Doctoral Dissertation Research: Protests and Concessions

博士论文研究：抗议与让步

• 批准号: 1938154
• 负责人: Pauline Jones
• 金额: $ 1.87万
• 依托单位: Regents of the University of Michigan - Ann Arbor
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2020
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2020-03-15 至 2021-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1938154&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Protests; Concessions

This project addresses why autocratic regimes, which rely on coercion to retain power, promise concessions to protesters, and the contexts in which those promises affect policies. When an autocrat responds to a protest today with the promise of a policy change tomorrow, that promised concession is not fully credible: if protest ends before policy change is complete, the autocrat may renege, or deliberately fail to implement a promised concession. The autocrat can therefore exploit concessions to demobilize protest and ensure office retention, without real reform. The prospect of reneging directly affects the behavior of protesters, depending on their level of political knowledge, and their individual cost of protesting. Variation in these factors among protesters can make mobilization impossible to sustain once concessions are promised. This project provides expectations for when concessions are promised to citizens, as well as for conditions in which protest needs to be sustained after that promise to realize a benefit. The findings are relevant for citizens in autocracies and local and international organizations that support them, including the U.S. government. Improved understanding of the strategic purpose of concessions will provide policymakers better expectations over when an autocrat submits to protesters' demands out of weakness, and when they do so to enhance regime resilience.This project addresses three sets of questions: (1) Under what conditions do autocratic governments concede to protesters’ demands?; (2) Under what conditions does reneging, or the deliberate failure to deliver promised concessions, occur?; and (3) How do protesters strategically anticipate receipt of concessions? The project includes a formal model, two original datasets on protest and concessions, and interviews with activists in Moscow. Overall, this work provides a much-needed full theorization of concessions as a response to protest, including reneging. It generates novel insight into how protesters’ perception of the promise of concessions and the risk of reneging affects the ability to sustain mobilization. Finally, it contributes to scholarship on authoritarian resilience and stability.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

这个项目解决了为什么依靠胁迫来保住权力的独裁政权向抗议者承诺让步的原因，以及这些承诺影响政策的背景。当一位独裁者对今天的抗议活动做出回应，承诺明天将改变政策时，这种承诺的让步并不完全可信：如果抗议在政策改变完成之前结束，独裁者可能会食言，或者故意不履行承诺的让步。因此，独裁者可以利用让步来遣散抗议活动，并确保留任，而不需要进行真正的改革。违约的前景直接影响抗议者的行为，这取决于他们的政治知识水平，以及他们个人的抗议成本。抗议者之间的这些因素存在差异，一旦承诺让步，动员就不可能持续下去。该项目提供了对何时向公民承诺让步的期望，以及在承诺实现惠益后抗议需要持续的条件。这些发现与独裁国家的公民以及包括美国政府在内的支持他们的当地和国际组织相关。提高对让步战略目的的理解，将为政策制定者提供更好的预期，让他们了解独裁者何时出于软弱而屈服于抗议者的要求，以及何时这样做是为了增强政权的韧性。这个项目解决了三组问题：(1)在什么条件下，独裁政府会向抗议者的要求让步？(2)在什么条件下会发生违背承诺或故意不兑现承诺的让步？(3)抗议者如何从战略上预期让步会得到？该项目包括一个正式的模型，两个关于抗议和让步的原始数据集，以及对莫斯科活动人士的采访。总体而言，这项工作提供了亟需的全面的特许权理论化，作为对抗议的回应，包括食言。它为抗议者对让步承诺和违约风险的看法如何影响持续动员的能力提供了新的见解。这一奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的学术价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。