课题基金 / 基金详情

CRII: RI: Fair, Efficient, and Truthful Resource Allocation in Dynamic Environments

CRII: RI: Fair, Efficient, and Truthful Resource Allocation in Dynamic Environments
CRII:RI:动态环境中公平、高效、真实的资源分配
批准号:
2052488
负责人:
Hadi Hosseini
金额:
$13.44万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2020
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2020-08-16 至 2023-08-31

项目摘要

项目成果

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中文摘要
翻译
通过人工智能(AI)、经济学和计算的整合,该项目研究了在缺乏可转移货币的动态环境和情况下资源分配的新解决方案。随着在线平台的出现,经济理论作为一种基本方法出现在各种领域,如排班、课程注册、云计算和众包,以促进效率、公平和真实的理想社会属性。这些新的应用超出了古典经济理论和市场设计的范围。涉及不断变化的偏好、动态人群和在线项目的复杂场景需要新颖、实用和可扩展的解决方案。该项目解决了人工智能和经济学交叉领域的各种基本问题,同时丰富了动态环境中对资源分配的算法和社会理解。这与传统机制形成对比,传统机制要么只关注静态和离线环境中资源分配的经济方面,要么忽视公平等社会方面。本项目研究的新技术旨在扩展资源分配的算法方面,并探索动态公平分配的可行性限制。这方面的进展对设计有效的机制来公平分配资源,同时激励参与者的诚实行为具有深远的影响。具体而言,该项目研究了两个相互关联的组成部分:(1)不确定性下的顺序分配,通过将人工智能中研究的模型与经济理论相结合,调查、分析和创建新的机制,在代理人偏好不断变化的环境中公平和阻止战略操纵(例如护士调度和课程分配);(2)在线机制,通过利用算法设计和人工智能的见解来研究当代理随着时间的推移到达和离开或物品的可用性不确定时分配机制的公平性和效率(例如食品银行组织和众包平台)。这些新技术旨在利用不确定条件下决策的数学框架,以及算法经济学和机制设计的公理方法,建立动态资源分配的理论模型,并采用多智能体设计范式来研究公平分配问题中已建立机制之间的关系。最终,这项研究的结果将导致在动态环境中需要有效和社会期望决策的实际应用的健壮系统的发展。该奖项反映了美国国家科学基金会的法定使命,并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估,被认为值得支持。
英文摘要
Through the integration of artificial intelligence (AI), economics, and computation this project investigates novel solutions for resource allocation in dynamic environments and situations that lack transferable currency. With the advent of online platforms, economic theory emerges as a fundamental approach to promote desirable social properties of efficiency, fairness, and truthfulness in a variety of domains such as shift scheduling, course registration, cloud computing, and crowdsourcing. These new applications are beyond the scope of classical economic theory and market design. Complex scenarios involving changing preferences, dynamic populations, and online items require novel, practical, and scalable solutions. This project tackles a variety of fundamental problems at the intersection AI and economics while enriching the algorithmic and societal understanding of resource allocation in dynamic settings. This contrasts with classical mechanisms that either focus solely on economic aspects of resource allocation in static and offline settings or disregarded social aspects such as fairness. New techniques investigated in this project seek to expand the algorithmic aspects of resource allocation and explore the limits of feasibility for dynamic fair allocation. Advances here can have profound impact in designing efficient mechanisms to allocate resources fairly while incentivizing truthful behavior among the participants. Specifically, the project studies two interconnected components: (1) sequential allocation under uncertainty, by synthesizing models studied in AI with economic theory to investigate, analyze, and create new mechanisms that are fair and discourage strategic manipulation in environments where agents' preferences are evolving (e.g. nurse scheduling and course allocation); and (2) online mechanisms, by employing insights from algorithm design and AI to study fairness and efficiency of allocation mechanisms when agents arrive and depart over time or the availability of items is uncertain (e.g. food bank organizations and crowdsourcing platforms). The new techniques aim to exploit the mathematical framework of decision making under uncertainty as well as axiomatic approaches of algorithmic economic and mechanism design to develop theoretical models for dynamic resource allocation, and employ the multiagent design paradigm to investigate the relation between the well-established mechanisms in fair allocation problems. Ultimately, the findings of this research will lead to the development of robust systems for practical applications in dynamic settings that demand efficient and socially desirable decisions.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.
期刊论文(20)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
Fair Stable Matchings Under Correlated Preferences (Student Abstract)
相关偏好下的公平稳定匹配(学生摘要)
DOI: --
发表时间: 2021
期刊: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
影响因子: --
作者: [Brilliantova, Angelina, Hosseini, Hadi]
通讯作者: Hosseini, Hadi
Fairness Does Not Imply Satisfaction (Student Abstract)
公平并不意味着满意(学生摘要)
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v34i10.7228
发表时间: 2020
期刊: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
影响因子: --
作者: [Searns, Andrew, Hosseini, Hadi]
通讯作者: Hosseini, Hadi
Graphical House Allocation
图形房屋分配
DOI: --
发表时间: 2023
期刊: AAMAS '23: Proceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
影响因子: --
作者: [Hosseini, Hadi, Payan, Justin, Sengupta, Rik, Vaish, Rohit, Viswanathan, Vignesh]
通讯作者: Viswanathan, Vignesh
Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Chores
家务劳动的序数最大最小份额近似
DOI: --
发表时间: 2022
期刊: Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
影响因子: --
作者: [Hosseini, Hadi, Searns, Andrew, Segal-Halevi, Erel]
通讯作者: Segal-Halevi, Erel
18
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