Staggered membership renewal and differential time horizons in second chambers. Staggering formulas, membership patterns, time horizons and their effects on both procedural and substantive dimensions of law-making

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Political power in democracies is pro tempore, i.e. limited in time, and based on renewal in political personnel through regular elections. Discontinuity in office – potential and actual – is, accordingly, a basic democratic principle with profound effects on the time horizons of elected representatives and their behavior in office. Yet, at the institutional level, democratic renewal may be partial rather than complete. A striking example are those second parliamentary chambers in which membership renewal is staggered. This can be the result of staggered elections, as in the cases of the Australian Senate, the Japanese Sangiin and the French Sénat or of staggered changes in membership through lowerlevel delegation, as in the case of the German Bundesrat. In such settings, institutional continuity coexists with marked differences in the time horizons of members, who join and leave the institution at different, more or less predictable, points in time. The present project examines how these differentials in time horizons affect legislative behavior through a comparison of four second chambers that operate under the conditions of parliamentary democracy. The analysis focuses on time horizon effects along two dimensions, one procedural, and the other substantive in character. In its first phase, the project explores the impact of differential time horizons on the volume and timing of legislative amendments; where possible, the volume and timing of legislative proposals originating in the second chamber; and the volume and timing of motions relating to legislative agenda control at floor level. In its second phase, the project investigates whether differential time horizons matter for policy substance, in particular whether they encourage short-termism in the policy objectives pursued, as expressed, e.g., through legislative amendments intended to bring immediate benefits to prospective voters. The key overarching questions asked are: Does the combination of staggered membership renewal and resulting variation in legislators’ time horizons systematically encourage specific patterns of legislative behavior? In particular, does it put second chambers in more or less permanent ‘election mode’, characterized by a strong emphasis on short-termist electoral signaling, as expressed in both procedural and substantive terms? Or does staggering, on the contrary, promote stability in lawmaking and encourage a willingness to take “the longer view“ when it comes to shaping public policies?