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Staggered membership renewal and differential time horizons in second chambers. Staggering formulas, membership patterns, time horizons and their effects on both procedural and substantive dimensions of law-making

第二院的交错会员更新和不同的时间范围。

基本信息

批准号：
229826419
负责人：
Professor Dr. Klaus H. Goetz
金额：
--
依托单位：
Lehrstuhl für Politische Systeme und Europäische Integration
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2012
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2011-12-31 至 2015-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/229826419?language=en
关键词：
Staggered membership renewal differential time

项目摘要

Political power in democracies is pro tempore, i.e. limited in time, and based on renewal in political personnel through regular elections. Discontinuity in office – potential and actual – is, accordingly, a basic democratic principle with profound effects on the time horizons of elected representatives and their behavior in office. Yet, at the institutional level, democratic renewal may be partial rather than complete. A striking example are those second parliamentary chambers in which membership renewal is staggered. This can be the result of staggered elections, as in the cases of the Australian Senate, the Japanese Sangiin and the French Sénat or of staggered changes in membership through lowerlevel delegation, as in the case of the German Bundesrat. In such settings, institutional continuity coexists with marked differences in the time horizons of members, who join and leave the institution at different, more or less predictable, points in time. The present project examines how these differentials in time horizons affect legislative behavior through a comparison of four second chambers that operate under the conditions of parliamentary democracy. The analysis focuses on time horizon effects along two dimensions, one procedural, and the other substantive in character. In its first phase, the project explores the impact of differential time horizons on the volume and timing of legislative amendments; where possible, the volume and timing of legislative proposals originating in the second chamber; and the volume and timing of motions relating to legislative agenda control at floor level. In its second phase, the project investigates whether differential time horizons matter for policy substance, in particular whether they encourage short-termism in the policy objectives pursued, as expressed, e.g., through legislative amendments intended to bring immediate benefits to prospective voters. The key overarching questions asked are: Does the combination of staggered membership renewal and resulting variation in legislators’ time horizons systematically encourage specific patterns of legislative behavior? In particular, does it put second chambers in more or less permanent ‘election mode’, characterized by a strong emphasis on short-termist electoral signaling, as expressed in both procedural and substantive terms? Or does staggering, on the contrary, promote stability in lawmaking and encourage a willingness to take “the longer view“ when it comes to shaping public policies?

民主国家的政治权力是临时的，即有时间限制，并以通过定期选举更新政治人员为基础。因此，职务的不连续性-潜在的和实际的-是一项基本的民主原则，对当选代表的时间范围及其在职务上的行为有着深远的影响。然而，在体制一级，民主复兴可能是部分的，而不是完全的。一个突出的例子是那些成员更新交错的第二议会议院。这可能是交错选举的结果，如澳大利亚参议院、日本参议院和法国参议院的情况，也可能是通过较低级别代表团交错更换成员的结果，如德国联邦参议院的情况。在这种情况下，机构的连续性与成员的时间范围明显不同并存，他们在不同的、或多或少可预测的时间点加入和离开机构。本项目通过比较在议会民主制条件下运作的四个第二议院来考察这些时间跨度上的差异如何影响立法行为。分析的重点是时间跨度效应沿沿着两个方面，一个程序，另一个实质性的。在第一阶段，该项目探讨了不同的时间范围对立法修正案的数量和时间的影响;在可能的情况下，第二议院提出的立法建议的数量和时间;以及与立法议程控制有关的动议的数量和时间。在第二阶段，该项目调查不同的时间范围对政策实质是否重要，特别是它们是否鼓励所追求的政策目标中的短期主义，例如，通过立法修正案，旨在为未来的选民带来直接利益。关键的首要问题是：交错的成员更新和由此产生的立法者的时间范围的变化相结合，系统地鼓励立法行为的特定模式？特别是，它是否将第二议院置于或多或少永久的“选举模式”中，其特征是强烈强调短期选举信号，如程序和实质性条款所示？或者说，恰恰相反，交错式立法促进了立法的稳定性，并鼓励人们在制定公共政策时愿意采取“更长远的眼光”？