Breakthrough: CPS-Security: Towards Provably Correct Distributed Attack-Resilient Control of Unmanned-Vehicle-Operator Networks

突破：CPS 安全：实现无人驾驶车辆运营商网络的可证明正确的分布式抗攻击控制

• 批准号: 1505664
• 负责人: Minghui Zhu
• 金额: $ 50万
• 依托单位: Pennsylvania State Univ University Park
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2015
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2015-07-15 至 2019-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1505664&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Breakthrough; CPS; Security; Towards; Provably

Inherent vulnerabilities of information and communication technology systems to cyber-attacks (e.g., malware) impose significant security risks to Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). This is evidenced by a number of recent accidents. Noticeably, current distributed control of CPS is not really attack-resilient (ensuring task completion despite attacks). Although provable resilience would significantly lift the trustworthiness of CPS, existing defenses are rather ad-hoc and mainly focus on attack detection. In addition, while network attacks have been extensively studied, resilient-to-malware distributed control has been rarely investigated.This project aims to bridge the gap. It aims to investigate provably correct distributed attack-resilient control of CPS. The project will focus on a representative class of CPS, namely unmanned-vehicle-operator networks, and its four main research thrusts are: (1) The development of a distributed attack-resilient control framework to ensure task completion of multiple vehicles despite network attacks and malware attacks, (2) The synthesis of novel distributed attack-resilient control algorithms to deal with network attacks, (3) The design of estimation algorithms to detect malware attacks on vehicles, and computationally efficient algorithms which allow clean vehicles to avoid the collision with the vehicles compromised by malware, and (4) The validation of the cost-effectiveness of the proposed distributed attack-resilient control framework via a principled systematic evaluation plan.The research findings profoundly impact CPS security of a variety of engineering disciplines beyond unmanned-vehicle-operator networks, including smart grid, smart buildings and intelligent transportation systems. The proposed research is interdisciplinary and involves interactions among security, control, distributed algorithms and robotics. This will lead to educational and training opportunities that cross traditional disciplinary boundaries for high-school, undergraduate and graduate students in STEM.

信息和通信技术系统对网络攻击(如恶意软件)的固有脆弱性给网络物理系统(CP)带来了巨大的安全风险。最近发生的多起事故证明了这一点。值得注意的是，当前对CP的分布式控制并不具有真正的攻击弹性(确保在受到攻击的情况下完成任务)。虽然可证明的弹性将显著提高CP的可信度，但现有的防御是相当临时的，主要集中在攻击检测上。此外，虽然网络攻击已经得到了广泛的研究，但对恶意软件的弹性分布式控制的研究还很少。它的目的是研究CPS的可证明正确的分布式攻击弹性控制。该项目将聚焦于一类具有代表性的CP，即无人车-操作员网络，其四个主要研究主题是：(1)开发一个分布式攻击弹性控制框架，以确保在网络攻击和恶意软件攻击下多个车辆完成任务；(2)合成新的分布式攻击弹性控制算法，以应对网络攻击；(3)设计检测对车辆的恶意软件攻击的估计算法，以及允许清洁车辆避免与被恶意软件危害的车辆相撞的计算高效算法，通过一个原则性的系统评估方案对所提出的分布式抗攻击控制框架的成本效益进行了验证。研究结果深刻地影响了智能电网、智能建筑和智能交通系统等各种工程学科的CPS安全。拟议的研究是跨学科的，涉及安全、控制、分布式算法和机器人之间的相互作用。这将为STEM的高中生、本科生和研究生提供跨越传统学科界限的教育和培训机会。