Staggered membership renewal and differential time horizons in second chambers. Staggering formulas, membership patterns, time horizons and their effects on both procedural and substantive dimensions of law-making

民主国家的政治权力是临时的，即时间有限，并以通过定期选举更新政治人员为基础。因此，职位不连续--潜在的和实际的--是一项基本的民主原则，对当选代表的时间范围及其在任行为产生深远影响。然而，在制度层面上，民主复兴可能是局部的，而不是完全的。一个明显的例子是第二个议会会议厅，其中成员资格的更新是错开的。这可能是错开选举的结果，如澳大利亚参议院、日本参众两院和法国S的情况，也可能是通过较低级别的代表团错开改变成员资格的结果，如德国联邦议院的情况。在这种情况下，机构的连续性与成员时间范围的显著差异并存，成员在不同的、或多或少可以预测的时间点加入和离开机构。本项目通过对在议会民主条件下运作的四个第二议院的比较，审查这些时间范围上的差异如何影响立法行为。分析集中在两个维度上的时间范围效应，一个是程序性的，另一个是实质性的。在第一阶段，该项目探讨了不同的时间范围对立法修正案的数量和时间的影响；如有可能，第二议院提出的立法提案的数量和时间；以及与在最低一级控制立法议程有关的动议的数量和时间。在第二阶段，该项目调查不同的时间范围对政策实质是否重要，特别是它们是否鼓励所追求的政策目标的短期主义，例如，通过旨在给潜在选民带来直接利益的立法修订。被问到的关键问题是：交错的成员资格更新和由此导致的立法者时间范围的变化相结合，是否系统性地鼓励特定的立法行为模式？特别是，它是否将第二议院置于或多或少永久性的‘选举模式’，其特点是强烈强调短期选举信号，无论是程序上还是实质上都是如此？或者，相反，错位是否会促进立法的稳定性，并鼓励人们在制定公共政策时采取“更长远的眼光”？

Political power in democracies is pro tempore, i.e. limited in time, and based on renewal in political personnel through regular elections. Discontinuity in office – potential and actual – is, accordingly, a basic democratic principle with profound effects on the time horizons of elected representatives and their behavior in office. Yet, at the institutional level, democratic renewal may be partial rather than complete. A striking example are those second parliamentary chambers in which membership renewal is staggered. This can be the result of staggered elections, as in the cases of the Australian Senate, the Japanese Sangiin and the French Sénat or of staggered changes in membership through lowerlevel delegation, as in the case of the German Bundesrat. In such settings, institutional continuity coexists with marked differences in the time horizons of members, who join and leave the institution at different, more or less predictable, points in time. The present project examines how these differentials in time horizons affect legislative behavior through a comparison of four second chambers that operate under the conditions of parliamentary democracy. The analysis focuses on time horizon effects along two dimensions, one procedural, and the other substantive in character. In its first phase, the project explores the impact of differential time horizons on the volume and timing of legislative amendments; where possible, the volume and timing of legislative proposals originating in the second chamber; and the volume and timing of motions relating to legislative agenda control at floor level. In its second phase, the project investigates whether differential time horizons matter for policy substance, in particular whether they encourage short-termism in the policy objectives pursued, as expressed, e.g., through legislative amendments intended to bring immediate benefits to prospective voters. The key overarching questions asked are: Does the combination of staggered membership renewal and resulting variation in legislators’ time horizons systematically encourage specific patterns of legislative behavior? In particular, does it put second chambers in more or less permanent ‘election mode’, characterized by a strong emphasis on short-termist electoral signaling, as expressed in both procedural and substantive terms? Or does staggering, on the contrary, promote stability in lawmaking and encourage a willingness to take “the longer view“ when it comes to shaping public policies?