CAREER: Combating Censorship from within the Network

职业：打击网络内部的审查制度

• 批准号: 2145783
• 负责人: Eric Wustrow
• 金额: $ 56.99万
• 依托单位: University of Colorado at Boulder
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2022
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2022-05-01 至 2027-04-30
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2145783&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: CAREER; Combating; Censorship; within; Network

Over half of the world’s Internet population live in countries that censor political, social, or religious content online, and authoritarian governments continue to design and deploy increasingly sophisticated censorship systems. Internet censorship is thus a significant and growing threat, making research into circumvention technologies an important priority. While in the past proxies and (Virtual Private Networks) VPNs could be used to circumvent censorship, today, censors use complex techniques to find and block existing circumvention resources. This project proposes new ways to study and combat Internet censorship around the world by adopting a perspective similar to the censor’s themselves, and leveraging Internet infrastructure in non-censoring countries. First, this infrastructure will be used to measure “normal” Internet traffic, so that circumvention proxies can learn what to mimic in order to camouflage their activity and evade detection. Second, this project will use those findings and the network infrastructure itself to create new kinds of proxies that are harder for censors to block. Studying and combatting censorship from the network perspective will help level the playing field between censors and circumvention tool developers, ultimately supporting Internet users’ autonomy and access to information globally, including the billions of people worldwide living in repressively censored regions.This work will use network taps deployed at (Internet Service Providers) ISPs and Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) in non-censoring countries to measure popular Internet protocols and how they are used in practice, develop novel ways to detect new and emerging forms of censorship, and explore how existing proxies and circumvention strategies can be improved using ISP data. Building on the growing Refraction Networking deployment, this work also investigates new ways that the ISP perspective can be used to combat censorship directly, such as improvements in Refraction transports to better resist active probing attacks from censors, implementing peer-to-peer proxy protocols that are harder for censors to detect and block, and finding ways to directly make censorship more expensive for governments in practice.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

世界上一半以上的互联网用户生活在对网上政治、社会或宗教内容进行审查的国家，专制政府继续设计和部署日益复杂的审查系统。因此，互联网审查是一个日益严重的威胁，使研究规避技术成为一个重要的优先事项。虽然在过去，代理和（虚拟专用网络）VPN可以用来规避审查，但今天，审查人员使用复杂的技术来查找和阻止现有的规避资源。该项目提出了研究和打击世界各地互联网审查的新方法，方法是采用与审查者本身类似的视角，并利用非审查国家的互联网基础设施。首先，该基础设施将用于测量“正常”的互联网流量，以便规避代理可以学习模仿什么，以伪装其活动并逃避检测。其次，该项目将利用这些发现和网络基础设施本身来创建新类型的代理服务器，这些代理服务器更难被审查机构阻止。从网络角度研究和打击审查制度，将有助于在审查者和规避工具开发者之间建立公平的竞争环境，最终支持互联网用户的自主权和全球信息获取，包括全世界数十亿生活在压制审查地区的人。这项工作将使用部署在（互联网服务提供商）和互联网交换点（IXP）在非审查国家，以衡量流行的互联网协议，以及如何在实践中使用，开发新的方法来检测新的和正在出现的审查形式，并探索如何使用ISP数据改进现有的代理和规避策略。在不断增长的折射网络部署的基础上，这项工作还研究了ISP视角可用于直接对抗审查的新方法，例如改进折射传输以更好地抵御审查机构的主动探测攻击，实施更难被审查机构检测和阻止的点对点代理协议，该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的评估被认为值得支持。影响审查标准。

项目成果

Open to a fault: On the passive compromise of TLS keys via transient errors

容易出现故障：通过瞬时错误被动破坏 TLS 密钥

• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium
• 作者: George Arnold Sullivan;Jackson Sippe;Nadia Heninger;Eric Wustrow
• 通讯作者: Eric Wustrow

How the Great Firewall of China Detects and Blocks Fully Encrypted Traffic

中国防火墙如何检测和阻止完全加密的流量

• 发表时间: 2023
• 期刊: USENIX Security Symposium
• 作者: Wu, Mingshi;Sippe, Jackson;Sivakumar, Danesh;Burg, Jack;Anderson, Peter;Wang, Xiaokang;Bock, Kevin;Houmansadr, Amir;Levin, Dave;Wustrow, Eric
• 通讯作者: Wustrow, Eric

Chasing Shadows: A security analysis of the ShadowTLS proxy

追逐阴影：ShadowTLS 代理的安全分析

• 发表时间: 2023
• 期刊: Free and Open Communications on the Internet
• 作者: Gaukas Wang;Anonymous;Jackson Sippe;Hai Chi;Eric Wustrow
• 通讯作者: Eric Wustrow