Existence of Equilibria in Bayesian Games, Strategic-Form Games, and Extensive-Form Games with Infinite Action Spaces

贝叶斯博弈、策略型博弈和具有无限行动空间的扩展型博弈中均衡的存在性

• 批准号: 0922535
• 负责人: Philip Reny
• 金额: $ 14.96万
• 依托单位: University of Chicago
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-09-01 至 2012-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0922535&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Existence; Equilibria; Bayesian; Games; Strategic

Auctions are a ubiquitous means for allocating resources, both in the private and in the public sectors. A key question of interest is whether auctions are able to allocate resources effciently. This question has been studied by many authors since at least the early 1960s. Not surprisingly, auctions work well only when the bidders competing within them bid carefully, taking into account not only their own private information about the value of the object(s) for sale, but also the information they would infer if they were to win one or more objects. Previous research has shown that auctions can produce effcient outcomes when better information leads to higher bids. When this occurs, wesay that bidders employ monotone bidding strategies. The idea that monotonicity of strategies leads to more effcient outcomes can be applied to other settings as well. For example, one might hope that in an oligopoly setting, the competition of the market will lead firms with lower costs to produce more output. And indeed, this will be the case when firms employ monotone strategies. Thus, monotonicity of strategies in economic settings provide important information about how well markets work. One of several goals of the present research is to understand, quite generally, when economic settings haracterized by strategic interaction possesses Bayesian Nash equilibriain which the participants employ monotone pure strategies. The results we expect to obtain will provide the most general answer to this question to date, and so will provide useful information about the efficiency properties of a large class of economic environments.

拍卖是一种无处不在的资源分配手段，无论是在私营部门还是在公共部门。一个关键的问题是拍卖是否能够有效地分配资源。至少从1960年代初以来，许多作者就研究过这个问题。毫不奇怪，只有当参与竞拍的竞拍者仔细地出价时，拍卖才能运作良好，不仅考虑到他们自己关于销售物品价值的私人信息，而且考虑到如果他们赢得一件或多件物品，他们将推断出的信息。先前的研究表明，当更好的信息导致更高的出价时，拍卖可以产生有效的结果。当这种情况发生时，我们说，投标人采用单调投标策略。 策略的单调性导致更有效的结果的想法也可以应用于其他环境。例如，人们可能希望在寡头垄断的情况下，市场竞争将导致成本较低的公司生产更多的产品。事实上，当企业采用单调策略时，情况就是如此。 因此，经济环境中策略的单调性提供了关于市场如何运作的重要信息。本研究的几个目标之一是了解，通常，以战略互动为特征的经济环境何时具有参与者采用单调纯策略的贝叶斯纳什均衡。我们期望得到的结果将为这个问题提供迄今为止最普遍的答案，因此将提供关于一大类经济环境的效率属性的有用信息。