，这项拟议的研究旨在解决与保护电力基础设施和电力市场免受此类恶意网络攻击相关的基本开放研究挑战。数据完整性攻击可以操纵电网等网络物理系统的行为的各种机制尚不清楚，有效的对策仍未开发出来。通过结合电力系统、估计、优化和控制理论的专业知识，这项拟议的研究旨在开发一个数学框架和一套算法工具，作为新信息技术的基础，该技术能够(I)评估现有电网的脆弱性，(Ii)计算成功攻击的后果，以及(Iii)开发有效的对策来挫败这些攻击--这些创新将有助于显著增强美国关键能源基础设施的安全。除了提高美国电网的安全性外，拟议中的工作还将通过满足培训下一代工程师设计、建造和管理智能电网的迫切需求来产生社会影响。将拟议的研究新颖地整合到高级课程中，将有助于提高对该领域的认识和兴奋；最终目标是刺激更多的人采用电力职业，从而有助于缓解目前缺乏训练有素的能够管理我们电网的工程师的问题。