Rationing the Commons: A Research Program on the Efficiency of Institutions for Groundwater Management

公地配给：地下水管理机构效率研究计划

• 批准号: 1919076
• 负责人: Nicholas Ryan
• 金额: $ 45.82万
• 依托单位: Yale University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2019
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2019-08-01 至 2021-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1919076&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Rationing; Commons; Research; Program; Efficiency

Society has clear ideals of how to manage common resources (commons); however, commons fail---carbon dioxide fills the air, fisheries collapse, and wells dry up. Two methods that are used to manage the commons formal method which imposes taxes, and informal community management that limits access---have problems. Taxes on the use of commons are difficult to collect and may harm some low-income users while local controls cannot meet the large amount of resources required to manage the commons. This proposed research will use field experiments and economic theory to develop a "second best" commons management model that combines both methods of managing the commons mentioned above. The model is then tested for efficiency in managing ground water commons; the research also calculates the efficiency gains from using this new management approach. The results of this research project will provide important tools to manage the commons, such as air quality, water, and parks among others. This will not only improve efficiency in resource management in the US; it will also establish the US as the global leader in management of the commons. The research program has two parts. The first part studies the efficiency of current institutions for managing groundwater commons. The main institution for groundwater management in many countries is electricity rationing. Farmers use electric pumps to extract water with heavily subsidized electricity, so they over use this "free water". The state knows little about the value of the commons for users but can enforce limits on electricity use. This research will estimate enough statistics for efficiency loss from this commons management regime and then estimate a structural model of agricultural production to study the efficiency of counterfactual management policies, such as pricing power and water. The second part will test a new commons policy through a field experiment. The policy, Direct Benefit Transfers for Electricity, raises the marginal price of electricity in exchange for lump-sum transfers that compensate for the loss of marginal electricity subsidies. The outcomes of power and water savings and agricultural adaptation in the experiment will mirror the structural estimates of the response of farmers to higher power prices. In this way, the research program will both estimate a model to study a new commons policy and validate the gains from that policy in a field experiment. The results of this research will improve the efficiency of resource allocation and therefore increase economic efficiency in the US and throughout the world.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

社会对于如何管理公共资源（公地）有着明确的理想;然而，公地失败了-空气中充满了二氧化碳，渔业崩溃，威尔斯干涸。管理公地的两种方法--正式的征税方法和非正式的社区管理方法--都存在问题。对公地使用征税很难征收，可能会损害一些低收入使用者，而地方控制无法满足管理公地所需的大量资源。本研究将以实地实验与经济理论，结合上述两种公地管理方法，发展出一种“次佳”的公地管理模式。然后，该模型进行了测试，在管理地下水公地的效率;研究还计算了使用这种新的管理方法的效率收益。该研究项目的结果将为管理公共资源提供重要工具，如空气质量，水和公园等。这不仅将提高美国资源管理的效率，还将使美国成为全球公地管理的领导者。研究计划有两个部分。第一部分研究了目前管理地下水公地的机构的效率。许多国家地下水管理的主要制度是电力配给。农民们用电泵抽水，用大量补贴的电力，所以他们过度使用这种“免费水”。国家对用户的公共资源价值知之甚少，但可以强制限制用电。本研究将估计足够的统计数据，从这种公地管理制度的效率损失，然后估计一个农业生产的结构模型，研究反事实的管理政策，如定价权和水的效率。第二部分将通过实地实验来测试新的公共政策。电力直接利益转移政策提高了电力的边际价格，以换取补偿边际电力补贴损失的一次性转移。试验中的节电节水和农业适应成果将反映农民对更高电价反应的结构性估计。通过这种方式，研究计划将评估一个模型来研究新的公共政策，并在实地实验中验证该政策的收益。这项研究的成果将提高资源分配的效率，从而提高美国和世界各地的经济效率。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。