Communication, Beliefs, and Revenue Bounds
Communication, Beliefs, and Revenue Bounds
批准号:
1724747
负责人:
Philip Reny
金额:
$28.3万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2017
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2017-08-01 至 2021-07-31
中文摘要
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英文摘要
This award funds three research projects in game theory. The first analyzes strategic situations in which participants communicate freely, including making statements with no strategic motives. The second project seeks to develop new methods for determining which equilibrium results are consistent with specific concepts of consistency. The third project analyzes how a profit-maximizing multi-product monopolist will choose a marketing strategy when it has incomplete information about demand. The goal here is to develop bounds on the maximum possible sales, which could provide some insight into why such firms frequently bundle goods. The results of these projects may create new tools for analyzing bargaining, negotiation, and repeated market interactions.The first project analyzes a model without the common explicit enumeration of all possible actions for the players; in practice this limits communication possibilities. Instead the PI develops a model in which players are able to freely announce their private information. Using a new refinement of sequential equilibrium, the resulting outcomes are often stable in the Kohlberg-Mertens (1986) sense. The second project presents an argument that normal form perfection, rather than backward induction or sequential equilibrium, captures the decision-theoretic consequences of dynamic consistency in games. The researcher then develops an equilibrium-based analog of rationalizability to address the issues of invariance. This means that invariance is sought as a result rather than being imposed as an axiom. The third project tackles a complicated problem in multi-dimensional optimal mechanism design. While there are no known methods for providing useful characterizations of the solution, in practice we observe that firms use simple mechanisms. The project will examine whether good revenue bounds can explain the wide use of these mechanisms.
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A simple sufficient condition for a unique and student-efficient stable matching in the college admissions problem
大学招生问题中独特且学生有效的稳定匹配的简单充分条件
DOI:
10.1007/s40505-020-00197-2
发表时间:
2021
期刊:
Economic Theory Bulletin
影响因子:
0.3
作者:
[Reny, Philip J.]
通讯作者:
Reny, Philip J.
An improved bound for the Shapley–Folkman theorem
Shapley-Folkman 定理的改进界限
DOI:
10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.04.003
发表时间:
2020
期刊:
Journal of Mathematical Economics
影响因子:
1.3
作者:
[Budish, Eric, Reny, Philip J.]
通讯作者:
Reny, Philip J.
The Better Half of Selling Separately
单独销售的更好的一半
DOI:
10.1145/3369927
发表时间:
2020
期刊:
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
影响因子:
1.2
作者:
[Hart, Sergiu, Reny, Philip J.]
通讯作者:
Reny, Philip J.
Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games
不连续博弈中的纳什均衡
DOI:
10.1146/annurev-economics-082019-111720
发表时间:
2020
期刊:
Annual Review of Economics
影响因子:
5.6
作者:
[Reny, Philip J.]
通讯作者:
Reny, Philip J.
Perfect Conditional ε ‐Equilibria of Multi‐Stage Games With Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions
具有无限组信号和动作的多阶段博弈的完美条件 ε 均衡
DOI:
10.3982/ecta13426
发表时间:
2020
期刊:
Econometrica
影响因子:
6.1
作者:
[Myerson, Roger B., Reny, Philip J.]
通讯作者:
Reny, Philip J.
Efficient Matching, Continuous Voting, and Non-Contractable Critical Information
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批准号:2049810
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$15.0万
-
财政年份:2021
-
负责人:Philip Reny
-
依托单位:
Existence of Equilibria in Infinite Games
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批准号:1227506
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$27.33万
-
财政年份:2012
-
负责人:Philip Reny
-
依托单位:
Existence of Equilibria in Bayesian Games, Strategic-Form Games, and Extensive-Form Games with Infinite Action Spaces
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批准号:0922535
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$14.96万
-
财政年份:2009
-
负责人:Philip Reny
-
依托单位:
Equilibrium Existence Issues
-
批准号:0617884
-
项目类别:Continuing Grant
-
资助金额:$11.78万
-
财政年份:2006
-
负责人:Philip Reny
-
依托单位:
Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium
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批准号:0214421
-
项目类别:Continuing Grant
-
资助金额:$10.48万
-
财政年份:2003
-
负责人:Philip Reny
-
依托单位:
Auctions: Efficiency and Existence of Equilibrium
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批准号:9905599
-
项目类别:Continuing Grant
-
资助金额:$12.65万
-
财政年份:1999
-
负责人:Philip Reny
-
依托单位:
Efficiency and Stability in Economic Environments with Asymmetric Information
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批准号:9709392
-
项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$15.38万
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财政年份:1997
-
负责人:Philip Reny
-
依托单位:
海外基金