Mechanism design under bounded rationality: The optimal contracts in the complex world

有限理性下的机制设计：复杂世界中的最优合约

• 批准号: DP0881381
• 负责人: A/Prof Suren Basov
• 金额: $ 5.73万
• 依托单位: La Trobe University
• 依托单位国家: 澳大利亚
• 项目类别: Discovery Projects
• 财政年份: 2008
• 资助国家: 澳大利亚
• 起止时间: 2008-01-01 至 2011-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://dataportal.arc.gov.au/RGS/Web/Grants/DP0881381
• 关键词: Mechanism; design; under; bounded; rationality

The research will help to clarify the nature of optimal contracts in real life environments. An important feature of such environments is that they are complex so that actors cannot be assumed to behave fully rationally. We propose to address the question of optimal contract design under bounded rationality. Determining the incidence of costs of boundedly rational behaviour may provide foundations for some policy proposals in areas as diverse as industrial relations and income taxation in Australian settings.

这项研究将有助于澄清现实生活环境中最优合同的性质。这种环境的一个重要特征是它们很复杂，因此不能假定行为者的行为完全理性。我们提出了有限理性下的最优契约设计问题。确定有限理性行为的成本发生率可能会为澳大利亚的劳资关系和所得税等领域的一些政策建议提供基础。