Cost/Value Allocations in Supply Chain Operations

供应链运营中的成本/价值分配

• 批准号: 1538451
• 负责人: Xin Chen
• 金额: $ 30万
• 依托单位: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2015
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2015-08-01 至 2019-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1538451&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Cost; Value; Allocations; Supply; Chain

Cooperation among manufacturers has the potential to create a robust network of financially successful manufacturing firms that is essential for the resurgence of manufacturing in the US. These firms stay nimble by maintaining independent ownerships and keeping their sizes small. But they can also benefit from economy of scale enjoyed by large enterprises by joining forces with other members of their supply chain. Quantity discount in procurement, risk pooling in inventory control, and cost efficiency in environment regulation compliance are just a few examples of advantages that can be achieved by cooperation. Because firms are motivated to pursue their own interests, value sharing and/or cost allocation schemes are of vital importance for the formation of stable cooperative relationships. Cooperative game theory lays out a general framework for identifying and analyzing these schemes. Nevertheless, combining the general theory with supply chain specifics to develop implementable solutions and algorithms is a major challenge, which will be tackled in this project. This research will provide analytical tools to determine whether a mutually profitable cooperation is possible for a given set of manufacturers, and if so, identify allocation schemes to sustain the relationship. This research will analyze cooperative games in supply chain systems, such as the Newsvendor model and the Economic Lot Sizing model. The analysis will be also extended to more general versions of these systems that feature multi-period decision-making, price-demand relationships, concave inventory costs, and finite demand windows. The aim is to develop general conditions under which non-empty cores exist and identifying possible monotone allocation schemes. The underlying optimization problems that characterize individual participants' behavior and determine the outcome of the games, are difficult and will be addressed by new optimization techniques developed during this research. Moreover, the project will consider not only the effect of allocation schemes on incentive to cooperate, which is a verifiable action, but also participants' effort levels, which are not directly observable. Therefore, in addition to willingness to participate, the design of the value sharing/cost allocation scheme also needs to take into account incentive to contribute, and the development of such schemes in this project will add a new dimension to the existing models in the supply chain literature.

制造商之间的合作有可能创造一个强大的网络，由财务上成功的制造企业组成，这对美国制造业的复苏至关重要。这些公司通过保持独立所有权和保持小规模来保持灵活性。但它们也可以通过与供应链的其他成员联合，从大型企业所享有的规模经济中获益。采购中的数量折扣、库存控制中的风险分担以及环境法规合规中的成本效率只是合作可以实现的优势的几个例子。 由于企业有追求自身利益的动机，因此价值分享和/或成本分摊计划对于形成稳定的合作关系至关重要。合作博弈理论为识别和分析这些方案提供了一个通用框架。然而，将一般理论与供应链具体情况相结合，以开发可实施的解决方案和算法是一个重大挑战，这将在本项目中解决。这项研究将提供分析工具，以确定是否互利的合作是可能的一组给定的制造商，如果是这样，确定分配方案，以维持这种关系。本研究将分析供应链系统中的合作博弈，如报童模型和经济批量模型。该分析还将扩展到这些系统的更一般的版本，具有多期决策，价格-需求关系，凹库存成本和有限的需求窗口。我们的目的是发展的一般条件下，非空的核心存在，并确定可能的单调分配方案。表征个体参与者的行为并确定游戏结果的基本优化问题是困难的，将通过本研究期间开发的新优化技术来解决。此外，该项目不仅将考虑分配方案对合作激励的影响，这是一种可核查的行动，而且还将考虑参与者的努力水平，这是无法直接观察到的。因此，除了参与意愿之外，价值分享/成本分配方案的设计还需要考虑贡献激励，本项目中此类方案的开发将为供应链文献中的现有模型增加一个新的维度。