SaTC: CORE: Small: Leveraging Physical Side-Channel Information to Build Detection-Based Rowhammer Defenses

SaTC：核心：小型：利用物理侧信道信息构建基于检测的 Rowhammer 防御

• 批准号: 2038076
• 负责人: Zhenkai Zhang
• 金额: $ 20万
• 依托单位: Texas Tech University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2021
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2021-02-15 至 2021-10-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2038076&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: SaTC; CORE; Small; Leveraging; Physical

Preventing a process from modifying a memory it does not own is a cornerstone of security. However, this essential protection has recently come under threat due to the discovery of a vulnerability, known as the Rowhammer for dynamic random-access memory (DRAM). It has been found that this vulnerability commonly exists in DRAM chips and can be exploited to form a wide range of powerful attacks. Defending against Rowhammer attack remains a challenging problem. This project aims to solve this problem by developing novel detection-based defense techniques. The project has 3 major thrusts. Thrust 1 will analyze certain inevitable physical side effects of computation (e.g., electromagnetic radiation, acoustic emanation, and power consumption) to discover malicious hammering. Thrust 2 will design and implement deployable defense techniques based on the discovered physical side-channel information which can robustly detect and promptly thwart any potential Rowhammer attacks, including elusive ones hidden inside trusted execution environments. Thrust 3 concerns experiments and evaluation to quantify and demonstrate the significance of the project. The techniques developed in this project may impact industry and help practitioners design more secure and dependable systems. Code, data, publications, presentations, will be released publicly. A project repository will be maintained on CPS-VO (https://cps-vo.org/) for at least 5 years.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

防止进程修改它不拥有的内存是安全性的基石。 然而，由于发现了一个称为动态随机存取存储器（DRAM）的Rowhammer漏洞，这种基本保护最近受到了威胁。据发现，这种漏洞普遍存在于DRAM芯片中，可以被利用形成大范围的强大攻击。防御Rowhammer攻击仍然是一个具有挑战性的问题。该项目旨在通过开发新的基于检测的防御技术来解决这个问题。该项目有三个主要目标。第一部分将分析计算的某些不可避免的物理副作用（例如，电磁辐射、声发射和功率消耗）来发现恶意锤击。Thrust 2将根据发现的物理侧信道信息设计和实施可部署的防御技术，这些技术可以鲁棒地检测并迅速阻止任何潜在的Rowhammer攻击，包括隐藏在可信执行环境中的难以捉摸的攻击。重点3涉及实验和评估，以量化和证明项目的重要性。在这个项目中开发的技术可能会影响行业，并帮助从业者设计更安全和可靠的系统。代码、数据、出版物、演示文稿将公开发布。项目库将在CPS-VO（https：//cps-vo.org/）上维护至少5年。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

项目成果

Red Alert for Power Leakage: Exploiting Intel RAPL-Induced Side Channels

漏电红色警报：利用 Intel RAPL 引发的侧通道

• DOI: 10.1145/3433210.3437517
• 发表时间: 2021
• 期刊: ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communication Security (Asia CSS ’21
• 作者: Zhang, Zhenkai;Liang, Sisheng;Yao, Fan;Gao, Xing
• 通讯作者: Gao, Xing