Robust Mechanism Design

坚固的机构设计

• 批准号: 0095321
• 负责人: Stephen Morris
• 金额: $ 34.93万
• 依托单位: Yale University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2001
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2001-06-01 至 2004-05-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0095321&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Robust; Mechanism; Design

An important recent application of economic theory has been to the design of markets. For example, the design of the spectrum auctions in the United States and around the world has been much influenced by recent developments in auction theory and the theory of mechanism design. However, much of the theory has been developed with a simplified view of (1) how different market participants value the objects for sale; and (2) what they believe other market participants' beliefs. Such simplifying assumptions have been made for the sake of tractability and the resulting theories have been highly successful. However, one concern of practitioners and theorists alike has been that the "optimal" mechanisms derived from theory are sometimes too complex to be implemented in practice, which has lead for a search for simpler mechanisms that seem to be more robust to the underlying description of the environment. Our project will use new developments in game theory, allowing for richer "types" of market participants (including richer beliefs) to provide a theoretical justification for the use of simple mechanisms.The project addresses two separate but linked objectives. First, we examine how robust received mechanisms are to allowing the richer type spaces. In particular, researchers often argue that solution concepts stronger than Bayes-Nash equilibrium, such as dominance solvability and ex post equilibrium, are desirable because they are "robust," although the exact notion of robustness is not always described. One way of formalizing robustness is to examine whether results continue to hold on richer type spaces. In our proposal, we discuss various type spaces in between the naive type space and the universal type space, and examine how different mechanisms' performances vary as we vary the type space.Our second objective is to develop new optimal mechanisms for particular type spaces, intermediate between the standard space of all payoff-relevant types and the universal type space. Optimality in this context refers to the objective of the mechanism designer, which may coincide with social efficiency or simply be a revenue maximization problem for the designer. When the objective of the mechanism designer requires him to maximize an expected value, it will be appropriate to consider subspaces of the universal type space, which can be generated from a prior distribution function.

经济理论的最新应用是在市场设计中。例如，美国和世界各地的频谱拍卖的设计受拍卖理论的最新发展和机制设计理论的影响很大。但是，大部分理论是通过简化的看法（1）不同的市场参与者如何重视要出售对象的知识； （2）他们认为其他市场参与者的信念。为了进行障碍，已经做出了这种简化的假设，并且由此产生的理论非常成功。但是，从业者和理论家都关心的是，从理论中得出的“最佳”机制有时太复杂而无法在实践中实施，这导致寻找更简单的机制，这些机制似乎对环境的基本描述似乎更强大。我们的项目将在游戏理论中使用新的发展，从而使市场参与者的“类型”（包括富裕的信念）提供了用于使用简单机制的理论理由。该项目解决了两个单独但链接的目标。首先，我们研究了允许较丰富类型的空间的强大接收机制。特别是，研究人员经常认为，解决方案概念比贝叶斯 - 纳什平衡强，例如优势可溶性和Ex均衡，这是可取的，因为它们“稳健”，尽管并非总是描述出确切的鲁棒性概念。正式化鲁棒性的一种方法是检查结果是否继续保持较丰富的空间。在我们的提案中，我们讨论了幼稚类型空间和通用类型空间之间的各种类型空间，并检查随着类型空间的变化，不同机制的性能如何变化。我们的第二个目标是为特定类型的空间开发新的最佳机制，在所有收益相关类型的标准空间之间中间，并在所有付费相关类型的标准空间之间进行中间体。在这种情况下，最佳性是指机制设计师的目标，这可能与社会效率相吻合，或者只是设计师的收入最大化问题。当机制设计人员的目标要求他最大化期望值时，考虑通用类型空间的子空间，可以从先前的分布函数生成。