CAREER: A New Theory of Social Choice for More than Two Alternatives: Combining Economics, Statistics, and Computation
CAREER: A New Theory of Social Choice for More than Two Alternatives: Combining Economics, Statistics, and Computation
批准号:
1453542
负责人:
Lirong Xia
金额:
$52.5万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Continuing Grant
财政年份:
2015
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2015-02-01 至 2023-01-31
中文摘要
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英文摘要
The proposal aims at generating computational mechanisms that will enable individuals to contribute towards making better collective decisions (e.g., news ranking) including crowdsourcing where aggregation of online noise answers can occur. The proposal brings together ideas from economics, statistics, and computation to expand the capabilities of social choice mechanisms to handle large numbers of alternative choices, to extract ground truth from aggregated preferences, and to address problems where individual agents might not be able to compare some alternatives. In contrast to classical social choice theory, which is limited to the selection between two alternatives, the project proposes a rigorous study of a model for computational choice that will be robust enough for discerning between thousands or even millions of alternatives.The proposal could have a profound impact in the way we build multi-agent systems, search engines and recommender systems. The proposed effort can serve as a catalyst in the growing area of computational social choice, including: (1) Rank aggregation has been used in many fields, involving some high impact applications like ranking of news. However, this problem is far from solved using traditional computational social choice methods because they either only work for two alternatives, require full rankings, does poorly in revealing the ground truth, or are hard to compute. The proposed research will develop new methodologies to overcome these deficiencies by designing objective, robust, and computable social choice mechanisms for rich preferences. (2) Crowdsourcing, whereby online workers' noisy answers are aggregated to produce a better overall answer to some question. This cannot be solved by existing computational social choice techniques as the online workers' answers are often partial orders, workers may manipulate the outcome by providing false answers, and the objective of aggregation is to reveal the true answer. The proposed research will directly tackle these challenges by designing new mechanisms, which are directly applicable to existing systems.
期刊论文(18)
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DOI:
10.1609/aaai.v32i1.11727
发表时间:
2018-04
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
[Zhibing Zhao;Tristan Villamil;Lirong Xia]
通讯作者:
Zhibing Zhao;Tristan Villamil;Lirong Xia
DOI:
10.1016/j.artint.2022.103824
发表时间:
2022-11
期刊:
Artif. Intell.
影响因子:
--
作者:
[Haibin Wang;Sujoy Sikdar;Xiaoxi Guo;Lirong Xia;Yongzhi Cao;Hanpin Wang]
通讯作者:
Haibin Wang;Sujoy Sikdar;Xiaoxi Guo;Lirong Xia;Yongzhi Cao;Hanpin Wang
Crowdsourcing Perceptions of Gerrymandering
众包对选区划分的看法
DOI:
10.1609/hcomp.v10i1.21993
发表时间:
2022
期刊:
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing
影响因子:
--
作者:
[Kelly, Benjamin, Kang, Inwon, Xia, Lirong]
通讯作者:
Xia, Lirong
Equitable Allocations of Indivisible Chore
公平分配不可分割的家务活
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2020
期刊:
AAMAS Conference proceedings
影响因子:
--
作者:
[Freeman, Rupert, Sikdar, Sujoy, Vaish, Rohit, Xia, Lirong]
通讯作者:
Xia, Lirong
DOI:
10.1613/jair.1.13734
发表时间:
2022-11
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
[Farhad Mohsin;Ao Liu;Pin-Yu Chen;Francesca Rossi;Lirong Xia]
通讯作者:
Farhad Mohsin;Ao Liu;Pin-Yu Chen;Francesca Rossi;Lirong Xia
共 18 条
Collaborative Research: RI: Medium: Informed, Fair, Efficient, and Incentive-Aware Group Decision Making
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批准号:2313136
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$62.53万
-
财政年份:2023
-
负责人:Lirong Xia
-
依托单位:
Collaborative Research: NSF-CSIRO: Fair Sequential Collective Decision-Making
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批准号:2303000
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$30.0万
-
财政年份:2023
-
负责人:Lirong Xia
-
依托单位:
Collaborative Research: RI: Medium: Transparent Fair Division of Indivisible Items
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批准号:2106983
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$62.19万
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财政年份:2021
-
负责人:Lirong Xia
-
依托单位:
Collaborative Research: RI: Small: Modeling and Learning Ethical Principles for Embedding into Group Decision Support Systems
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批准号:2007994
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$16.59万
-
财政年份:2021
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负责人:Lirong Xia
-
依托单位:
RI: Small: Algorithmic Mechanism Design for Multi-Type Resource Allocation
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批准号:1716333
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$37.35万
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财政年份:2017
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负责人:Lirong Xia
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依托单位:
海外基金