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Religious Regulation and Political Mobilization in Central Asia

中亚的宗教监管和政治动员

基本信息

批准号：
1658336
负责人：
Pauline Jones
金额：
$ 77.18万
依托单位：
Regents of the University of Michigan - Ann Arbor
依托单位国家：
美国
项目类别：
Continuing Grant
财政年份：
2017
资助国家：
美国
起止时间：
2017-08-01 至 2023-07-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1658336&HistoricalAwards=false
关键词：
Religious Regulation Political Mobilization Central

项目摘要

General AbstractRegimes in predominantly Muslim states around the world create religious monopolies that employ different combinations of subsidy and repression to eliminate religion as a potential threat. This project is the first to explore how individuals respond politically to the state's regulation of religion, and to identify the conditions under which they are likely to respond in ways that pose a real threat at home or abroad. It posits that the threat of violence is greatest when the state creates a religious monopoly that combines high levelsof repression and subsidies targeted at the regime's favored interpretation of Islam. The research team explores the direct relationship between religious monopolies and political mobilization in three post-Soviet Central Asian states: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Following a protracted religious revival, each state established a religious monopoly to constrain Islam's growing political potential, and yet, experienced notably different levels and types of religious political mobilization. These different outcomes range from from lobbying and peaceful protests to terrorist attacks and the exodus of jihadists. Until the mid-2000s, only Uzbekistan created a religious monopoly that employed both high degrees of repression and targeted subsidies. Since then, the religious monopolies in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have both started to move toward Uzbekistan's. In Kyrgyzstan, the state increased repression, while Tajikistan opted to target subsidies. Prior to 2015, Uzbekistan experienced the largest number of terrorist attacks in Central Asia, as well as having contributed the majority of the region's jihadists fighting in foreign wars. This project predicts that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will experience similar trends as individuals respond to changes in religious regulation. Moreover, it suggests a policy solution: governments can achieve socially desirable outcomes not by dampening religiosity, but rather, by creating more space for thepublic and private expression of religion, which can be accomplished through low levels of repression and general subsidies that support multiple interpretations of Islam.Technical AbstractThe political science literature posits that when states grant the dominant religion a monopoly, one observes a negative effect on both levels of religiosity and the degree of political mobilization. This result occurs because religious monopolies necessarily create a non-competitive religious marketplace. That is it results in a setting in which there is a single religious product for religious leaders to sell, and for religious adherents to buy. This poses a persistent empirical puzzle: governments in predominantly Muslim countries routinely establish religious monopolies, and yet, experience high levels of religiosity and varying levels and types of religious political mobilization. This research provides novel insight into this puzzle by making three important correctives. First, the proposed research eschews the assumption that establishing a monopoly is synonymous with establishing homogeneity within the dominant religion, or, more simply, that a religious monopoly precludes religious competition. Second, the work re-conceptualizes religious regulation as two-dimensional, consisting of both subsidies and repression. The project will create a novel typology of religious monopolies based on four different combinations of subsidy and repression. Third, the work will identify the direct effects of religious regulation on individual political behavior by specifying under which type of religious monopoly individuals are more likely to express loyalty, exercise voice, or choose to exit. The proposal argues that the key to explaining variation in religious political mobilization in predominantly Muslim counties is the type of religious monopoly. In particular, they note the significance of the interaction between the type of subsidy (general vs. targeted) and the level of repression (low vs. high). At the left end of the continuum, supportive monopolies are those in which subsidies are general and the level of repression is low; such combinations provide individuals with agreater incentive to express loyalty overall and to exercise voice in the form of lobbying and peaceful protest. At the right end, exclusive monopolies are those in which subsidies are targeted and the level of repression is high; such combinations provide individuals with a greater incentive to choose to exit overall and to exercise voice in violent and extreme forms. Targeting subsidies and increasing repression thus undermine the state's very goal of reducing Islam's potential political threat.

世界各地以穆斯林为主的国家的政权创造了宗教垄断，采用不同的补贴和镇压组合来消除宗教作为一个潜在的威胁。这个项目是第一个探索个人如何在政治上回应国家对宗教的管制，并确定他们可能以在国内外构成真实的威胁的方式作出反应的条件。它假定，当国家建立起一种宗教垄断，将高水平的镇压和针对政权对伊斯兰教的偏爱解释的补贴结合起来时，暴力的威胁是最大的。该研究小组探讨了宗教垄断和政治动员之间的直接关系，在三个后苏联中亚国家：吉尔吉斯斯坦，塔吉克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦。在漫长的宗教复兴之后，每个国家都建立了宗教垄断，以限制伊斯兰教日益增长的政治潜力，但经历了不同程度和类型的宗教政治动员。这些不同的结果包括游说、和平抗议、恐怖袭击和圣战分子外流。直到2000年代中期，只有乌兹别克斯坦建立了宗教垄断，既采用了高度镇压，又有针对性的补贴。从那时起，吉尔吉斯斯坦和塔吉克斯坦的宗教垄断都开始向乌兹别克斯坦靠拢。在吉尔吉斯斯坦，政府加大了镇压力度，而塔吉克斯坦则选择了补贴。在2015年之前，乌兹别克斯坦经历了中亚地区最多的恐怖袭击，并在该地区的圣战分子中贡献了大多数。该项目预测，吉尔吉斯斯坦和塔吉克斯坦将经历类似的趋势，因为个人对宗教法规的变化作出反应。此外，它还提出了一个政策解决方案：政府可以实现社会理想的结果，而不是通过抑制宗教狂热，而是通过为宗教的公共和私人表达创造更多的空间，这可以通过低水平的镇压和支持对伊斯兰教的多种解释的普遍补贴来实现。政治学文献假定，当国家给予占主导地位的宗教垄断权时，人们注意到，这对宗教虔诚程度和政治动员程度都产生了负面影响。这是因为宗教垄断必然会造成一个非竞争性的宗教市场。也就是说，它导致了一种环境，在这种环境中，只有一种宗教产品供宗教领袖出售，供宗教信徒购买。这带来了一个持续的经验之谜：在穆斯林占主导地位的国家，政府经常建立宗教垄断，然而，经历了高度的宗教信仰和不同程度和类型的宗教政治动员。这项研究提供了新的见解，这个难题，使三个重要的更正。首先，拟议中的研究避开了这样一个假设，即建立垄断等同于在占主导地位的宗教内部建立同质性，或者更简单地说，宗教垄断排除了宗教竞争。第二，这项工作将宗教监管重新定义为两个维度，包括补贴和镇压。该项目将基于四种不同的补贴和压制组合，创造一种新颖的宗教垄断类型。第三，这项工作将确定宗教管制对个人政治行为的直接影响，具体说明在哪种类型的宗教垄断下，个人更有可能表达忠诚，行使声音，或选择退出。该提案认为，解释穆斯林占主导地位的国家宗教政治动员变化的关键是宗教垄断的类型。特别是，他们注意到补贴类型（一般补贴与定向补贴）和压制程度（低与高）之间相互作用的重要性。在连续体的左端，支持性垄断是那些补贴普遍且压制程度较低的垄断;这种组合为个人提供了更大的激励，以表达总体忠诚，并以游说与和平抗议的形式行使声音。在正确的一端，独家垄断是指补贴有针对性和压制程度高的垄断;这种组合使个人有更大的动机选择全面退出，并以暴力和极端的形式行使发言权。因此，有针对性的补贴和不断增加的镇压破坏了国家减少伊斯兰教潜在政治威胁的目标。