Conference: 'Coordination, Incomplete Information, and Interated Dominance: Theory and Experiments. August 17 thru 19, 2002'

会议：“协调、不完全信息和交互支配：理论与实验”。

• 批准号: 0213296
• 负责人: Stephen Morris
• 金额: $ 2.04万
• 依托单位: Yale University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2002
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2002-07-15 至 2003-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0213296&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Conference; Coordination; Incomplete; Information; Interated

Many economic problems are naturally modeled as coordination problems. Speculators in financial markets may have an incentive to attack a currency only if they believe that others will do so. Depositors in a bank may have an incentive to withdraw their money only if they think that others will do so. In such settings, informal commentary points to "confidence" and "self-fulfilling expectations" as determinants of the outcome, but there is still no consensus on the corresponding theory to flesh out these explanations.The purpose of this project is to fund the participation of U.S. researchers in an international conference that brings together theorists and experimental economists who have been studying these issues. The conference will be held in Barcelona, Spain on August 17-19, 2002 in the campus of Pompeu Fabra University. The time is ripe is for such a conference. There has been rapid theoretical progress in the modeling of coordination with incomplete information. However, there is no consensus on whether the predictions of the new theories are of practical relevance. There is a well-developed experimental literature on coordination games. These literatures have developed independently and the two groups of researchers have much to learn from each other.

许多经济问题自然地被建模为协调问题。 金融市场上的投机者只有在相信其他国家也会攻击一种货币时，才有攻击这种货币的动机。只有当银行的储户认为其他人也会这么做时，他们才有动力去提取自己的钱。 在这样的背景下，虽然有“信心”和“自我实现的期望”等非正式的评论，但作为其解释的理论还没有达成共识。本项目的目的是资助美国研究人员参加一个国际会议，该会议汇集了研究这些问题的理论家和实验经济学家。会议将于2002年8月17日至19日在西班牙巴塞罗那的庞培法布拉大学校园举行。召开这样一次会议的时机已经成熟。 不完全信息协调问题的建模理论研究取得了很大的进展。 然而，对于新理论的预测是否具有实际意义，人们没有达成共识。 有一个发达的实验文献协调游戏。 这些文献各自独立发展，两组研究者有许多可以相互借鉴的地方。