Collaborative Research: Technological Shocks and Institutional Effectiveness under Heterogeneous Risk

现有法规在管理高容量水力压裂（HVHF）风险方面的有效性如何？水力压裂？？HVHF是一种从页岩地层中生产石油和天然气的技术，它彻底改变了国内的能源格局。在美国，国家是石油和天然气生产的主要监管者，因此，所使用的监管的类型和有效性各不相同。这些法规中有许多是在20世纪初至中期制定的，旨在管理传统的石油和天然气生产。鉴于HVHF在全国范围内的快速扩张，本项目询问这些法规是否仍然适用，因为传统和HVHF生产技术之间存在差异。为了回答这个问题，该项目首先开发了一个用于管理石油和天然气生产的跨州法规数据库，该数据库将在线提供给公众，州监管机构，记者和学者，以探索不同的州如何管理石油和天然气生产以及这些法规的有效性。第二，该项目让土地所有者参加焦点小组，以更好地了解受HVHF繁荣影响的人们的观点，无论是积极的还是消极的。第三，该项目使用了一系列实验室经济实验，以促进学术理解，在一个受控的设置，不同的法规如何激励个人？长期以来，学者们一直对治理机构与共有资源可持续性之间的联系感兴趣，其中石油和天然气是典型的例子。促进有效集体行动的机构往往被视为解决公地悲剧的最佳希望，而机构的持久性往往被视为最佳情况。然而，长期存在的制度也将参与者锁定在一条特定的道路上，当外部变化发生时，这条道路可能有效，也可能无效。这个项目扩展了CPR学者的知识传统，通过研究今天的CPR困境的解决方案如何加剧明天不同的CPR困境。这种机构的问题不一定是资源崩溃的可能性（即公地悲剧），而是在面临重大变化的情况下继续采取行动的可能性。在集体行动对群体不再有效或公平之后很长一段时间，危机预防和复原治理机构可以继续用于促进集体行动。以前稳定和有效的制度现在可能具有重新分配租金的效果，从那些最不容易受到外部冲击带来的新风险影响的人手中，转移到那些最脆弱的人手中。这个奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并被认为是值得通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估的支持。

How effective are existing regulations are at managing the risks from high volume hydraulic fracturing (HVHF), also known as ?fracking?? HVHF is a technique for producing oil and gas from shale formations that has revolutionized the domestic energy landscape. In the U.S., states are the primary regulators of oil and gas production, so there is variation in the types of and effectiveness of regulations in-use. Many of these regulations were enacted in the early-to-mid 1900s and were designed to manage conventional oil and gas production. Given the rapid expansion of HVHF across the country, this project asks whether these regulations are still appropriate, given the differences between conventional and HVHF production techniques. To answer this, the project first develops a cross-state database of regulations in-use to manage oil and gas production, which will be available online for the public, state regulators, journalists, and academics to explore how different states manage oil and gas production and how effective those regulations are. Second, the project engages landowners in focus groups to better understand the perspectives of people impacted, both positively and negatively, by the HVHF boom. Third, the project uses a series of laboratory economic experiments to advance scholarly understanding, in a controlled setting, of how different regulations incentivize individuals? decisions on whether to lease their oil and gas rights for production.Scholars have long been interested in the linkages between governance institutions and the sustainability of common-pool resources (CPR), of which oil and gas are canonical examples. Institutions that facilitate efficient collective action are often seen as the best hope for a solution to the tragedy of the commons, and the long-endurance of institutions is often viewed as a best-case scenario. However, long-enduring institutions also lock participants in to a particular path that may or may not be efficient when exogenous changes occur. This project expands on the intellectual tradition of CPR scholars, by examining how a solution to a CPR dilemma today can exacerbate a different CPR dilemma tomorrow. The problem with such institutions is not necessarily the possibility of resource collapse (i.e. a tragedy of the commons), but rather of continued action in the face of substantially changed circumstances. CPR governance institutions can continue to be used to facilitate collective action, long after collective action ceases to be efficient or equitable for the group. Previously stable and efficient institutions may now have the effect of redistributing rents from those who are least vulnerable to the new risks introduced by an exogenous shock to those who are most vulnerable. This insight is a significant contribution to literature on institutions and decision-making.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.