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Communication, Beliefs, and Revenue Bounds

沟通、信念和收入界限

基本信息

批准号：
1724747
负责人：
Philip Reny
金额：
$ 28.3万
依托单位：
University of Chicago
依托单位国家：
美国
项目类别：
Standard Grant
财政年份：
2017
资助国家：
美国
起止时间：
2017-08-01 至 2021-07-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1724747&HistoricalAwards=false
关键词：
Communication Beliefs Revenue Bounds

项目摘要

This award funds three research projects in game theory. The first analyzes strategic situations in which participants communicate freely, including making statements with no strategic motives. The second project seeks to develop new methods for determining which equilibrium results are consistent with specific concepts of consistency. The third project analyzes how a profit-maximizing multi-product monopolist will choose a marketing strategy when it has incomplete information about demand. The goal here is to develop bounds on the maximum possible sales, which could provide some insight into why such firms frequently bundle goods. The results of these projects may create new tools for analyzing bargaining, negotiation, and repeated market interactions.The first project analyzes a model without the common explicit enumeration of all possible actions for the players; in practice this limits communication possibilities. Instead the PI develops a model in which players are able to freely announce their private information. Using a new refinement of sequential equilibrium, the resulting outcomes are often stable in the Kohlberg-Mertens (1986) sense. The second project presents an argument that normal form perfection, rather than backward induction or sequential equilibrium, captures the decision-theoretic consequences of dynamic consistency in games. The researcher then develops an equilibrium-based analog of rationalizability to address the issues of invariance. This means that invariance is sought as a result rather than being imposed as an axiom. The third project tackles a complicated problem in multi-dimensional optimal mechanism design. While there are no known methods for providing useful characterizations of the solution, in practice we observe that firms use simple mechanisms. The project will examine whether good revenue bounds can explain the wide use of these mechanisms.

该奖项资助了三个博弈论研究项目。第一个分析的战略情况下，参与者自由沟通，包括没有战略动机的声明。第二个项目寻求开发新的方法来确定哪些均衡结果与特定的一致性概念相一致。第三个项目分析了在需求信息不完全的情况下，利润最大化的多产品垄断厂商如何选择营销策略。这里的目标是确定最大可能销售额的界限，这可以提供一些关于为什么这些公司经常捆绑商品的见解。这些项目的结果可能会创造新的工具来分析讨价还价，谈判，和重复的市场互动。第一个项目分析了一个模型，没有共同的明确枚举的所有可能的行动，为球员;在实践中，这限制了沟通的可能性。相反，PI开发了一个模型，在这个模型中，玩家可以自由地公布他们的私人信息。使用一种新的序列均衡的改进，结果往往是稳定的Kohlberg-Mertens（1986）的意义。第二个项目提出了一个论点，即范式完美，而不是逆向归纳或顺序均衡，捕捉动态一致性的决策理论的后果在游戏中。然后，研究人员开发了一个基于均衡的合理化模拟，以解决不变性的问题。这意味着不变性是作为结果而寻求的，而不是作为公理强加的。第三个项目解决了多维优化机构设计中的一个复杂问题。虽然没有已知的方法来提供有用的解决方案的特征，在实践中，我们观察到，企业使用简单的机制。该项目将审查良好的收入界限是否能够解释这些机制的广泛使用。