SaTC: CORE: Small: Collaborative: EM and Power Side-Channel Attack Immunity through High-Efficiency Hardware Obfuscations

SaTC：核心：小型：协作：通过高效硬件混淆来抵御电磁和电源侧通道攻击

• 批准号: 1717467
• 负责人: Arijit Raychowdhury
• 金额: $ 25万
• 依托单位: Georgia Tech Research Corporation
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2017
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2017-10-01 至 2022-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1717467&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: SaTC; CORE; Small; Collaborative; EM

In the increasingly digitally connected world, data security and privacy have emerged as key challenges, from a personal to a national level. Encryption is at the heart of securing data and when mathematically secure encryption primitives are implemented in physical hardware, they exhibit vulnerability to smart attackers due to unintentional leakage of physical signals during encryption process. This research is exploring new ways to modeling the fundamental cause of such leakages in electromagnetic and power signatures and developing efficient hardware obfuscations and countermeasures to improve security of future systems. Both the PIs are actively involved in both undergraduate and graduate research, and will disseminate the findings through publicly accessible models, involving and training undergraduate/graduate students to increase awareness of the security vulnerabilities, possible countermeasures and best practices. Side Channel Attacks (SCA) utilize unintentional physical leakage signals during encryption process such as Power (i.e., current at the power pin), electromagnetic (EM) radiation, acoustic etc. to steal secret keys. This project is investigating EM and Power SCA on Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) engines, including the origin of EM SCA, and exploring efficient circuit, architecture and hardware level suppression and obfuscation techniques which can provide robustness against possible attacks. If successful, this cross-disciplinary project spanning crypto-algorithm, circuit design and EM analysis will lay the foundations of EM side channel security in mobile platforms and IoT nodes.

在日益数字化连接的世界中，数据安全和隐私已成为从个人到国家层面的主要挑战。加密是保护数据的核心，当在物理硬件中实现数学上安全的加密原语时，由于在加密过程中无意中泄漏物理信号，它们容易受到智能攻击者的攻击。这项研究正在探索新的方法来模拟电磁和功率特征中这种泄漏的根本原因，并开发有效的硬件混淆和对策，以提高未来系统的安全性。这两个pi都积极参与本科生和研究生的研究，并将通过可公开访问的模型传播研究结果，让本科生/研究生参与和培训，以提高对安全漏洞、可能的对策和最佳实践的认识。侧信道攻击（SCA）利用加密过程中无意的物理泄漏信号，如电源（即电源引脚处的电流），电磁（EM）辐射，声学等来窃取密钥。该项目正在研究高级加密标准（AES）引擎上的EM和Power SCA，包括EM SCA的起源，并探索有效的电路、架构和硬件级抑制和混淆技术，这些技术可以提供抗可能攻击的鲁棒性。如果成功，这个跨越加密算法、电路设计和EM分析的跨学科项目将为移动平台和物联网节点的EM侧信道安全奠定基础。

项目成果

EM and Power SCA-Resilient AES-256 Through >350× Current-Domain Signature Attenuation and Local Lower Metal Routing

• DOI: 10.1109/jssc.2020.3032975
• 发表时间: 2021-01
• 期刊: IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits
• 影响因子: 5.4
• 作者: D. Das;Josef Danial;Anupam Golder;Nirmoy Modak;Shovan Maity;Baibhab Chatterjee;Dong-Hyun Seo;Muya Chang;Avinash L. Varna;H. Krishnamurthy;S. Mathew;Santosh K. Ghosh;A. Raychowdhury;Shreyas Sen