Collaborative Research: Information, Markets and Networks

经典市场分析建立在市场参与者在单一市场中使用相同信息进行互动的假设之上。过去四十年的研究强调了市场中信息不对称的重要性。过去二十年的研究强调了通过网络联系有限参与市场的重要性。该项目开发了研究信息和网络在市场中的作用的新方法。分析经济环境中信息不对称的经典方法是理解假设一种特定信息结构的后果。在本文中，我们开发了一种替代方法来理解所有信息结构中可能发生的情况。这种替代方法提供了强大的工具和关于信息在市场中的作用的新见解。该项目建立在NSF支持的早期工作的基础上，研究在不同信息结构的战略情况下可能发生的情况。“信息和市场”项目的第一个组成部分将这种方法应用于传统的市场环境。在这种背景下，该方法突出了信息在使更多结果可行以及对可能发生的事情施加更多激励约束方面的独特作用。该方法还阐明了信息不对称条件下竞争均衡的战略基础。关于“信息和价格歧视”的第二个部分着眼于价格歧视下的结果，概括了先前关于单一商品垄断的研究。该项目的第三个组成部分是“信息、网络和波动性”。任意网络和任意信息结构的问题是紧密相连的。在之前关于对称环境和相互作用的研究的基础上，我们研究了在具有一般信息结构的任意网络中，哪种信息结构在具有特殊冲击和总体冲击的经济中产生最大的波动性。

Classical market analysis built in the assumption that market participants interact in a single market with the same information. Research over the last forty years has highlighted the importance of asymmetric information in markets. Research over the last twenty years has highlighted the importance of limited participation in markets via network linkages. The project develops new approaches to studying the role of information and networks in markets. The classical approach to analyzing asymmetric information in economic settings is to understand the consequences of assuming one particular information structure. In this paper, we develop an alternative approach to understanding what can happen in all information structures. This alternative approach delivers powerful tools and new insights about the role of information in markets. The project builds on earlier work supported by the NSF on what can happen in strategic situations across different information structures. The first component of the project on "Information and Markets" applies that approach to classical market settings. In this context, the approach highlights the distinct roles of information in making more outcomes feasible but also in imposing more incentive constraints on what can happen. The approach also clarifies the strategic foundations of competitive equilibria under asymmetric information. A second component on "Information and Price Discrimination" looks at outcomes under price discrimination, generalizing prior work on single good monopoly. A third component of the project is on "Information, Networks and Volatility". The problems of arbitrary networks and arbitrary information structures are tightly linked. Building on earlier work for symmetric environments and interaction, we examine which information structure generates the most volatility in an economy with both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks in arbitrary networks with general information structures.