First Person Authority

第一人称权威

• 批准号: 219645423
• 负责人: Professor Dr. Wolfgang Barz
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Institut für Philosophie
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Research Grants
• 财政年份: 2012
• 资助国家: 德国
• 起止时间: 2011-12-31 至 2015-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/219645423?language=en
• 关键词: First; Person; Authority

This project is a sequel to the previous research under the title "First Person Authority". During the first funding period, the aim of my investigations was to show that there is no phenomenon of First Person Authority. Many of my arguments to this effect had certain controversial presuppositions: first, that being a legitimate object of philosophical study requires contributing to a philosophical problem and, second, that the phenomenon of First Person Authority, if it exists, raises a philosophical problem. During the requested extension period, the aim of my research is to defend these metaphilosophical claims and to give a detailed account of the philosophical problem that is raised by the phenomenon of First Person Authority.

本课题是“第一人称权威”研究的续篇。在第一个资助期内，我的调查目的是表明不存在第一人称权威的现象。我在这方面的许多论点都有某些有争议的前提：首先，作为哲学研究的合法对象需要对一个哲学问题做出贡献，其次，第一人称权威的现象，如果存在的话，提出了一个哲学问题。在所要求的延长期内，我的研究目的是捍卫这些形而上学的主张，并详细说明第一人称权威现象所提出的哲学问题。

项目成果

Infallibility, Acquaintance, and Phenomenal Concepts

无误、熟悉和现象概念

• DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12135
• 发表时间: 2016
• 期刊: Dialectica
• 作者: Wolfgang Barz

Doubts about One’s Own Existence

对自己存在的怀疑

• DOI: 10.1080/0020174x.2014.967805
• 发表时间: 2014
• 期刊: Inquiry
• 影响因子: 1.3
• 作者: Wolfgang Barz