CIF:Medium:Collaborative Research:Maximal Leakage and Active Receivers for Side- and Covert Channel Analysis

旁路是指在计算机或通信系统中不可避免地和无意地向未经授权的用户泄露信息的任何进程。隐蔽通道是同时访问同一计算机的两方故意通过其进行通信的任何机制，尽管该机制不允许进行通信。这两种渠道的例子比比皆是，它们的存在使我们的计算和通信基础设施变得不那么安全：侧渠道允许攻击者收集他们本来无法访问的敏感信息，而秘密渠道允许用户之间未经授权的泄露。该项目使工程师能够衰减侧面和转换通道，从而使我们的电子基础设施不太容易受到外部攻击和内部泄漏的影响。在这个过程中，该项目使信息理论、计算机体系结构和通信网络方面的研究人员能够进行新的合作。该项目通过研究机会和为专业社会改进的指导计划，扩大了未被充分代表的群体，特别是妇女的参与。该项目从理论上探讨了对间接和秘密渠道信息的研究。从历史上看，信息论在减轻旁路和秘密渠道方面提供的帮助相对较少。这部分是因为不清楚如何量化通过旁路泄露的信息量，部分是因为许多旁路和秘密通道涉及一个可以主动控制通道的接收器。为了解决这两个障碍，该项目开发了一种最近提出的测量旁路泄漏的指标，该指标在操作上是合理的，并且很容易计算。该项目还开发了一些结果，使人们能够预测活跃的接收者将如何行动。该项目最终将这些结果应用于跨越通信网络和多核处理器的三个具体场景。

A side-channel is any process that inevitably and unintentionally leaks information to an unauthorized user in a computer or communication system. A covert channel is any mechanism through which two parties simultaneously accessing the same computer intentionally communicate, despite this mechanism being disallowed for communication. Examples of both channels abound, and their presence makes our computation and communication infrastructure less secure: side channels allow attackers to glean sensitive information that they would not otherwise be able to access, and covert channels enable unauthorized disclosure between users. This project enables engineers to attenuate side- and convert channels, thereby making our electronic infrastructure less vulnerable to external attack and internal leaks. In the process, the project enables a new collaboration between researchers in information theory, computer architecture, and communication networks. The project broadens participation of under-represented groups, especially women, through research opportunities and an improved mentoring program for a professional society.This project approaches the study of side- and covert channels information theoretically. Historically, information theory has provided relatively little assistance toward mitigating side- and covert channels. This is partly because it is unclear how to quantify the amount of information leaked through a side channel and partly because many side- and covert channels involve a receiver that can actively control the channel. Such receivers are not well understood.To address these two impediments, the project develops a recently-proposed metric for measuring leakage in side-channels that is operationally justified and easily computed. The project also develops results that enable one to predict how active receivers will act. The project culminates in the application of these results to three specific scenarios spanning communication networks and multi-core processors.