Rationing the Commons: A Research Program on the Efficiency of Institutions for Groundwater Management

社会对如何管理公共资源(公地)有明确的理想；然而，公地失败-二氧化碳充斥空气，渔业崩溃，水井干涸。用来管理公地的两种方法-征税的正式方法和限制准入的非正式社区管理-都有问题。对公地使用税很难征收，可能会伤害一些低收入用户，而地方控制不能满足管理公地所需的大量资源。这项拟议的研究将利用实地试验和经济理论来开发一个结合了上述两种管理公地方法的“次佳”公地管理模式。然后对该模型在管理地下水公地方面的效率进行了测试；研究还计算了使用这种新的管理方法所获得的效率收益。这一研究项目的结果将为管理公共设施提供重要工具，如空气质量、水和公园等。这不仅将提高美国的资源管理效率，还将确立美国在公共资源管理方面的全球领先地位。该研究计划包括两个部分。第一部分研究了现行地下水公地管理机构的效率。在许多国家，地下水管理的主要制度是电力配给。农民用电泵抽水，补贴电费很高，所以过度使用了这笔“免费水”。国家对公有资源对用户的价值知之甚少，但可以对电力使用进行限制。本研究将对这一公地管理制度的效率损失进行足够的统计，进而估计一个农业生产的结构模型来研究反事实管理政策的效率，如定价权和水。第二部分将通过实地实验来检验新的下议院政策。电力直接受益转移政策提高了边际电价，以换取一次性转移，以弥补边际电力补贴的损失。实验中的节电、节水和农业适应的结果将反映出农民对更高电价反应的结构性估计。通过这种方式，研究计划既将估计一个模型来研究新的公共政策，又将在实地实验中验证该政策的收益。这项研究的结果将提高资源配置的效率，从而提高美国和世界各地的经济效率。这一奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的智力优势和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

Society has clear ideals of how to manage common resources (commons); however, commons fail---carbon dioxide fills the air, fisheries collapse, and wells dry up. Two methods that are used to manage the commons formal method which imposes taxes, and informal community management that limits access---have problems. Taxes on the use of commons are difficult to collect and may harm some low-income users while local controls cannot meet the large amount of resources required to manage the commons. This proposed research will use field experiments and economic theory to develop a "second best" commons management model that combines both methods of managing the commons mentioned above. The model is then tested for efficiency in managing ground water commons; the research also calculates the efficiency gains from using this new management approach. The results of this research project will provide important tools to manage the commons, such as air quality, water, and parks among others. This will not only improve efficiency in resource management in the US; it will also establish the US as the global leader in management of the commons. The research program has two parts. The first part studies the efficiency of current institutions for managing groundwater commons. The main institution for groundwater management in many countries is electricity rationing. Farmers use electric pumps to extract water with heavily subsidized electricity, so they over use this "free water". The state knows little about the value of the commons for users but can enforce limits on electricity use. This research will estimate enough statistics for efficiency loss from this commons management regime and then estimate a structural model of agricultural production to study the efficiency of counterfactual management policies, such as pricing power and water. The second part will test a new commons policy through a field experiment. The policy, Direct Benefit Transfers for Electricity, raises the marginal price of electricity in exchange for lump-sum transfers that compensate for the loss of marginal electricity subsidies. The outcomes of power and water savings and agricultural adaptation in the experiment will mirror the structural estimates of the response of farmers to higher power prices. In this way, the research program will both estimate a model to study a new commons policy and validate the gains from that policy in a field experiment. The results of this research will improve the efficiency of resource allocation and therefore increase economic efficiency in the US and throughout the world.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.