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Doctoral Dissertation Research in DRMS: Victim Compensation

Doctoral Dissertation Research in DRMS: Victim Compensation
DRMS 的博士论文研究:受害者赔偿
批准号:
1559320
负责人:
Cristina Bicchieri
金额:
$1.59万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2016
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2016-03-15 至 2018-02-28

项目摘要

项目成果

Cristina Bicchieri的其他基金

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中文摘要
翻译
过去对受害者赔偿的研究特别关注移情作为其主要动机。然而,最近的研究发现,当某人因违反社会规范而遭受损失时,道德愤怒而不是同理心会驱使第三方赔偿受害者。这个研究项目建立在这一发现的基础上,以调查愤怒驱动补偿的潜在动机。利用实验经济学的行为游戏和心理学的尺度测量,本研究验证了人们补偿违反社会规范的受害者以表明他们自己支持规范的一般假设。这项研究通过对捐赠行为的心理决定因素提供更细致入微的观点,推动了捐赠科学的发展。这一理解为进一步加强自愿援助和规范一致性的应用工作奠定了框架。大量的心理学研究表明,补偿是由对受害者的移情关怀驱动的。补偿行为被解释为一种通过间接互惠的有效资源共享形式。然而,最近的研究表明,当损失是由于违反社会规范造成的,道德愤怒,而不是移情关怀,会驱使第三方赔偿受害者。鉴于这种动机与其他类型补偿行为的差异,这一结果表明,违反社会规范的受害者的补偿背后存在一种独特的心理机制。由于对违反规范者的惩罚也被证明是由愤怒驱动的,惩罚和补偿可能都是由相同的心理机制驱动的,并受到相同的进化压力的影响。鉴于这种相似性,本研究提出了规范传播假说:补偿违反社会规范的受害者的功能是表明补偿者对违反的规范的认可。通过调整第三方惩罚模型,本研究探讨了公共广播给补偿者带来好处的两种可能假设,这两种假设都可能同时促成这种行为的出现。第一个是声誉广播假说:通过补偿者对规范的认可,观察者将更愿意在未来与补偿者互动。第二种是规范稳定假说:通过表明他们支持规范,补偿方减轻了违反规范的破坏效应,增加了维持规范的可能性,在合作规范的情况下,增加了补偿方在未来互动中从合作产生盈余的特性中获得的预期利益。通过一系列改进的信任游戏,这四项研究对这三个假设进行了检验。因为道德愤怒驱使违反规范的受害者得到赔偿的发现是这个项目的基础,所以第一项研究用金钱激励复制了这个结果。第二项研究旨在测试一般规范广播假说,测量第三方是否在被他人观察时补偿更多。第三个研究测试了规范稳定假说的一个预测:那些看到违反规范的受害者得到补偿的人更有可能自己遵守规范。最后,第四项研究测试了声誉传播假说的预测:在相似的社交环境中,人们在选择游戏伙伴时更喜欢那些曾经补偿过违反规范受害者的人。
英文摘要
Past research on victim compensation specifically has focused on empathy as its primary motivator. However, recent research has found that, when someone experiences a loss due to the violation of a social norm, moral indignation rather than empathy drives third parties to compensate victims. This research project builds on that finding to investigate the underlying motivation for anger-driven compensation. Using behavioral games from experimental economics and scale measures from psychology, this research tests the general hypothesis that people compensate victims of social norm violations in order to signal their own endorsement of the norm. This research advances the science of giving by providing a more nuanced view of the psychological determinants of giving behavior. This understanding lays the framework for further applied work to increase voluntary assistance as well as norm conformity.A large body of psychological work has shown that compensation is driven by feeling empathic concern for the victim. Compensatory behavior has been explained as a form of efficient resource sharing through indirect reciprocity. Recent research, however, has demonstrated that, when a loss is due to the violation of a social norm, moral anger, and not empathic concern, drives third parties to compensate victims. Given this difference in motivation from other types of compensatory behavior, this result suggests a distinct psychological mechanism underlying the compensation of victims of social norm violations. As the punishment of norm violators has also been shown to be motivated by anger, punishment and compensation may both be driven by the same psychological mechanism and shaped by the same evolutionary pressures. In light of this similarity, this research develops the norm broadcasting hypothesis: the function of compensating the victim of a social norm violation is to signal the compensator's endorsement of the violated norm. Adapting models of third party punishment, this research explores two possible hypotheses underlying the benefits that this public broadcasting delivers to the compensator, both of which could simultaneously contribute to the emergence of this behavior. The first is the reputation broadcasting hypothesis: by compensators signaling their endorsement of the norm, observers will prefer interacting with the compensator in the future. The second is the norm stabilization hypothesis: by signaling their endorsement of the norm, the compensator mitigates the norm undermining effect of the violation, increasing the likelihood that the norm is maintained and, in the case of cooperative norms, increasing the expected benefit to the compensator from cooperation's surplus generating properties in future interactions. Using a series of modified trust games, the four proposed studies test these three hypotheses. Because the finding that moral anger drives the compensation of victims of norm violations grounds this project, the first study replicates this result with monetary incentives. The second study, designed to test the general norm broadcasting hypothesis, measures whether third parties compensate more when they are being observed by others. The third study tests a prediction of the norm stabilization hypothesis: that those who observe the victim of a norm violation being compensated are more likely to obey the norm themselves. Lastly, the fourth study tests a prediction of the reputation broadcasting hypothesis: that people prefer those who previously compensated a norm violation victim when selecting a partner for a game in a similar social context.
期刊论文(0)
专著(0)
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会议论文
Social Norms: Conditional Preferences and Mutual Expectations
  • 批准号:
    1052789
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $1.0万
  • 财政年份:
    2010
  • 负责人:
    Cristina Bicchieri
  • 依托单位:
Game-Theorectic Foundation for Multi-Agent Systems
  • 批准号:
    9734923
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $29.5万
  • 财政年份:
    1998
  • 负责人:
    Cristina Bicchieri
  • 依托单位:
U.S.-Italy Workshop on Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction; June 1992; Castiglioncello, Italy
  • 批准号:
    9021023
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $2.0万
  • 财政年份:
    1992
  • 负责人:
    Cristina Bicchieri
  • 依托单位:
Strategic Behavior and Counterfactuals
  • 批准号:
    8710209
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $3.0万
  • 财政年份:
    1987
  • 负责人:
    Cristina Bicchieri
  • 依托单位:
海外基金