Religious Regulation and Political Mobilization in Central Asia

一般摘要在世界各地以穆斯林为主的国家中，规则创造了宗教垄断，采用不同的补贴和镇压组合来消除宗教作为潜在威胁的情况。这个项目是第一个探索个人如何在政治上对国家对宗教的监管做出反应的项目，并确定在什么情况下，他们可能会以对国内外构成真正威胁的方式做出反应。它认为，当国家创造了一个宗教垄断，将高度的镇压和补贴结合在一起时，暴力的威胁最大。研究小组探索了三个后苏联中亚国家：吉尔吉斯斯坦、塔吉克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦的宗教垄断和政治动员之间的直接关系。在漫长的宗教复兴之后，每个国家都建立了宗教垄断，以限制伊斯兰教日益增长的政治潜力，但经历了明显不同的宗教政治动员水平和类型。这些不同的结果从游说与和平抗议到恐怖袭击和圣战分子的撤离，不一而足。直到本世纪头十年中期，只有乌兹别克斯坦创造了一种宗教垄断，既实施了高度镇压，又提供了有针对性的补贴。从那时起，吉尔吉斯斯坦和塔吉克斯坦的宗教垄断都开始向乌兹别克斯坦转移。在吉尔吉斯斯坦，国家加大了镇压力度，而塔吉克斯坦则选择以补贴为目标。在2015年前，乌兹别克斯坦经历了中亚地区最多的恐怖袭击，也是该地区参加外国战争的圣战分子的主要贡献者。该项目预测，随着个人对宗教法规的变化做出反应，吉尔吉斯斯坦和塔吉克斯坦将经历类似的趋势。此外，它还提出了一种政策解决方案：政府可以实现社会理想的结果，不是通过抑制宗教信仰，而是通过为宗教的公开和私人表达创造更多空间，这可以通过低水平的镇压和支持对伊斯兰的多种解释的一般补贴来实现。技术摘要政治学文献假设，当国家给予占主导地位的宗教垄断时，人们观察到对宗教信仰水平和政治动员程度的负面影响。这一结果的产生是因为宗教垄断必然会创造一个非竞争性的宗教市场。也就是说，它导致了一种单一的宗教产品，供宗教领袖出售，供宗教追随者购买。这带来了一个长期存在的经验主义难题：穆斯林为主的国家的政府经常建立宗教垄断，但却经历了高度的宗教信仰和不同程度和类型的宗教政治动员。这项研究通过三个重要的纠正，为这个谜题提供了新的见解。首先，拟议的研究避免了这样的假设，即建立垄断等同于在占主导地位的宗教中建立同质性，或者更简单地说，宗教垄断排除了宗教竞争。其次，这部作品将宗教管制重新概念化为二维的，包括补贴和压制。该项目将基于补贴和压制的四种不同组合，创建一种新的宗教垄断类型。第三，这项工作将通过具体说明在哪种类型的宗教垄断下个人更有可能表达忠诚、行使发言权或选择退出，来确定宗教监管对个人政治行为的直接影响。该提案认为，在以穆斯林为主的县，解释宗教政治动员差异的关键是宗教垄断的类型。特别是，他们注意到补贴类型(一般与目标)和压制程度(低与高)之间相互作用的重要性。在连续体的左端，支持性垄断是指补贴普遍且压制程度较低的垄断；这种组合为个人提供了更大的动机，以游说与和平抗议的形式全面表达忠诚并行使话语权。在正确的一端，排他性垄断是那些补贴有针对性、压制程度很高的垄断；这种组合为个人提供了更大的动机，让他们选择全面退出，并以暴力和极端的形式行使话语权。因此，以补贴为目标和加大镇压力度，破坏了国家降低伊斯兰教潜在政治威胁的目标。

General AbstractRegimes in predominantly Muslim states around the world create religious monopolies that employ different combinations of subsidy and repression to eliminate religion as a potential threat. This project is the first to explore how individuals respond politically to the state's regulation of religion, and to identify the conditions under which they are likely to respond in ways that pose a real threat at home or abroad. It posits that the threat of violence is greatest when the state creates a religious monopoly that combines high levelsof repression and subsidies targeted at the regime's favored interpretation of Islam. The research team explores the direct relationship between religious monopolies and political mobilization in three post-Soviet Central Asian states: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Following a protracted religious revival, each state established a religious monopoly to constrain Islam's growing political potential, and yet, experienced notably different levels and types of religious political mobilization. These different outcomes range from from lobbying and peaceful protests to terrorist attacks and the exodus of jihadists. Until the mid-2000s, only Uzbekistan created a religious monopoly that employed both high degrees of repression and targeted subsidies. Since then, the religious monopolies in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have both started to move toward Uzbekistan's. In Kyrgyzstan, the state increased repression, while Tajikistan opted to target subsidies. Prior to 2015, Uzbekistan experienced the largest number of terrorist attacks in Central Asia, as well as having contributed the majority of the region's jihadists fighting in foreign wars. This project predicts that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will experience similar trends as individuals respond to changes in religious regulation. Moreover, it suggests a policy solution: governments can achieve socially desirable outcomes not by dampening religiosity, but rather, by creating more space for thepublic and private expression of religion, which can be accomplished through low levels of repression and general subsidies that support multiple interpretations of Islam.Technical AbstractThe political science literature posits that when states grant the dominant religion a monopoly, one observes a negative effect on both levels of religiosity and the degree of political mobilization. This result occurs because religious monopolies necessarily create a non-competitive religious marketplace. That is it results in a setting in which there is a single religious product for religious leaders to sell, and for religious adherents to buy. This poses a persistent empirical puzzle: governments in predominantly Muslim countries routinely establish religious monopolies, and yet, experience high levels of religiosity and varying levels and types of religious political mobilization. This research provides novel insight into this puzzle by making three important correctives. First, the proposed research eschews the assumption that establishing a monopoly is synonymous with establishing homogeneity within the dominant religion, or, more simply, that a religious monopoly precludes religious competition. Second, the work re-conceptualizes religious regulation as two-dimensional, consisting of both subsidies and repression. The project will create a novel typology of religious monopolies based on four different combinations of subsidy and repression. Third, the work will identify the direct effects of religious regulation on individual political behavior by specifying under which type of religious monopoly individuals are more likely to express loyalty, exercise voice, or choose to exit. The proposal argues that the key to explaining variation in religious political mobilization in predominantly Muslim counties is the type of religious monopoly. In particular, they note the significance of the interaction between the type of subsidy (general vs. targeted) and the level of repression (low vs. high). At the left end of the continuum, supportive monopolies are those in which subsidies are general and the level of repression is low; such combinations provide individuals with agreater incentive to express loyalty overall and to exercise voice in the form of lobbying and peaceful protest. At the right end, exclusive monopolies are those in which subsidies are targeted and the level of repression is high; such combinations provide individuals with a greater incentive to choose to exit overall and to exercise voice in violent and extreme forms. Targeting subsidies and increasing repression thus undermine the state's very goal of reducing Islam's potential political threat.