Adaptive Authoritarianism via Central Directives and Policy Experiments

通过中央指令和政策实验实现适应性威权主义

• 批准号: 2147892
• 负责人: Yuen Yuen Ang
• 金额: $ 42.9万
• 依托单位: Regents of the University of Michigan - Ann Arbor
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2022
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2022-06-01 至 2023-05-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2147892&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Adaptive; Authoritarianism; via; Central; Directives

Many autocracies rely solely on repression, patronage, and manipulated elections to rule. Other autocracies are distinguished by their adaptive qualities. As a top-down political system, autocracies with single-party states simultaneously issue commands from the top and selectively conduct policy experiments. How are the two actions linked? When do central authorities encourage experimentation, and when do they insist on strict enforcement of policies? This project examines how a single-party autocratic government issues a mixture of ambiguous and clear directives to guide policy experimentation, as well as the conditions under which different types of commands are issued. This project compiles an original dataset on both the central directives issued and the policy experiments conducted by a single-party government from 1978 to 2020. This research program will serve three key objectives. First, the project will produce the first and most comprehensive dataset to date on both commands and experiments in the single-party autocratic bureaucracy. This will shed empirical light on how adaptive governance works and has evolved in the adaptive authoritarian state, and whether or not the regime is likely to remain adaptable and resilient. Second, for comparative political scientists, the project will bring attention to and illuminate the neglected theme of adaptation in the study of authoritarianism. Third, the project will help advance the emerging field of adaptive governance in political economy and international development by demonstrating a testable theory of adaptive governance that goes beyond description and motivates new data collection.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

许多专制人物仅依靠压制，赞助和被操纵的选举来统治。其他专制人物的自适应品质都以其自适应素质而区别。作为自上而下的政治制度，拥有单党国家的独裁者同时从顶部发出命令，并有选择地进行政策实验。这两个动作如何链接？中央当局什么时候鼓励实验，什么时候他们坚持严格执行政策？该项目研究了单一专制政府如何发行模棱两可和清晰的指令来指导政策实验，以及发出不同类型命令的条件。该项目在1978年至2020年的单党政府进行的中央指令和政策实验上汇总了原始数据集。该研究计划将实现三个关键目标。首先，该项目将在单党独裁官僚机构中的两个命令和实验上生产第一个也是最全面的数据集。这将证明自适应治理如何运作并在适应性的专制国家发展，以及该政权是否有可能保持适应性和弹性。其次，对于比较政治科学家来说，该项目将引起人们的关注并阐明被忽视的专制主义研究主题。第三，该项目将通过证明可测试的适应性治理理论超越描述并激励新数据收集的可测试理论来帮助推进政治经济学和国际发展的新兴领域。该奖项反映了NSF的法定任务，并被认为是值得通过基金会的知识分子和更广泛影响的审查审查标准来通过评估来通过评估来支持的。