SaTC: CORE: Medium: Collaborative: Taming Memory Corruption with Security Monitors

SaTC：核心：中：协作：通过安全监视器抑制内存损坏

• 批准号: 1916398
• 负责人: William Robertson
• 金额: $ 39.95万
• 依托单位: Northeastern University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2019
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2019-10-01 至 2023-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1916398&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: SaTC; CORE; Medium; Collaborative; Taming

Modern computing systems are under constant attack by organized crime syndicates, nation-state adversaries, and regular cyber-criminals alike. Among the most damaging attacks are those that exploit so-called memory corruption vulnerabilities which often confer the attacker with access to sensitive information or allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code on the victim's machine. To counter the threat posed by memory corruption vulnerabilities, this project will research and develop new defensive capabilities realized through the joint design of hardware and software. Hardware and software co-design holds the promise to enable the introduction of rigorous, principled, and efficient protection against low-level exploitation.To defend computing systems against memory corruption attacks, this project will augment a RISC-V processor with an array of security policy engines (ASPEn). ASPEn will feature both specialized and programmable policy engines. Specialized engines will be optimized for performance, power, and area, and enforce static security policies that are known at design time. To accommodate for the constantly-changing nature of the security landscape, programmable engines will be programmed to enforce more flexible security policies. The project is structured into two thrusts; Thrust-1 will design the ASPEn Security Monitor System for the RISC-V processor and Thrust-2 will focus on software design and the various policy types.This project will result in a generic security-focused hardware/software co-design approach that can be leveraged to secure other processors than the RISC-V core used for this project. This broader impact will further be supported by the open-source release of the resulting hardware designs, as well as the new and modified software stack consisting of tool chains, libraries, and policy types. Furthermore, the project will include a variety of training and outreach activities through tutorials, workshops, and curricular development. The project will also continue existing successful efforts of involving undergraduate, high-school, and underrepresented minority and women students throughout its duration.The project's resources and results will be made available publicly. The main project page can be found at https://seclab.bu.edu/projects/aspen.html, and source code releases will be made available via the project's code repository at https://github.com/BUseclab/ASPEn.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

现代计算机系统不断受到有组织犯罪集团、民族国家对手和普通网络罪犯的攻击。最具破坏性的攻击是那些利用所谓的内存损坏漏洞的攻击，这些漏洞通常赋予攻击者访问敏感信息的权限，或者允许攻击者在受害者的机器上执行任意代码。为了应对内存损坏漏洞带来的威胁，本项目将研究开发通过软硬件联合设计实现的新型防御能力。硬件和软件协同设计承诺引入严格的、有原则的和有效的保护，以防止低级的开发。为了保护计算系统免受内存损坏攻击，该项目将用一系列安全策略引擎（ASPEn）增强RISC-V处理器。ASPEn将以专门的和可编程的策略引擎为特色。专门的引擎将针对性能、功率和面积进行优化，并执行在设计时已知的静态安全策略。为了适应不断变化的安全环境，将对可编程引擎进行编程，以执行更灵活的安全策略。该项目分为两个部分；推力-1将为RISC-V处理器设计ASPEn安全监控系统，推力-2将专注于软件设计和各种策略类型。该项目将产生一种通用的以安全为中心的硬件/软件协同设计方法，可以用来保护其他处理器，而不是用于该项目的RISC-V核心。由此产生的硬件设计的开源版本，以及由工具链、库和策略类型组成的新的和修改的软件堆栈，将进一步支持这种更广泛的影响。此外，该项目将包括各种培训和推广活动，包括教程、研讨会和课程开发。该项目还将继续现有的成功努力，使本科生、高中生和代表性不足的少数民族学生和妇女学生在整个项目期间都参与其中。该项目的资源和结果将向公众公布。主要的项目页面可以在https://seclab.bu.edu/projects/aspen.html上找到，源代码发布将通过项目的代码存储库在https://github.com/BUseclab/ASPEn.This上提供，奖励反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的智力价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

项目成果

MPKAlloc: Efficient Heap Meta-data Integrity Through Hardware Memory Protection Keys

MPKAlloc：通过硬件内存保护密钥实现高效的堆元数据完整性

• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: and Vulnerability Assessment (DIMVA
• 作者: Blair, William;Robertson, William;Egele, Manuel
• 通讯作者: Egele, Manuel