Collaborative Research: Information, Markets and Networks

传统的市场分析假设市场参与者在单一市场中以相同的信息进行互动。 过去40年的研究强调了市场中信息不对称的重要性。 过去20年的研究突出表明，通过网络联系有限地参与市场十分重要。 该项目开发了研究信息和网络在市场中作用的新方法。 分析经济环境中信息不对称的经典方法是理解假设一种特定信息结构的后果。 在本文中，我们开发了一种替代方法来理解在所有信息结构中可能发生的事情。 这种替代方法提供了关于信息在市场中的作用的强大工具和新见解。 该项目建立在NSF支持的早期工作的基础上，这些工作涉及在不同信息结构的战略情况下可能发生的情况。 “信息与市场”项目的第一个组成部分将这一方法应用于传统的市场环境。 在这种情况下，该方法强调了信息在使更多的结果可行方面的独特作用，但也强调了对可能发生的事情施加更多的激励约束。 该方法还澄清了在不对称信息下的竞争均衡的战略基础。 关于“信息和价格歧视”的第二个组成部分着眼于价格歧视的结果，概括了以前关于单一商品垄断的工作。 该项目的第三个组成部分是“信息、网络和波动”。任意网络和任意信息结构的问题是紧密相连的。 在对称环境和相互作用的早期工作的基础上，我们研究了在具有一般信息结构的任意网络中，哪种信息结构在具有特质和总体冲击的经济中产生最大的波动。

Classical market analysis built in the assumption that market participants interact in a single market with the same information. Research over the last forty years has highlighted the importance of asymmetric information in markets. Research over the last twenty years has highlighted the importance of limited participation in markets via network linkages. The project develops new approaches to studying the role of information and networks in markets. The classical approach to analyzing asymmetric information in economic settings is to understand the consequences of assuming one particular information structure. In this paper, we develop an alternative approach to understanding what can happen in all information structures. This alternative approach delivers powerful tools and new insights about the role of information in markets. The project builds on earlier work supported by the NSF on what can happen in strategic situations across different information structures. The first component of the project on "Information and Markets" applies that approach to classical market settings. In this context, the approach highlights the distinct roles of information in making more outcomes feasible but also in imposing more incentive constraints on what can happen. The approach also clarifies the strategic foundations of competitive equilibria under asymmetric information. A second component on "Information and Price Discrimination" looks at outcomes under price discrimination, generalizing prior work on single good monopoly. A third component of the project is on "Information, Networks and Volatility". The problems of arbitrary networks and arbitrary information structures are tightly linked. Building on earlier work for symmetric environments and interaction, we examine which information structure generates the most volatility in an economy with both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks in arbitrary networks with general information structures.