Developing Effective Strategies for Enhancing Power System Resiliency in the Presence of Cyber-Physical Attacks

与传统电力系统相比，智能电网的一个主要特点是广泛部署更多的网络技术，以实现各种测量，通信和控制功能。然而，无数信息和通信技术的实施将不可避免地增加电网的网络脆弱性。除了网络入侵，电网还受到物理攻击的威胁。例如，攻击者可以对故意选择的设备进行物理攻击，以中断电源。以潜在恐怖活动形式出现的人为破坏最近也受到更多关注。该项目将通过解决几个紧迫的智能电网网络物理安全问题，带来变革性的成果。它将通过为网络物理风险评估和缓解计划的制定一个全面的框架，大大推进最先进的技术水平。所开发的网络物理安全分析模型将能够涵盖物理组件，网络漏洞，物理漏洞，人为因素等的不确定性，这预计将导致电力系统网络物理安全，弹性和可信度领域的重大进步，通过考虑一组全面的不确定因素。该项目的定量研究将使电力系统运营商和规划者能够做出更明智的决策。该项目的成果将使公用事业、监管机构和政府机构能够评估和改善现代电力系统的网络物理安全和弹性。此外，研究成果将纳入各种教育和外联活动，使下一代劳动力了解国家重要基础设施中新出现的网络-物理脆弱性。在智能电网部署中实施无数先进的传感、通信和控制技术也增加了对网络物理脆弱性的关注，从长远来看，这一领域的研究对智能电网的成功至关重要。该项目的主要目标是在出现网络物理攻击的情况下提高电力系统的弹性。为此，提出了三种新的策略，可以部署在系统规划或运行阶段，包括有效识别全面的关键意外事件有关的网络物理攻击，面向安全约束的最优潮流，鲁棒优化电力系统保护会计的不确定性。本项目的主要研究任务是：1）基于状态空间修剪和智能搜索相结合的方法，开发一种有效的电力系统关键元件综合辨识方法; 2）开发一种面向潮流的最优潮流框架和相应的混合并行计算方案;以及3）基于多攻击场景防御者-攻击者-防御者模型，考虑攻击资源的不确定性，开发一种新的分配防御资源以最小化损害的方案。这些拟议的防御战略可能会大大增强当代电网在出现不利的重大网络物理事件时的弹性。

As compared with the traditional power system, one of the major characteristics of the evolving smart grid is the widespread deployment of more cyber technologies for achieving various measurement, communication, and control functionalities. However, the implementation of myriad information and communication technologies will inevitably increase the cyber vulnerability of the power grid. Besides cyber intrusions, the power grid is also under emerging threats from physical attacks. For example, attackers could physically attack deliberately selected equipment to disrupt the power supply. Man-made sabotage in the form of potential terrorist activities are also receiving more attention recently. This project will lead to transformative results by addressing several pressing smart grid cyber-physical security problems. It will significantly advance the state of the art by developing a comprehensive framework for cyber-physical risk assessment and mitigation scheme development. The developed cyber-physical security analysis models will be able to cover a wide range of uncertainties in physical components, cyber vulnerability, physical vulnerability, human factors, etc. This is expected to lead to significant advancement in the field of power system cyber-physical security, resiliency, and trustworthiness by considering a comprehensive set of uncertain factors. The quantitative study in the project will enable more informed decision-making for power system operators and planners. The project outcomes will allow utilities, regulators, and government agencies to evaluate and improve cyber-physical security and resiliency of modern electric power systems. In addition, the research outcomes will be integrated into a wide variety of educational and outreach activities for equipping the next-generation workforce with the awareness on the emerging cyber-physical vulnerabilities in national critical infrastructures. Implementation of myriad advanced sensing, communication, and control technologies in smart grid deployment also increases concerns on cyber-physical vulnerability, and research in this field will be critical to the success of the smart grid in the long term. The major goal of this project is to enhance power system resiliency in the presence of emerging cyber-physical attacks. Three novel strategies are proposed for this purpose which can be deployed in either the system planning or operation stage, including the efficient identification of comprehensive critical contingencies relating to cyber-physical attacks, resiliency-oriented security-constrained optimal power flow, and robust optimization based power system protection accounting for uncertainties. The major research tasks of this project are: 1) developing an efficient procedure for comprehensively identifying the critical components in a power system based on an integrated state space pruning and intelligent search methodology; 2) developing a novel resiliency-oriented optimal power flow framework and an associated hybrid parallel computing solution; and 3) developing a novel scheme for allocating defensive resources to minimize damage considering the uncertainties in offensive resources based on a multiple-attack-scenario defender-attacker-defender model. These proposed defense strategies could result in major enhancement of the resiliency of contemporary power grids in the presence of adverse, significant cyber-physical events.