Doctoral Dissertation Research: Protests and Concessions

本项目探讨了为什么依靠高压手段维持权力的专制政权会向抗议者承诺让步，以及这些承诺影响政策的背景。当一个独裁者以承诺明天改变政策来回应今天的抗议时，这个承诺的让步并不完全可信：如果抗议在政策改变完成之前就结束了，这个独裁者可能会食言，或者故意不履行承诺的让步。因此，独裁者可以利用让步来平息抗议并确保留任，而无需真正的改革。反悔的前景直接影响抗议者的行为，这取决于他们的政治知识水平，以及他们抗议的个人成本。这些因素在抗议者中的变化可能会使动员在承诺让步后无法维持。该项目提供了对何时向公民承诺特许权的预期，以及在承诺之后需要持续抗议以实现利益的条件。这些发现与专制国家的公民以及支持他们的地方和国际组织（包括美国政府）有关。更好地理解让步的战略目的，将使政策制定者更好地预测，独裁者何时屈服于抗议者的要求是出于软弱，何时屈服是为了增强政权的韧性。这个项目解决了三组问题：(1)专制政府在什么条件下会对抗议者的要求让步？(2)在什么情况下会出现食言或故意不履行承诺的让步？(3)抗议者如何在战略上预期得到让步？该项目包括一个正式的模型，两个关于抗议和让步的原始数据集，以及对莫斯科活动人士的采访。总的来说，这项工作提供了一个急需的充分的理论化让步作为对抗议的回应，包括食言。它对抗议者对让步承诺和食言风险的看法如何影响维持动员的能力产生了新颖的见解。最后，它有助于研究威权主义的韧性和稳定性。该奖项反映了美国国家科学基金会的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

This project addresses why autocratic regimes, which rely on coercion to retain power, promise concessions to protesters, and the contexts in which those promises affect policies. When an autocrat responds to a protest today with the promise of a policy change tomorrow, that promised concession is not fully credible: if protest ends before policy change is complete, the autocrat may renege, or deliberately fail to implement a promised concession. The autocrat can therefore exploit concessions to demobilize protest and ensure office retention, without real reform. The prospect of reneging directly affects the behavior of protesters, depending on their level of political knowledge, and their individual cost of protesting. Variation in these factors among protesters can make mobilization impossible to sustain once concessions are promised. This project provides expectations for when concessions are promised to citizens, as well as for conditions in which protest needs to be sustained after that promise to realize a benefit. The findings are relevant for citizens in autocracies and local and international organizations that support them, including the U.S. government. Improved understanding of the strategic purpose of concessions will provide policymakers better expectations over when an autocrat submits to protesters' demands out of weakness, and when they do so to enhance regime resilience.This project addresses three sets of questions: (1) Under what conditions do autocratic governments concede to protesters’ demands?; (2) Under what conditions does reneging, or the deliberate failure to deliver promised concessions, occur?; and (3) How do protesters strategically anticipate receipt of concessions? The project includes a formal model, two original datasets on protest and concessions, and interviews with activists in Moscow. Overall, this work provides a much-needed full theorization of concessions as a response to protest, including reneging. It generates novel insight into how protesters’ perception of the promise of concessions and the risk of reneging affects the ability to sustain mobilization. Finally, it contributes to scholarship on authoritarian resilience and stability.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.