Collaborative Research: Information and Markets

合作研究：信息与市场

• 批准号: 2049744
• 负责人: Stephen Morris
• 金额: $ 24.57万
• 依托单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2021
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2021-08-01 至 2024-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2049744&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Information; Markets

This project analyzes the impact of information for the structure of markets. The use of information in internet and other markets has been revolutionized in the twenty by developments in technology. Economic institutions are adapting to these changes. At the same time, there have been fundamental improvements in our theoretical understanding of the role of information in the economy, but these new insights are somewhat abstract. Our project brings recent theoretical developments in information economics to bear on key economic questions in the economy. One component of our project addresses the new multi-billion dollar market for internet advertising. Advertisers purchase the right to display advertisements to particular internet users (the display of one advertisement to a particular internet user is known as an "impression". Because internet platforms have detailed information about users, it is possible to target users precisely, i.e., show particular advertisements to internet users with particular characteristics. The market for impressions has become very sophisticated. The research team seeks to understand the gains and losses associated with targeting impressions. This work will be an input into the important policy question of how internet platforms should be regulated. The team's work on the market for impressions will analyze new questions in auction theory. In particular, in the market for impressions, the publisher can use his private information about users to control advertisers' information about the value of particular viewers. Providing more information will increase the efficiency of the allocation. But more information will also reduce competition and give more information rents to the buyer. The team plans to understand the optimal information structure for the publishers and see how the optimal policy translates into selling methods used in practice. A second component of the project will study "Price Discrimination in Competitive Markets". Price discrimination when firms exploit information about consumers to target them with different prices. Price discrimination has been most successfully studied in the context of a monopoly seller. When firms both compete with each other but also price discriminate, the analysis can become intractable. This is a good example of a setting where more insight and tractability can be gained by allowing richer information. The team plans to provide tight bounds on welfare outcomes and price distributions for a given distribution of heterogeneous values of consumers. Finally, they want to improve our understanding of the relation between information and "higher-order beliefs". Higher-order beliefs encode a population's beliefs about the world, their beliefs about others' beliefs and so on. What is the relation between representing information via higher-order beliefs and less structured representations? They will develop the connection, understanding how a many player formalization of "more information" translates into higher-order beliefs and identifying settings where higher-order beliefs can be used to approximate any information structure.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

本项目分析信息对市场结构的影响。在互联网和其他市场的信息的使用已经在技术的发展革命性的二十。 经济体制正在适应这些变化。与此同时，我们对信息在经济中的作用的理论理解也有了根本性的改进，但这些新的见解有些抽象。我们的项目带来了信息经济学的最新理论发展，以解决经济中的关键经济问题。我们项目的一个组成部分是针对互联网广告的数十亿美元的新市场。广告商购买向特定互联网用户显示广告的权利（向特定互联网用户显示一个广告被称为“展示”。由于互联网平台有关于用户的详细信息，因此可以精确地定位用户，即，向具有特定特征的互联网用户显示特定广告。 印象市场已经变得非常复杂。研究团队试图了解与目标印象相关的收益和损失。这项工作将为如何监管互联网平台这一重要政策问题提供投入。 该团队对印象市场的研究将分析拍卖理论中的新问题。特别地，在印象市场中，发布者可以使用其关于用户的私人信息来控制广告商关于特定观众的价值的信息。提供更多的信息将提高分配的效率。但更多的信息也会减少竞争，给买方更多的信息租金。该团队计划了解出版商的最佳信息结构，并了解最佳策略如何转化为实际使用的销售方法。该项目的第二个组成部分将研究“竞争市场中的价格歧视”。价格歧视：指企业利用消费者的信息，针对他们制定不同的价格。 在垄断销售者的背景下，价格歧视的研究最为成功。当企业既相互竞争，又存在价格歧视时，分析就变得棘手了。这是一个很好的例子，说明通过允许更丰富的信息可以获得更多的洞察力和易处理性。该团队计划提供严格的福利结果和价格分布的异质消费者的价值分布。 最后，他们希望提高我们对信息和“高阶信念”之间关系的理解。高阶信念编码了一个群体对世界的信念，他们对他人信念的信念等等。通过高阶信念表示信息和较少结构化表征之间的关系是什么？ 他们将发展这种联系，理解多个参与者如何将“更多信息”的形式化转化为高阶信念，并确定高阶信念可以用于近似任何信息结构的设置。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的智力价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

项目成果

Optimal Information Disclosure in Classic Auctions

经典拍卖中的最优信息披露

• DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20210504
• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: American Economic Review: Insights
• 作者: Bergemann, Dirk;Heumann, Tibor;Morris, Stephen;Sorokin, Constantine;Winter, Eyal
• 通讯作者: Winter, Eyal