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Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Medium: Systematic Detection Of and Defenses Against Next-Generation Microarchitectural Attacks

Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Medium: Systematic Detection Of and Defenses Against Next-Generation Microarchitectural Attacks
协作研究:SaTC:核心:中:下一代微架构攻击的系统检测和防御
批准号:
2153936
负责人:
Caroline Trippel
金额:
$40.0万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Continuing Grant
财政年份:
2022
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
未结题
起止时间:
2022-10-01 至 2026-09-30

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中文摘要
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英文摘要
It is difficult to compute on sensitive data without inadvertently leaking it to the wrong party. Making matters worse, processor design significantly exacerbates this problem. Specifically, processors are made up of performance optimizations (called microarchitecture). Research has shown how a savvy attacker can manipulate microarchitecture to leak sensitive data. This project’s novelties are to design methodologies and tools for analyzing microarchitecture through a security lens: capturing its potential to leak sensitive data and providing actionable feedback to hardware designers and software writers to help avoid sensitive data breaches at both hardware design time and software run time. The project’s broader impact and importance is to develop a means for building efficient, secure processors—i.e., those where performance and security are not mutually exclusive.The project is broken into two synergistic thrusts. Thrust 1, Analysis, develops techniques for understanding and succinctly characterizing the information leakage potential of microarchitectural components (at various stages in their development) when they are integrated into a larger design. Thrust 2, Hardening, develops techniques for using said characterizations (specifications), e.g., generated by thrust 1, to derive software mitigations. In both thrusts, a major goal is to develop techniques that can be automated. Correspondingly, by the end of the project, the goal is to develop and disseminate a complete end-to-end prototype framework that can be used alongside traditional hardware design flows to 1) enable security-efficiency co-design by hardware engineers and 2) protect programs when run on previously analyzed microarchitectures.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.
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CAREER: Scalable Assurance via Verifiable Hardware-Software Contracts
  • 批准号:
    2236855
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $57.5万
  • 财政年份:
    2023
  • 负责人:
    Caroline Trippel
  • 依托单位:
Collaborative Research: CISE: Large: Cross-Layer Resilience to Silent Data Corruption
  • 批准号:
    2321489
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $218.75万
  • 财政年份:
    2023
  • 负责人:
    Caroline Trippel
  • 依托单位:
FMitF: Track II: Scaling Formal Hardware Security Verification with CheckMate from Research to Practice
  • 批准号:
    2017863
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $10.0万
  • 财政年份:
    2020
  • 负责人:
    Caroline Trippel
  • 依托单位:
国内基金
海外基金
Research on Quantum Field Theory without a Lagrangian Description
  • 批准号:
    24ZR1403900
  • 项目类别:
    省市级项目
  • 资助金额:
    --
  • 批准年份:
    2024
  • 负责人:
    SATOSHI NAWATA
  • 依托单位:
Cell Research
Cell Research
Cell Research (细胞研究)