权益分类	功能权益	普通用户	{{item.name}}会员
{{category.name}}	{{benefitItem.name}}

Operationalizing Pseudo-Market Mechanisms: School Choice and Shared Office Allocation

伪市场机制的运作：择校和共享办公室分配

基本信息

批准号：
1730636
负责人：
Hulya Eraslan
金额：
$ 44.37万
依托单位：
William Marsh Rice University
依托单位国家：
美国
项目类别：
Standard Grant
财政年份：
2017
资助国家：
美国
起止时间：
2017-08-15 至 2020-07-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1730636&HistoricalAwards=false
关键词：
Operationalizing Pseudo Market Mechanisms Choice

项目摘要

Market design methods have been increasingly used in important applications like school choice. Most existing methods ask participants to rank their alternatives in order. In contrast, this project studies a class of methods that elicits numerical scores for each alternative. Such preference intensities provide more information than just the ordering over the items, and therefore the methods developed in this project can generate better assignments of the scarce items. By soliciting numerical preferences, the placement of students in schools, for example, can be more efficient, and priorities in school choice can be also allowed. In addition, the assignment methods developed in this project can be used when agents care about how other agents are assigned. Such allocations with peer effects also have important applications in college dormitories or shared offices. In this project, the submitted intensities of preferences are used to operate a pseudo-market on a computer, without using real money. Methods computing competitive equilibria to pseudo-markets have been used less in practice and many hurdles need to be overcome. This project studies theoretical, computational, lab experimental, field test and structural empirical work on pseudo-market mechanisms, with key applications being school choice and the allocation of shared offices. The investigators develop a new computational algorithm to compute a competitive equilibrium to a pseudo-market. Given the multiplicity of equilibria, equilibrium selection is carefully addressed. Lab experiments investigate the concerns that agents may have non-expected-utility preferences and can manipulate the mechanism by colluding in groups. A variety of research methodologies are combined to implement and evaluate pseudo-market mechanisms in school choice, where students have priorities at each school that must be respected.

市场设计方法在学校选择等重要应用中得到了越来越多的应用。大多数现有的方法要求参与者按顺序对他们的选择进行排序。相比之下，本项目研究了一类方法，这些方法可以为每个选择得出数值分数。这种偏好强度提供了比物品排序更多的信息，因此本项目开发的方法可以更好地生成稀缺物品的分配。例如，通过征求数字偏好，学生在学校的安置可以更有效，择校的优先次序也可以被允许。此外，当代理关心其他代理如何分配时，可以使用本项目中开发的分配方法。这种具有同伴效应的分配在大学宿舍或共用办公室也有重要的应用。在这个项目中，提交的偏好强度被用来在计算机上操作一个伪市场，而不使用真钱。计算伪市场竞争均衡的方法在实践中使用较少，需要克服许多障碍。本项目研究伪市场机制的理论、计算、实验室实验、实地测试和结构性实证工作，重点应用于学校选择和共享办公室分配。研究者开发了一种新的计算算法来计算伪市场的竞争均衡。考虑到均衡的多样性，均衡选择被仔细地处理。实验室实验调查了代理人可能有非预期效用偏好，并可以通过群体串通来操纵机制的担忧。各种研究方法结合起来实施和评估择校中的伪市场机制，其中学生在每所学校都有优先权，必须得到尊重。