SaTC: CORE: Small: An Exploration of Schedule-Based Vulnerabilities In Real-Time Embedded Systems

SaTC：核心：小型：实时嵌入式系统中基于调度的漏洞的探索

• 批准号: 1718952
• 负责人: Sibin Mohan
• 金额: $ 50万
• 依托单位: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2017
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2017-08-01 至 2021-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1718952&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: SaTC; CORE; Small; Exploration; Schedule

Many safety-critical systems such as automobiles, aircraft, medical devices, and power plants are controlled by real-time, embedded systems. As such systems are interconnected via networks such as the Internet, they have become increasingly vulnerable to cyber attacks. This project is studying vulnerabilities of such systems, how attackers might avoid detection, and protection strategies. This project focuses on the surveillance phase of a cyber attack against an embedded, real-time system (RTS). The researchers are addressing the following question: How can an adversary extract critical information about an operational RTS, while avoiding detection? In this environment, task scheduling (e.g., when will an import program be executed?) is exceptionally critical information, enabling an attacker to launch a targeted attack against specific, important tasks. To succeed in gathering the necessary information and launching an attack, the attacker must avoid perturbing the system in ways that might reveal his or her presence. The researchers are developing algorithms and side-channel metrics to study what they could reveal about system schedule characteristics and task start times and duration estimates. Based on these studies, the team is designing randomization-based mitigations for such attacks. Results are evaluated both through simulation and through experiments on real embedded platforms.

许多安全关键系统，如汽车、飞机、医疗设备和发电厂，都是由实时嵌入式系统控制的。由于这些系统是通过互联网等网络相互连接的，因此越来越容易受到网络攻击。该项目正在研究此类系统的漏洞，攻击者如何避免检测，以及保护策略。该项目侧重于针对嵌入式实时系统（RTS）的网络攻击的监视阶段。研究人员正在解决以下问题：攻击者如何在不被发现的情况下提取有关运行RTS的关键信息？在这种环境中，任务调度（例如，何时执行导入程序？）是非常关键的信息，使攻击者能够对特定的重要任务发起有针对性的攻击。为了成功地收集必要的信息并发起攻击，攻击者必须避免以可能暴露其存在的方式干扰系统。研究人员正在开发算法和侧信道指标，以研究它们可以揭示的系统调度特征、任务启动时间和持续时间估计。基于这些研究，该团队正在为此类攻击设计基于随机化的缓解措施。通过仿真和实际嵌入式平台上的实验对结果进行了评价。

项目成果

A Novel Side-Channel in Real-Time Schedulers

• DOI: 10.1109/rtas.2019.00016
• 发表时间: 2018-06
• 期刊: 2019 IEEE Real-Time and Embedded Technology and Applications Symposium (RTAS)
• 作者: Chien-Ying Chen;Sibin Mohan;R. Pellizzoni;R. Bobba;N. Kiyavash

Period Adaptation for Continuous Security Monitoring in Multicore Real-Time Systems

多核实时系统中连续安全监控的周期自适应

• DOI: 10.23919/date48585.2020.9116364
• 发表时间: 2020
• 期刊: Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE
• 作者: Hasan, Monowar;Mohan, Sibin;Pellizzoni, Rodolfo;Bobba, Rakesh B.
• 通讯作者: Bobba, Rakesh B.

The future of IoT security: special session

• 发表时间: 2018-09
• 作者: Sibin Mohan;Mikael Asplund;Gedare Bloom;A. Sadeghi;Ahmad Ibrahim;Negin Salajageh;P. Griffioen;B. Sinopoli

A Covert Queueing Channel in FCFS Schedulers

• DOI: 10.1109/tifs.2018.2797953
• 发表时间: 2017-07
• 期刊: IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
• 影响因子: 6.8
• 作者: AmirEmad Ghassami;N. Kiyavash

Securing Real-Time Internet-of-Things

• DOI: 10.3390/s18124356
• 发表时间: 2017-05
• 期刊: Sensors (Basel, Switzerland)
• 作者: Chien-Ying Chen;M. Hasan;Sibin Mohan