CPS: Synergy: Collaborative Research: Foundations of Secure Cyber-Physical Systems of Systems

CPS：协同：协作研究：安全网络物理系统的基础

• 批准号: 1646063
• 负责人: Stephen Checkoway
• 金额: $ 24万
• 依托单位: University of Illinois at Chicago
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2016
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2016-10-01 至 2018-11-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1646063&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: CPS; Synergy; Collaborative; Research; Foundations

Factories, chemical plants, automobiles, and aircraft have come to be described today as cyber-physical systems of systems--distinct systems connected to form a larger and more complex system. For many such systems, correct operation is critical to safety, making their security of paramount importance. Unfortunately, because of their heterogeneous nature and special purpose, it is very difficult to determine whether a malicious attacker can make them behave in a manner that causes harm. This type of security analysis is an essential step in building and certifying secure systems.Unfortunately, today's state of the art security analysis tools are tailored to the analysis of server, desktop, and mobile software. We currently lack the tools for analyzing the security of cyber physical systems of systems. The proposed work will develop new techniques for testing and analyzing security properties of such systems. These techniques will be used to build a new generation of tools that can handle the complexity of modern cyber-physical systems and thus make these critical systems more secure.The technical approach taken by the investigators is to applying proven dynamic analysis techniques, including dynamic information flow tracking and symbolic execution, to this problem. Existing tools, while powerful, are monolithic, designed to apply a single technique to a single system. Scaling them to multiple heterogeneous systems is the main contribution of the proposed work. To do so, the investigators will develop a common platform for cross-system dynamic analysis supporting arbitrary combinations of component execution modes (physical, simulated, and emulated), requiring new coordination mechanisms. Second, building on the platform above, they will implement cross-system dynamic information flow tracking, allowing dynamic information flow tracking across simulated, emulated, and potentially physical components. Third, they will extend existing symbolic/concrete execution techniques to execution across multiple heterogeneous systems. Fourth, they will introduce new ways of handling special-purpose hardware, a problem faced by dynamic analysis tools in general.

如今，工厂、化工厂、汽车和飞机被描述为系统的网络物理系统--不同的系统连接起来形成一个更大、更复杂的系统。对于许多这样的系统，正确的操作对安全至关重要，使其安全性至关重要。不幸的是，由于它们的异构性和特殊用途，很难确定恶意攻击者是否可以使它们以造成伤害的方式行为。这种类型的安全分析是构建和认证安全系统的重要步骤。不幸的是，当今最先进的安全分析工具都是针对服务器、桌面和移动的软件的分析而定制的。我们目前缺乏分析系统的网络物理系统安全性的工具。拟议的工作将开发用于测试和分析此类系统的安全特性的新技术。这些技术将被用于构建新一代的工具，这些工具可以处理现代网络物理系统的复杂性，从而使这些关键系统更加安全。研究人员采取的技术方法是将经过验证的动态分析技术应用于这一问题，包括动态信息流跟踪和符号执行。现有的工具虽然功能强大，但都是单一的，旨在将单一技术应用于单一系统。将它们扩展到多个异构系统是所提出的工作的主要贡献。为此，研究人员将开发一个跨系统动态分析的通用平台，支持组件执行模式（物理，模拟和仿真）的任意组合，需要新的协调机制。其次，在上述平台的基础上，他们将实现跨系统的动态信息流跟踪，允许跨模拟、仿真和潜在物理组件的动态信息流跟踪。第三，它们将扩展现有的符号/具体执行技术，以跨多个异构系统执行。第四，他们将介绍处理专用硬件的新方法，这是动态分析工具通常面临的问题。