RI: Small: Modeling Platform Competition: A Multi-Agent Systems Approach

RI：小型：建模平台竞赛：多代理系统方法

• 批准号: 1527037
• 负责人: Sanmay Das
• 金额: $ 42.96万
• 依托单位: Washington University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2015
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2015-09-01 至 2019-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1527037&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: RI; Small; Modeling; Platform; Competition

In many important real-world settings, the interactions of multiple agents are governed by the platform that brings them together. Even if we assume rational behavior on the parts of agents, the outcomes of such interactions depend heavily on the rules, regulations, and norms of the platform. When multiple such platforms compete in dynamic environments, and agents are constrained in terms of their knowledge and computational capabilities, it becomes very difficult to predict societal outcomes based only on traditional economic theory. The goal of this project is to employ computational methods to study platform competition in three important domains: (1) financial markets; (2) kidney exchange; (3) online episodic labor and matching markets. We will explore these domains in detail, focusing initially on the following questions: (1) In financial markets, is high-frequency trading (HFT) beneficial or costly to society? If it is costly, how can we incentivize agents to switch to market platforms that do away with the incentives for HFT? (2) When multiple living-donor paired kidney exchanges compete on how frequently they run their matching algorithms, is this socially harmful in preventing a thicker market that would potentially allow more matches? Does this disproportionately affect certain types of patients? If so, how can we incentivize exchanges or patients to wait longer? (3) In platforms that allow users to search for tangible goods/durables (e.g. cars) or intangible matches, how does the amount and type of information provided to participants affect social welfare? How do the dynamics of platform competition affect the information available to users?In this project, the PI and his students will use multiple approaches, including computational game theory, multi-agent simulation, and empirical game analysis, to model the dynamics of platform competition. Applying the computational lens to studying the dynamics of platform competition is particularly important because of three features of these environments: (1) The complex interactions that occur between participants (e.g. traders learning from market prices, platforms deciding how much information to provide to participants); (2) The inherent complexity of the decision-problems faced by the big players (the platform itself, or agents that perform an important service for the platform) like market-makers in financial markets or the clearing algorithm for kidney exchanges; (3) A focus on the dynamics of how platforms evolve under competition. This research program will serve to both elucidate important questions about the specific applications, as well as explore new methodological questions as they arise in how computational modeling of economic and social systems can contribute deeper understanding when used in conjunction with the types of modeling common to economics and operations research.

在许多重要的现实环境中，多个代理的交互由将它们聚集在一起的平台管理。即使我们假设代理人的行为是理性的，这种交互的结果也很大程度上取决于平台的规则、法规和规范。当多个这样的平台在动态环境中竞争时，代理人在知识和计算能力方面受到限制，仅基于传统经济理论预测社会结果变得非常困难。该项目的目标是采用计算方法来研究三个重要领域的平台竞争：（1）金融市场;（2）肾脏交换;（3）在线偶发劳动力和匹配市场。我们将详细探讨这些领域，首先关注以下问题：（1）在金融市场中，高频交易（HFT）对社会是有益的还是昂贵的？如果它是昂贵的，我们如何激励代理商转向市场平台，消除高频交易的激励？(2)当多个活体捐赠者配对肾脏交换在运行匹配算法的频率上展开竞争时，这是否会对社会有害，从而阻止可能允许更多匹配的更厚的市场？这是否会对某些类型的患者造成不成比例的影响？如果是这样，我们如何激励交易所或患者等待更长时间？(3)在允许用户搜索有形商品/耐用品（例如汽车）或无形匹配的平台中，提供给参与者的信息数量和类型如何影响社会福利？平台竞争的动态如何影响用户可用的信息？在这个项目中，PI和他的学生将使用多种方法，包括计算博弈论，多智能体模拟和经验博弈分析，来模拟平台竞争的动态。运用计算透镜来研究平台竞争的动力学是特别重要的，因为这些环境具有三个特征：（1）参与者之间发生的复杂交互（例如，交易者从市场价格中学习，平台决定向参与者提供多少信息）;（2）大玩家面临的决策问题的固有复杂性（平台本身，或为平台提供重要服务的代理人），如金融市场的做市商或肾脏交易所的清算算法;（3）关注平台在竞争下如何演变的动态。该研究计划将有助于阐明有关具体应用的重要问题，并探索新的方法论问题，因为它们出现在经济和社会系统的计算建模如何与经济学和运筹学常见的建模类型结合使用时，可以促进更深入的理解。