Rationing the Commons: A Research Program on the Efficiency of Institutions for Groundwater Management

社会对于如何管理公共资源（公地）有着明确的理想；然而，公共资源失败了——二氧化碳充斥空气，渔业崩溃，水井干涸。管理公共资源的两种方法有问题，一种是征税的正式方法，另一种是限制使用的非正式社区管理。公地使用税很难征收，可能会损害一些低收入使用者，而地方控制无法满足管理公地所需的大量资源。本研究将使用实地实验和经济理论来开发一个“次优”的公共资源管理模型，将上述两种管理公共资源的方法结合起来。然后测试该模型在管理地下水公地方面的效率；该研究还计算了使用这种新的管理方法所获得的效率收益。该研究项目的结果将为管理公共资源（如空气质量、水和公园等）提供重要工具。这不仅会提高美国资源管理的效率；它还将确立美国在公地管理方面的全球领导者地位。研究计划分为两部分。第一部分研究了现行地下水公地管理制度的效率。在许多国家，地下水管理的主要制度是电力配给。农民使用电泵抽水，使用大量补贴的电力，因此他们过度使用这种“免费水”。国家对公共资源对用户的价值知之甚少，但可以对电力使用实施限制。本研究将对这种公共管理制度的效率损失估计足够的统计数据，然后估计农业生产的结构模型，以研究反事实管理政策的效率，如定价权和水。第二部分将通过实地实验来检验新的公共政策。这项名为“电力直接利益转移”的政策提高了电力的边际价格，以换取一次性转移支付，以弥补边际电力补贴的损失。实验中节能、节水和农业适应性的结果将反映出农民对更高电价反应的结构性估计。通过这种方式，该研究项目将估算一个模型来研究新的公共政策，并在实地试验中验证该政策的收益。这项研究的结果将提高资源配置的效率，从而提高美国和全世界的经济效率。该奖项反映了美国国家科学基金会的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

Society has clear ideals of how to manage common resources (commons); however, commons fail---carbon dioxide fills the air, fisheries collapse, and wells dry up. Two methods that are used to manage the commons formal method which imposes taxes, and informal community management that limits access---have problems. Taxes on the use of commons are difficult to collect and may harm some low-income users while local controls cannot meet the large amount of resources required to manage the commons. This proposed research will use field experiments and economic theory to develop a "second best" commons management model that combines both methods of managing the commons mentioned above. The model is then tested for efficiency in managing ground water commons; the research also calculates the efficiency gains from using this new management approach. The results of this research project will provide important tools to manage the commons, such as air quality, water, and parks among others. This will not only improve efficiency in resource management in the US; it will also establish the US as the global leader in management of the commons. The research program has two parts. The first part studies the efficiency of current institutions for managing groundwater commons. The main institution for groundwater management in many countries is electricity rationing. Farmers use electric pumps to extract water with heavily subsidized electricity, so they over use this "free water". The state knows little about the value of the commons for users but can enforce limits on electricity use. This research will estimate enough statistics for efficiency loss from this commons management regime and then estimate a structural model of agricultural production to study the efficiency of counterfactual management policies, such as pricing power and water. The second part will test a new commons policy through a field experiment. The policy, Direct Benefit Transfers for Electricity, raises the marginal price of electricity in exchange for lump-sum transfers that compensate for the loss of marginal electricity subsidies. The outcomes of power and water savings and agricultural adaptation in the experiment will mirror the structural estimates of the response of farmers to higher power prices. In this way, the research program will both estimate a model to study a new commons policy and validate the gains from that policy in a field experiment. The results of this research will improve the efficiency of resource allocation and therefore increase economic efficiency in the US and throughout the world.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.