Conference: 'Coordination, Incomplete Information, and Interated Dominance: Theory and Experiments. August 17 thru 19, 2002'

许多经济问题自然地被建模为协调问题。金融市场上的投机者只有在相信其他人也会这样做的情况下，才会有攻击一种货币的动机。只有当银行的存款人认为其他人也会这样做时，他们才会有取钱的动机。在这种情况下，非正式的评论指出，“信心”和“自我实现的期望”是结果的决定因素，但对于充实这些解释的相应理论，仍然没有达成共识。该项目的目的是资助美国研究人员参加一个国际会议，该会议汇集了一直在研究这些问题的理论家和实验经济学家。会议将于2002年8月17日至19日在西班牙巴塞罗那庞培法布拉大学校园举行。召开这样一次会议的时机已经成熟。不完全信息协调模型的理论研究取得了迅速的进展。然而，对于新理论的预测是否具有实际意义，目前还没有达成共识。关于协调博弈的实验文献已经相当成熟。这些文献都是独立发展的，两组研究人员有很多可以相互学习的地方。

Many economic problems are naturally modeled as coordination problems. Speculators in financial markets may have an incentive to attack a currency only if they believe that others will do so. Depositors in a bank may have an incentive to withdraw their money only if they think that others will do so. In such settings, informal commentary points to "confidence" and "self-fulfilling expectations" as determinants of the outcome, but there is still no consensus on the corresponding theory to flesh out these explanations.The purpose of this project is to fund the participation of U.S. researchers in an international conference that brings together theorists and experimental economists who have been studying these issues. The conference will be held in Barcelona, Spain on August 17-19, 2002 in the campus of Pompeu Fabra University. The time is ripe is for such a conference. There has been rapid theoretical progress in the modeling of coordination with incomplete information. However, there is no consensus on whether the predictions of the new theories are of practical relevance. There is a well-developed experimental literature on coordination games. These literatures have developed independently and the two groups of researchers have much to learn from each other.